How to define consciousness--and how not to define consciousness

Routledge eBooks, 2016

Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical commitments (about the nature of consciousness, mind and world) have intruded into definitions. Similar problems can arise in the way a "conscious process" is defined, potentially obscuring the way that conscious phenomenology actually relates to its neural correlates and antecedent causes in the brain, body and external world. Once a definition of "consciousness" is firmly grounded in its phenomenology, investigations of its ontology and its relationships to entities, events and processes that are not conscious can begin, and this may in time transmute the meaning (or sense) of the term. As our scientific understanding of these relationships deepen, our understanding of what consciousness is will also deepen. A similar transmutation of meaning (with growth of knowledge) occurs with basic terms in physics such as "energy", and "time." 1 I have given a detailed critique of this aspect of Dennett's position that I do not have space to repeat here (see Velmans, , 2009 chapter 5) chapter 5); see also Zahavi (2007), Beenfeldt (2008). 2 See Gallagher, 2007, Zahavi, 2007 for recent reviews of European phenomenological approaches. Note however that classical Indian conclusions about the nature of consciousness arise largely from altered conscious states consequent on prolonged periods of meditation, and this can be an additional source of confusion when comparing Eastern and Western understanding of everyday conscious phenomenology. The pure, contentless consciousness said to be experienced in such states is, in various writings, thought to underly all of Nature, which makes this a claim about what in the West is sometimes referred to as "the ground of being" or, in Kantian terms, "the thing in itself," rather than a claim about the forms of "phenomenal consciousness," that are more usually investigated in modern consciousness studies.

I here describe meanings (or aspects) attributed to the term consciousness, extracted from the literature and from recent online discussions. Forty such meanings were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function or about experience; some overlapped but others were apparently mutually exclusive -and this list is by no means exhaustive. Most can be regarded as expressions of authors' views about the basis of consciousness, or opinions about the significance of aspects of its contents. The prospects for reaching any single, agreed, theory independent definition of consciousness thus appear remote. However, much confusion could be avoided if authors were always to specify which aspects of consciousness they refer to when using the term. An example is outlined of how this can be done (using a 'PE-SE' framework).

About forty meanings attributed to the term consciousness can be identified and categorized based on functions and experiences.

Journal of Nonlocality, 2014

In spite of millennia of introspection, research and debate, there is still no compelling evidence for any single model of consciousness . Nor is there agreement on how to define consciousness, what constitutes a rigorous model of consciousness, and what research methods are most appropriate or productive when investigating consciousness. Current science relies on biological models of brain function as metaphors for describing what consciousness does and cannot confirm postulated causal relationships between discrete functional brain states and specific characteristics or subjective "states" of consciousness. The absence of a strong conceptual framework for thinking about consciousness, together with intrinsic limitations of contemporary research methods and technologies, have resulted in numerous un-testable hypotheses concerning the general nature of consciousness and a paralyzing lack of consensus on research priorities and methods , despite the fact that "mind" and "brain" have supplanted genetics as the next great scientific challenge for the international community -see the Human Brain Project in the EU and the BRAIN Initiative in the US (http://www.nih.gov/science/brain).

This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, implies that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of mind, clinical psychology, and other related fields ultimately refer to a single natural phenomenon, analysed under four general aspects. The proposed taxonomy will, it is hoped, possess sufficient clarity to serve as a sound theoretical framework for further scientific studies, and to count as a significant step in the direction of a properly formulated unified concept of consciousness.

Studia Humana, Volume 8:4 (2019), pp. 27—33, 2019

This article demonstrates that certain issues of philosophy of mind can only be explained via strict observance of the logical law of identity, that is, use of the term "consciousness" in only one meaning. Based on the understanding of consciousness as space in which objects distinguished by the subject are represented, this article considers problems such as the fixation of the consciousness level, correlation between consciousness and thought, between the internal and the external, and between consciousness and the body. It demonstrates the insufficiency of the reactive conception of action for the resolution of the hard problem of consciousness and the necessity of a transition to an active paradigm in which many issues in philosophy of mind would be formulated differently.

2011

In this work, I examine the traditional theories of mind and consciousness. I present the arguments that support them and the presuppositions that hold them. A critical analysis of these theories will show that they all fail for apparently different reason. I will also provide the standard arguments against them. I maintain that this failure is the result of a fundamental presupposition that they all share, namely substance ontology. The standard causality view, which presents the other source of this problem is the direct consequence of assuming a substance ontology. The result of these assumptions is to render consciousness impotent or over-determining. As a result, consciousness must be reduced to some other phenomenon, eliminated, or accepted as impotent. Moreover, theses view cannot really distinguish between mind and consciousness. The position maintained in this work is to abandon the ontological primacy of substance ontology and replace it with process ontology and add emerg...

The subject of consciousness overlaps with various fields of knowledge, and is perceived as one of the more complex and difficulty subjects of study and research. The draft of the attached article is an attempt to provide a response to some of the big questions accompanying the subject: the delimitation of the term ‘consciousness’ in relation to closely-related terms; the function of consciousness; consciousness and subjective experience; consciousness and the ‘mind-body’ problem, and more. The article presents a model of consciousness, which we believe can serve as a frame of reference for existing research and a source of information for new studies. We are well aware that the model presented here is very different from those which currently exist in the professional literature. Before submitting the article for publication, we thought it wise to receive comments and feedback, recommendations for future reading, etc. from scholars and researchers dealing with the subject of consciousness. This paper is part of project that include, later on, at least two related issues: "The Languages of Man and Animals - Homologies and Uniqueness" and "The Emergence and Function of Emotion and Related Terms"

Journal of Social Sciences, 2021

Contemporary science, in recent decades, reflects intensely on the phenomenon of consciousness. This fact is due to the accelerated development of cognitive sciences, biological and physical sciences, neuroscience, which have achieved certain successes in researching the problem of mind-body, consciousness. However, what is strictly required is the issue of the possibility of a scientific theory of consciousness, which would apply a new research methodology. The most recent approaches in this direction substantiate the need for research from a phenomenological structural perspective, which explains consciousness as a phenomenon determined by the subquantum level. Structural-phenomenological theory holds that this level is a profound reality regulated by specific principles and laws that make consciousness possible.