Introduction: The Problem of Selves and Persons in Psychology

Scientists and practitioners alike invest in theorizing the self in psychology, but prioritize differently theoretical and practical objectives. Theorizing the self differs also when mapped onto the ‘science versus art’ debate, viewed historically and with reference to the philosophy of science. Jung's model of the psyche is compared and contrasted with social cognitive models of self-concept. Finally, some implications of social constructionism are considered.

This article offers solutions to two historically unresolved subject matter problems in psychology: (1) What is a "person"? And, (2) what is the "self"? Part 1 of the paper presents Peter Ossorio's (2006) Descriptive Psychologically-based answer to the first of these questions, an answer that comprises a paradigm case formulation of the concept "person" itself, as well as a parametric analysis for describing individual persons. Part 2 of the paper presents a new solution to the second question. The solution is a disarmingly simple one in which "self" or "I", consistent with actual usage, means simply and essentially "this person" -- this holistically considered, embodied, conscious, deliberate actor that I intend when I use the terms "I" or "me" or "myself" -- as opposed to "that person", the specific individual I intend when I say "he" or "she" or "herself". The ways in which this formulation (a) uniquely possesses an empirical grounding, (b) avoids many historical problems that have arisen in trying to delineate the nature of the self, and (3) integrates the field of self psychology, are all demonstrated. The article provides logical and empirical arguments in support of both of its formulations, as well as for the importance of the science of psychology possessing such formulations of its core subject matter.

1990

VIEWS OF THE SELF AND THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS SEPTEMBER 1990 THOMAS M. RAVENS, B. A. , DARTMOUTH COLLEGE M.E., THAYER SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING M. A. , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews This thesis examines some views of the self and investigates the ethical implications of these views. The working hypothesis is that our ethical principles are conditioned by what we hold to be the nature of the self. My investigation of the self concerns the question of whether there is a metaphysical self which functions as the subject of human experience, that is, which thinks, feels and acts. I conclude that there is no such self. Next, I investigate how our thinking about persons and our moral principles are affected by the denial of the self. I conclude that some principles of moral responsibility such as promise keeping are unaffected for they only presuppose psychological continuity. However, principles of distributive justice may be affected in scope and

2000

Ever since William James 1 categorized different senses of the self at the end of the 19th century, philosophers and psychologists have refined and expanded the possible variations of this concept. James' inventory of physical self, mental self, spiritual self, and the ego has been variously supplemented. Neisser, for example, suggested important distinctions between ecological, interpersonal, extended, private and conceptual aspects of self 2. More recently, when reviewing a contentious collection of essays from various disciplines, Strawson found an overabundance of delineations between cognitive, embodied, fictional and narrative selves, among others 3. It would be impossible to review all of these diverse notions of self in this short review. Instead, I have focused on several recently developed approaches that promise the best exchange of ideas between philosophy of mind and the other cognitive sciences and that convey the breadth of philosophical analysis on this topic. These approaches can be divided into two groups that are focused, respectively, on two important aspects of self-the 'minimal' self and the 'narrative' self (see Glossary).

Self as Self The word " self " means complete individuality. It can also refer to one's character, one's nature or one's interest. The term concept is an abstract idea which gives meaning to what it represents. Therefore, self-concept is how we define our self, based on the characteristic we know and the values we hold to ourselves. These values and characteristics are linked to various aspects of our self-concept such as self,

Psychological Studies, 2019

The concept of self is a multi-faceted one that is used by different theorists in different ways. In this paper, we present an overview of the dominant themes and images that structure conceptions of self as used by psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and other scholars. In order for concepts like self and identity to be meaningful, it is necessary that we compare and clarify their various uses, identify the different aspects of experience that they are intended to illuminate, and seek to consolidate them in ways that are coherent and integrative. In this paper, we identify four broad models of self in psychology: self as inner life, social conceptions of identity, relational conceptions of self and conceptions of self based on group identifications. We offer this typology as an initial framework for coordinating different conceptions of self and identity.

Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd edition

Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2010

What is the self? Philosophers and psychologists pursuing an answer to this question immediately find themselves immersed in a host of questions about mind and body, subject and object, object and process, the homunculus, free will, self-awareness, and a variety of other puzzling matters that largely have eluded satisfying theoretical explication. In this paper I argue that some of this difficulty is attributable to our implicit, phenomenologically-based belief that the self is unitary entity-i.e., a singular ''I" that remembers, chooses, thinks, plans, and feels. In this article I address the question of what the self is by reviewing research, conducted primarily with neuropsychological participants, that converges on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than many previous treatments of the topic have assumed. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised by cognitive and neurological disorders, other aspects-for instance, semantic trait summaries-appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that there is no single, unified ''I" to be found. Rather, I argue ''the" self may best be construed as a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems.  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cogn Sci 2010 1 172-183 WHAT IS THE SELF? T he phenomenology is universal. Each of us has the experience of a unitary self, an 'I' that remembers, chooses, thinks, plans, and feels. Yet it has been notoriously difficult to provide an account of just what this thinking, feeling, remembering, and planning entity is. Gordon Allport expressed this concern in the following famous quote: 'Who is the I that knows the bodily me, who has an image of myself and a sense of identity over time, who knows that I have propriate strivings? I know all these things, and what is more, I know that I know them. But who is it who has this perspectival grasp?.. . It is much easier to feel the self than to define the self.' (see Ref 1; p. 128

Many diverse theories and accounts, scattered across different disciplines, have already been proposed about self and its nature, but the self has still remained ambiguous without a clear definition universally accepted by the majority of social scientists or philosophers and it is worth understanding why. In this regard, there are some problems that need to be addressed, including the multidisciplinarity, polysemy, diversity, similarity, multi-referentiality, linguistic and semantic issues, and so forth. Also, at issue is the improper use of the term ʹselfʹ, that is a serious oversight putting the concept into a state of increasing confusion. The primary aim of the present study is to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the self and to identify its various meanings already used in psychology, philosophy, sociology, and neuroscience. Another is to provide some plausible explanations for why the self has become so problematic, and also to shed light on the obstacles to achieve a general consensus on its definition. In the end, possible solutions for dealing with the problem are suggested.