2004, Central Asia-Caucasus …
Unresolved security issues in the South Caucasus have a direct and negative impact on the security interests of NATO and the U.S. They impede access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, threaten the security of needed energy resources as well as access to friendly allies in the Wider Middle East, and create an environment of instability that Russia can both exploit and perpetuate. Unresolved security issues there exercise a decisive and adverse effect on democratic reform, market-based development, and overall prosperity across the South Caucasus. Continuing shortfalls in these areas threaten to turn the region into a haven for transnational organized crime and even terrorism. This paper argues that the national security interests of NATO and its members in the South Caucasus, especially concerning the war on terrorism, NATO's obligations in Central Asia and Afghanistan, and the role of the Alliance in the Wider Middle East, have grown to such a degree that its interests would be significantly affected negatively by instability and unrest in the South Caucasus. The individual and collective interests of NATO members therefore suggest that a larger role of the Alliance in strengthening the security of the South Caucasus is warranted. This paper does not propose the inclusion of South Caucasus countries as NATO members, which is unlikely under any circumstances for many years. But it nonetheless considers NATO to be the sine qua non for security in the South Caucasus. It argues that the most promising, and indeed sole, means of redressing the "security deficit" in the South C aucasus is through the gradual extension of the widest possible range of NATO programs into the area. In short, it shifts the focus from the question of "To Be or Not To Be?" with respect to NATO membership to one of how to select, develop, and compound NATO programs that will, together and increasingly over time, transform the regional security picture overall. By this point the region will also have evolved to a point at, or near, the doorstep of both NATO and the EU. This paper therefore suggests that NATO, in its June 2004 Istanbul summit, asserts that the security of the countries of the South Caucasus is an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Specific NATO initiatives holding the most promise for enhancing South Caucasus security include the following: Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO vi vi 1) Exploring the possibility of creating a special format for NATO's dialogue with the three nations of the South Caucasus, on the model of those set up for Ukraine and Russia; 2) Exploring the possibility of creating a NATO Defense College in the South Caucasus, similar in concept to that of the Baltic Defense College (BALTDEFCOL) and building on its experience. 3) Greatly enhancing the number of regional officers receiving training through PfP in order to foster a cadre of officers benefiting from contact with Western militaries that, in turn, are able to share their knowledge and expertise with colleagues; 4) Raising the profile of the region in NATO's own hierarchy by appointing a political/military specialist as an advisor to the Secretary-General on the region; creating a "Security Working Group" under NATO in order to optimize security assistance efforts; and prioritizing the development of expertise amongst NATO's planning staffs on the IPAPs of the regional states. While this paper proposes an a la carte approach to NATO involvement as most promising to the interests of South Caucasus countries, it asserts that such an approach is impossible without a focused and strategic approach to the South Caucasus as a whole on the part of NATO. Central to such an approach is that the definition of NATO and U.S. interests and goals must be carried out initially without regard for Russian responses. Russia itself is in flux and its policies a half decade hence may differ from those of today, especially as they relate to former Soviet territories. If NATO and the U.S. demonstrate that their policies in the South Caucasus are compatible with Russia's legitimate security concerns (as opposed to political aspirations), and can even be supportive of them, it enhances the possibility that Russians not committed to zerosum thinking may gain influence in Moscow. Clarity by NATO in defining its own strategy, directness in articulating it, and flexibility in its execution are the hallmarks of any future success. The point of conjunction between U.S. and Russian long-term interests in the South Caucasus, and also those of Turkey and Iran, is the strengthening of sovereignties there, the progress of reform, and the development of sustainable modern economies that take advantage of regional complementarities. The policies set forth in this paper advance these objectives by creating a web of relationships and structures that strengthen the essential prerequisite: regional security. As such, they are not directed against anyone.