Agility, focus, and convergence: The future of command and control

2004

major tenet of command and control is centralized direction and decentralized execution. But there has been steady movement in the last decade toward increased centralization on all levels. This trend should be arrested and the German-style task-oriented command and control from top to bottom adopted. Otherwise the Armed Forces could find themselves resembling the former Soviet military and paying a heavy price in the quest for absolute certainty and control. Centralization Authority is concentrated in a single commander and headquarters under centralized (order-oriented) command and control. One actor determines objectives and directs their accomplishment. Centralization ensures unity of effort through unity of command, facilitates decisionmaking, offers effective use of forces and assets, eliminates uncertainty, and maximizes Milan N. Vego teaches in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College and is the author of Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas.

Military Cyber Affairs, 2019

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) declared cyberspace as an operational domain in 2011. The DoD subsequently formed US Cyber Command and the Cyber Mission Force to conduct operations to achieve national and military objectives in and through cyberspace. Since that time, the DoD has implemented and evolved through multiple command and control (C2) structures for cyberspace operations, derived from traditional military C2 doctrine, to achieve unity of effort across both the global cyberspace domain and with military operations in the physical domains (land, sea, air, and space). The DoD continues to struggle to adapt its C2 methods from the physical domains to the cyber domain. Applying traditional military C2 constructs to the cyberspace domain leads to several problems due to the uniqueness of cyberspace from the other domains. Cyberspace presents a very different operational environment than the physical domains, where time and space are compressed. In this paper, we de...

2011

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2006

Command and control (C2) comprises those policies (rules) and mechanisms (services), implemented through human and synthetic means, required for the effective governance of an enterprise. An enterprise is an arbitrary unit of organization tasked with governance of a mission. We present an enterprise command and control (EC2) framework designed to provide DOD enterprises, exemplified by a Joint Task Force (JTF), with shared network-accessible C2 services. A JTF is DOD's designated unit of organization responsible for mission-specific joint operations. JTF EC2 includes a precise definition of enterprise, an associated enterprise command structure (ECS) and a specific set of control processing services (CPS). The proposed framework is consistent with the DOD's stated goal of migrating to network-centric (i.e., GIG-mediated) operations (NCO). In support of collaboration in jointly managed activities, agile JTF enterprises benefit from serviceoriented capabilities along their vertical command (accountability) axes and along their horizontal production (logistics) axes, allowing them to support a wider range of NCO functions while simultaneously participating in and influencing behavior of multiple communities of interest (COIs).

2009

The International C2 Journal was created in 2006 at the urging of an international group of command and control professionals including individuals from academia, industry, government, and the military. The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP, of the U.S. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, or OASD-NII) responded to this need by bringing together interested professionals to shape the purpose and guide the execution of such a journal. Today, the Journal is overseen by an Editorial Board comprising representatives from many nations. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency.

I will be presenting my research paper 'Knowledge Representation to Capture & Retrieve Experiential Learning in Military Settings' at the ICCRTS-KSCO 2017: 22ND INTERNATIONAL C2 RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY SYMPOSIUM / 9TH KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS FOR COALITION OPERATIONS CONFERENCE 6th-8th November in L.A.

Journal of Battlefield Technology, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2005

This paper addresses the question "what is the Science of Command and Control (C2)?" by first defining the three key perspectives that cover that which comprises C2, and by examining the system-level properties of these three perspectives in combination. The paper then analyses the concept of a 'science' of C2 by extracting the core components of a science: an organised body of knowledge and the process of acquiring that body of knowledge. In addition to these, the paper recognises the role that the application of the 'science' plays in advancing the state of understanding of C2. The paper then uses the definition of the science of C2 to formulate a general matrix for understanding C2 research programs. The paper closes by studying examples of extant research placed in this matrix. The result is a comprehensive definition of the science of C2 and a tool for understanding C2 research.

Defence Studies, 2007

The Australian Defence Force's Future Warfighting Concept 1 explains that Network Centric Warfare (NCW) "…seeks to…generate precision and combat power through shared situational awareness, clear procedures, and the information connectivity needed to synchronise our actions to meet the commander's intent". Command and control (C2) is central to NCW because it provides the unifying concept of commander's intent. C2's role within NCW lies in the human dimension, which is all about helping Australian Defence Force (ADF) commanders make better decisions. It is C2's ability to translate information into actionable knowledge that helps commanders improve their situational awareness, distribute information and intelligence appropriately, gain timely access to expert advice, and create an optimal headquarters structure 2, 3. An important requirement for translating information into actionable knowledge is an approach to C2 referred to as "power to the edge" 4. Power to the edge, in combination with agility, is essential to focussing resources and activities so as to produce effective and timely combat power. For the ADF this means evolving from a top-down process 5. This paper examines key assumptions about C2 that appear in the NCW literature. Based on data collected from over a 100 interviews, conducted across all ranks and Services, with ADF personnel who have served in the recent conflict in the Middle East, it seeks to determine-whether a new C2 in the form of a furthering of decentralised control is, in fact, emerging as a result of information technology, and-if so, is this new C2 better translating information into actionable knowledge and thereby improving agility and speed of response? The data gives mixed evidence of whether a new C2 is emerging as a result of the information age. It suggests that some elements of a new C2 are definitely emerging; however, these are not due solely to information age technology. This paper provides an overview of the evidence behind this claim. Data relating to C2 arrangements and processes in the NCW environment are presented, alongside data on the decisionmaking processes that these recently deployed personnel experienced. Other related data are also presented: the personnel's perceptions of the rise of 'informal' C2 arrangements, the challenges associated with C2 in a multinational context, and their experiences of flexibility and adaptiveness, uncertainty, and autonomy and empowerment. The paper also discusses the implications of these findings for training and future C2 research and practice.

2015

The Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) is a versatile military organization, designed to effectively handle missions as diverse as expeditionary warfare, air warfare, tactical ballistic missile defense, and maritime interdiction operations. Different ESG organizations have allocated command in novel ways, each affecting organizational dynamics differently. The Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) program has been using model based-experimentation to investigate the congruence of organizational structure with mission requirements. The ESG provides an opportunity to apply the principles developed in previous A2C2 research to this rapidly evolving operational organization. ESG, Amphibious Squadron, and Marine Expeditionary Unit staffs were interviewed, and observations were made in the command center and during daily battle rhythm meetings. This led to insight regarding

2006

The Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) is a versatile military organization, designed to effectively handle missions as diverse as expeditionary warfare, air warfare, tactical ballistic missile defense, and maritime interdiction operations. Different ESG organizations have allocated command in novel ways, each affecting organizational dynamics differently. The Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) program has been using model based-experimentation to investigate the congruence of organizational structure with mission requirements. The ESG provides an opportunity to apply the principles developed in previous A2C2 research to this rapidly evolving operational organization. ESG, Amphibious Squadron, and Marine Expeditionary Unit staffs were interviewed, and observations were made in the command center and during daily battle rhythm meetings. This led to insight regarding questions of interest for the Navy, such as the allocation of Composite Warfare Command (CWC) roles, the inclusion of an ISR coordinator, and the division of tasks under both CWC and Joint Amphibious Doctrine-especially as these affect the Commander of the Amphibious Squadron (CPR). This information will form a basis to increase the fidelity of the representations and processes used in models, to create realistic scenarios, and to develop experimental designs with which to examine relevant issues of organizational structure. Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) Over the past decade, the Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) research program, sponsored by the Office of Naval Research (ONR), has focused on examining command structures for future Naval, Joint and Combined forces. As the primary adversaries of the United States change from Cold War monoliths to smaller asymmetric threats, new C2 structures need to be explored which are ideally suited to meeting new challenges. The charter of the A2C2 program is to help develop these organizational structures, structures that are adaptable in the face of new enemies and new missions.

1992

2006

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2007

: Evidence from recent operations suggests that current joint and USSOCOM doctrine are producing command and control (C2) arrangements between conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) that are dysfunctional at the tactical level and counter-productive in achieving operational objectives. Operations Restore Hope, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom each reveal the dangers of attempting to integrate C2 between SOF and CF at the operational level, but failing to do so at the tactical level. To address current threats effectively, the U.S. military would be wise to reverse this approach. In the global campaign against ideological extremist insurgency, SOF best leverage their counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare skills by focusing on Phase 0 shaping operations in the arc of instability. In counterinsurgency environments such as Afghanistan and Iraq, priority of mission should go to CF efforts, and joint force ...

This paper presents the detailed results of a thought experiment in Network-Centric