Virtue Ethics

American Philosophical Quarterly, 1990

THE past fifteen years have witnessed a dramatic resurgence of philosophical interest in the vir? tues. The charge that modern philosophical thought neglects the virtues (Becker 1975, Von Wright 1963, Taylor in French, Wettstein, and Uehling 1988), once apposite, is by now outmoded; and the calls for a renewed investigation of virtue and virtue ethics are being answered from many quarters. What has been missing to date is any systematic guide to the plethora of issues, charges, claims, and counter-claims raised in recent work on the ...

Critics of virtue ethics have argued that its focus on character rather than action, as well as its rejection of universal rules of right action renders virtue ethics unable to shed much light on the question of what ought and ought not to be done in specific situations. According to them, this explains why so few attempts have been made to apply virtue theory to specific moral questions. In this paper I aim to go some way towards developing a version of virtue theory that satisfies four constraints that applied ethics places upon moral theory: (1) the requirement that it present standards of right action; (2) a sensitivity to the complexity of moral life in multicultural and pluralistic societies; (3) an acceptance of the principle of universalisability as a necessary property of an ethical theory, and (4) the provision of a non-egoistic justification and explanation of universal rules and principles.

The paper reviews the history of applied ethics and applied virtue ethics in particular, before advancing to methodological issues and to a broad survey of recent work in applied areas of environmental virtue ethics, virtue jurisprudence, aretaic medical ethics, professional ethics, educational theory, civic virtue and deliberative democracy, and philosophy of love and sex. The paper concludes with reflections on the vibrancy of contemporary work in applied virtue ethics, along with discussion of prospects and challenges.

Korean Journal of Ethics, 2016

Since Anscombe’s seminal essay “Modern Moral Philosophy (1958),” which asks us to restore the concept of virtues in moral discussions, virtue ethicists have strived either to reform the ancient Greek tradition of virtue cultivation for achieving happiness or to construct new virtue ethical systems based on modern philosophical literature, such as Hume’s and Nietzsche’s thoughts on virtues. Broadly examining the current spectrum of Aristotelian, Humean, and Nietzschean virtue ethical theories, this article argues that in order to develop virtue theories tailored to our contemporary times, virtue ethicists equally opt to dispense with the proper principles of defining virtue, which have been emphasized by the original philosophers. Given that such principles reflect the essences of their thoughts regarding the virtues of their periods, lacking the principles for defining virtue attests to the reduced practical applicability of virtue ethics to the moral problems in modern-day contemporary societies.

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 1997

In his "primer" on virtue ethics Steven Duncan attempts an interesting synthesis. He states that "there has been no full scale attempt to reconstruct morality . . . on the basis of an ethics of the virtues" [1]. He shoulders this heavy undertaking, hoping "to present a credible alternative to the other great traditions in ethics" [1]. For his new synthesis he draws on the natural law theory of Grisez and Finnis as well as the AristotelianThomistic theory of the virtues. This "modern" theory he hopes will withstand the scrutiny of contemporary criticism.

Ethical Explorations: Moral Dilemmas in a Universe of Possibilities, 2023

"We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit."-Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics "To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order; to put the nation in order, we must first put the family in order; to put the family in order, we must first cultivate our personal life; we must first set our hearts right."-Confucius, The Great Learning In this chapter, you'll embark on an exploration of virtue ethics, an approach that seeks to answer the fundamental questions, "What does it mean to be a good person? And how can I become one?" Virtue ethics diverges from other moral theories by focusing on the character of the moral agent rather than the act or the consequences. This approach views virtues-traits like wisdom, courage, kindness, and justice-as central to leading a morally good life.

2015

Introduction 1 Virtue, say the Stoics, is the finest of all things, outshining pleasure, wealth, and even life itself, as much as the sun outshines a candle. Indeed, it is the only good thing, and all of the things that we mistakenly value and pursue are merely indifferents, with no tendency to bring us happiness. Virtue is necessary for our happiness, and sufficient for our happiness, and indeed the sole component and contributor to our happiness. Whoever has virtue is perfectly happy, and indeed no less happy than Zeus himself. Alas, that none of us have it! For virtue is so demanding, requires such a pitch of perfection, that no human beings known to us-not even the founders of the Stoic school themselves-are truly virtuous. Not even close. We are all entirely vicious, and entirely wretched and miserable as a result. Nor is any of us more virtuous than another: all vicious people are equally vicious. It is possible to make progress towards virtue, the Stoics insist, but during this progress you are still thoroughly vicious and not even partly virtuous. The person making progress towards virtue is like a drowning man some distance beneath the surface of the sea: whether you are five feet underwater or five miles, you are drowning in either case. You might be getting closer to a place where you will be able to breathe, but that doesn't mean that you are more able to breathe as you get closer. So long as you are vicious, you are also insane, and enslaved, and an enemy of all mankind. Only the virtuous-whom the Stoics refer to as "Sages"-are sane, free, and friendly, and only they are wealthy, good-looking, and lovable. These are some of the extraordinary and counter-intuitive theses that the Stoics maintained about virtue. Considered in isolation from their theoretical context in the Stoic system as a whole, they look laughably implausible. When understood in light of the Stoics' broader commitments and theoretical framework, they do not (in my opinion) gain much plausibility, but they do at least acquire some philosophical motivation and rationale. Whatever philosophical interest the Stoic theory of virtue has, can only be seen through examining its role in the larger structure.

2021

Abstract: This paper analyzes some influential ideas in virtue ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre, in his work After Virtue, and Elizabeth Anscombe, in his controversial essay “Modern Moral Philosophy”, brought fresh ideas into moral philosophy of their time changing views on contemporary morality. They strongly influenced moral philosophers who then followed their ideas. The two philosophers criticized contemporary moral philosophies such as emotivism, utilitarianism, deontology. Elizabeth Anscombe criticized also the use of the concepts of duty and moral obligation in the absence of God as the context God had no place. For solving the quests of modern morality, both MacIntyre and Anscombe proposed that the only solution was the returning to ancient Aristotelian virtues

Since the publication of Anscombe’s famous paper “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958), virtue ethics has become a matter of discussion among scholars. At least four charges have been raised against virtue ethics, one of which is the charge of promoting undue enthusiasm regarding the moral fitness of human beings. This article explores the limits of virtue ethics with regard to the frailty of human virtuousness. After giving a report of the charges raised against virtue ethics from the perspective of empirical ethics, the author presents the idea of what he would like to call critical virtue ethics as seen by three Lutheran thinkers: Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Luther himself. He will demonstrate that the empirical contestation of virtue ethics shows a remarkable resemblance to insights found in Luther, Kant and Nietzsche. And finally, the writer draws tentative conclusions about the future of critical virtue ethics.

Covers a range of topics in contemporary reappropriations of virtue ethics, with brief historical background. Includes fundamental virtue theory (Aristotle, Aquinas, MacIntyre's After Virtue); contemporary contributions to virtue approaches (e.g. biblical virtue ethics, virtue and limits to moral agency) and applied virtue ethics. Both Protestant and Catholic approaches will be treated at length. Master's level students are welcome with department permission.