Realism and Rationality
Johan Gersel2011
My dissertation "Realism and Rationality" tries to defend the possibility of a realist conception of the world, that is, a conception of a world of mind-independent objects and states of affairs. I attempt to conserve the possibility of thought about a mind-independent world, without relinquishing the Fregean idea that meaning should be explained in terms of the knowledge of meaning possessed by a competent thinker. This semantic knowledge is what constitutes a thinker's understanding of the meaning of thought and language, and to the Fregean meaning should be explained in terms of our understanding of it. The dissertation, thus, investigates the possibility of a realist Fregean theory of meaning. Dummett has for years argued that the constraints that exist on an adequate Fregean theory of meaning force us to accept anti-realism. Our semantic knowledge can, according to him, at most be knowledge of verification-conditions, rather than truth-conditions. If this were indeed the case, the possible states of the world that we think about would be dependent on the nature of our epistemic capabilities. The world would be mind-dependent. The core of Dummett's attacks on realist theories of meaning is that he claims such theories are unable to account for what makes manifest the semantic knowledge that they attribute to thinkers. The typical response by the Fregean realist has been to argue that our knowledge of a realist semantic theory is made manifest by our acceptance of the validity of certain patterns of inference. Dummett has in return argued that only our use of a logic-free fragment of language is allowed to manifest our semantic knowledge, for otherwise we cannot justify deductive reasoning. In this dissertation I will trace these arguments. I will start out by considering how the Fregean should understand realism and anti-realism. Subsequently, I will present how I take realist and anti-realist theories of meaning to be structured. Following this, I will focus on the actual arguments against a realist Fregean theory of meaning. I will consider various possible responses and objections to these arguments. Ultimately, I will conclude that realism does face a genuine threat, but that this threat can be overcome by adopting a quite particular picture of experience, and a quite particular picture of how we are justified in our acceptance of classical logic as deductively valid. The role of the anti-realist antagonist will, as mentioned, be played by Dummett, whereas the protagonists will be Evans, Campbell, and to some degree McDowell. The major inspirations for the arguments of the dissertation are Dummett's "The Logical Basis of Metaphysics", Evan's "Varieties of Reference" and his "Things Without the Mind", as well as Campbell's "Reference and Consciousness". Resumé af "Realism and Rationality" [6] Resumé af "Realism and Rationality" Min afhandling "Realism and Rationality" forsøger at forsvare muligheden for, at vi kan taenke på realistisk verden, en verden af bevidsthedsuafhaengige genstande og sagforhold. Jeg forsøge at bevare muligheden for taenkning omkring en realistisk verden uden at give afkald på den Fregeanske idé, at mening skal forklares i kraft af den viden om mening som kompetente taenkere besidder. Denne semantiske viden er grundlaget for en taenkers forståelse af den mening som sprog og taenkning besidder, og i Fregeaneren's øjne skal mening forklares i kraft af vor forståelse af mening. Formålet med denne afhandling er derfor at undersøge muligheden for en realistisk Fregeansk meningsteori. Dummett har i mange år argumenteret for, at de begraensninger som en Fregeansk menings teori er underlagt tvinger os til at acceptere anti-realisme. Ifølge Dummett kan vores semantiske viden kun vaere viden om verifikationsbetingelser, og ikke sandhedsbetingelser. Hvis dette virkelig er tilfaeldet, så vil konsekvensen vaere, at vores epistemiske formåen begraenser de mulige tilstande som den verden vi kan taenke på kan vaere i. Verden ville i så fald vaere bevidsthedsafhaengig. Kernen af Dummetts angreb på realistiske meningsteorier er, at han mener, at sådanne teorier er ude af stand til at forklare hvad, der manifesterer en taenkers besiddelse af den semantiske viden, der bliver tilskrevet ham. Det typiske svar fra Fregeaneren har vaeret at haevde, at vores besiddelse af sådan viden er manifesteret i vores accept af validiteten af visse slutningsmønstre. Dummett har som modsvar haevdet, at medmindre vi ekskluderer vores accept af slutningsmønstre fra den adfaerd, som manifesterer vores besiddelse af semantisk viden, så kan vi aldrig begrunde klassisk logiks deduktive validitet. Denne afhandling vil følge disse argumenters rute. Jeg starter ud med at overveje hvordan Fregeaneren bør forstå realisme og anti-realisme. Dernaest beskriver jeg henholdsvis, hvordan en realistisk og en antirealistisk meningsteori er struktureret. Efterfølgende fokuserer jeg på de faktiske argumenter mod en realistisk Fregeansk meningsteori. Jeg gennemgår diverse modsvar og kritikker af disse argumenter. Jeg vil ultimativt konkludere, at realisten står over for en reel trussel. Min konklusion er dog, at denne trussel kan afvaerges, hvis vi accepterer et saerligt billede af erfaring, samt et bestemt billede af hvordan vi er begrundede i vores accept af klassisk logiks deduktive validitet. Rollen som anti-realist vil ikke overraskende blive spillet af Dummett. Realisterne på rollelisten er hovedsagligt Evans og Campbell og til en hvis grad McDowell. Hovedinspirationen bag argumenterne i denne afhandling er vaerker som Dummetts "The Logical Basis of Metaphysics", Evans' "Varieties of Reference" samt hans "Things Without the Mind", og Cambpells "Reference and Consciousness". 12 See among many places B148 in Kant ( ) 13 See again the "Analogies of Experience" in Kant (2003). 14 See page 53 in Strawson (1995) 15 See Stroud (1968) inferential patterns upon which his realism relies. Thereby, the realist can stave off the second prong of Dummett's anti-realist argument. This means that we are allowed to include the inferential patterns of a simple theory among the basis resources upon which we construct a theory of meaning, and thus realism and the possibility of thought about a mind-independent world is conserved. The structure of my dissertation will be the following: The first three chapters will fulfill the first part required by a defense of realism. It will present the structure of a theory of meaning that allows for realist thought. In doing so, I will also define the notion of mind-independence and display the contrasting structure of an anti-realist theory of meaning. The final four chapters will be concerned with arguing that inferential patterns as valid. In the second part of chapter one, I will present what I take to be the proper way to understand realism and mind-independence in light of the general approach to meaning adopted. Chapter 2 and 3 concern themselves with the dual task of elaborating on the structure of our theory of meaning and explaining what it is for a concept to refer to a mind-independent object or state of affairs. Chapter 2 will focus on what it is to grasp propositions about a mind-independent state of affairs. Chapter 3 will focus on what it is to grasp a concept of a mind-independent object. I find that the best way of explaining these issues is by elaborating on the different structures that realist and anti-realist theories of meaning possess. These will all along be defined in light of the definition of mind-independence given in chapter 1. These two chapters will thus gradually elaborate on our theory of meaning, and whenever the realist and anti-realist theory of meaning part ways the difference in their structures will be elucidated. This means that by the end of chapter 3, we should have reached the point where we have quite a clear grasp of what type of meaning the realist and the anti-realist ascribes to our concepts. Chapter 4 will concern itself with a discussion of whether the realist theory of meaning can be defended, if, as suggested, we take the basic resources for our theory to consist in the conceptual capacities possessed by those who grasp meaning. It will be argued that there are two ways in which such a defense can be accomplished. Either one accepts a modest theory of meaning along the lines of that advocated by John [17] McDowell 17 . Alternatively one must include our capacity to reason according to certain inferential patterns among the conceptual capacities in terms of which we explain meaning; this could be along the lines of including our grasp of a simple theory as suggested by Evans and Campbell. Chapter 5 will provide a brief detour from the main thrust of the argument. In that chapter, I will suggest that McDowell's solution is a coherent defense of realism, but has the flaw of being too modest. Thus, it does provide a possible avenue for the committed realist to take, but I think it should be chosen as the last option, if at all. Chapter 6 will present Dummett's argument as to why if we include our acceptance of the inferential patterns central to realism within the basic resources from which our theory of meaning takes it outset, then we cannot make sense of ourselves as justified in our acceptance of those inferential patterns as valid. Dummett's argument is meant to be an exhaustive argument to this effect. What I will argue in chapter 7 is that there is a possible source of justification for those inferential patterns that he has overlooked, namely experience. I will draw heavily upon the conception of experiential justification that Campbell has presented in defense of his preferred picture of demonstrative judgement. I will argue that experience conceived in this way can fulfill the needed role of justifying the inferential patterns constitutive of realism, thus, we can defend the mind-independence of reality against Dummett's charges. In a sense my...
