Philosophy: A Beginner's Guide," by Peter Cave

Philosophy, 1997

2012

(paperback). Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall The vast majority of introductory volumes about Wittgenstein's thought that continue to regularly appear almost month by month, are members of some particular series or other about the notable figures of the past, which most philosophy publishers now have on their lists. Series of of this kind with titles like 'Famous Thinkers', 'Great Minds', or 'Philosophical Guides', etc. are, generally speaking, directed mostly towards undergraduates with the aim of providing some form of professional guidance to their interpretations of the major works of philosophy. It has become an accepted fact that Wittgenstein, along with figures like Aristotle, Hume and Kant, deserves a place in any series of this kind, regardless of the relevance which his thinking, early or late, may be thought by many to have for 'current debate' within what would be broadly regarded as the analytic tradition. It is surely worth asking why Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin, who are often allied with Wittgenstein as 'philosophers of ordinary language' in the most general terms, and whose work within that grouping is sometimes regarded as being of equal importance to his own, have failed to obtain a similar role in philosophical publishing. Leaving aside the widespread interest in the life of Wittgenstein as an individual, they by comparison have come to be seen, rightly or wrongly, as insular figures who do not deserve the important historical status to be granted to only a select few. As an illustration of this point, Martin Gustaffson, in his introduction to a new volume of essays on the work of Austin (1), reminds us that this is the first collection of its kind for almost forty years. A new book about Ryle is now also long overdue (2). The contrast with Wittgenstein is stark. Taking, for example, the publisher of the present book under review, Continuum has a considerable number of Wittgenstein volumes in a series entitled 'Studies in British Philosophy'. There is at least one Wittgenstein book in a series on 'Philosophy and Theology'. Chon Tejedor is the author of 'Starting with Wittgenstein' in another series. There are 1 two books in a series of 'Readers Guides' to philosophical works, one on the Tractatus by Roger White and another on the Philosophical Investigations by Arif Ahmed, not to mention at least one book, on Wittgenstein & D.Z. Phillips, which is not a member of any particular series at all. The present book forms part of yet another wide-ranging series of 'Guides for the Perplexed' which tackles not only the thinking of individual philosophers, but also topics within philosophy, theology, politics, and in human life more generally, which are described by the publisher as 'especially challenging' (cover blurb). There is inevitably going to be a considerable overlap between the issues covered in the various introductory volumes on Wittgenstein which belong to these different groups, just as their different authors are more than likely to have some differences of opinion, integral to the subject, over substantial questions of exegesis and interpretation. This is all to the good. Mark Addis's book is described on the cover as 'An excellent overview of all facets of Wittgenstein's work' by one reviewer, Brian Bix of Minnesota, and is provided with an even more glowing presentation from the publisher: we are invited to agree that 'This is the most thorough and fully engaged account of Wittgenstein available-an invaluable resource...' This would be a strong claim to make about any volume on Wittgenstein, and it is hardly surprising if the reader should find that in this case it fails to be established, not because there is anything especially wrong with the book itself, but just because in a field which is often regarded as saturated, the same ground has already been covered equally well, if not in some cases rather better than it is covered here. This opinion need not be revised, as the publisher's blurb suggests, because the book includes a treatment of Wittgenstein's contribution to aesthetics and philosophy of religion, subjects admittedly not normally encountered in elementary accounts of his philosophy. Certainly, although the space allocated to these issues amounts to all of 12 pages, Addis does provide a good general description of the terrain, and mentions most of the associated issues. The relevant chapter entitled 'Epistemology, Religion and Aesthetics' is the final one in the book. The account of religion begins by remarking (Ibid., 142) that Wittgenstein once claimed to see every problem from a religious

Philosophical Investigations, 2008

International Philosophical Quarterly, 1978

Many philosophers believe that no problems remain in expounding Wittgenstein's Investigations. What he said, it is thought, is clear enough. The question to be faced now is whether what he said can stand up to contemporary criticism. Alternatively, others believe that what is needful is to make explicit the theory of meaning which Wittgenstein merely hinted at in his "album of sketches". On this view, genius though he was, Wittgenstein was laying the foundations for a properly worked out theory of criteria1 semantics. An Oxfordized Wittgenstein is on the horizon, if not already with us. Finch and Hallett try to rid us of these approaches to Wittgenstein. Hallett draws attention to Wittgenstein's resolution: "I fight continually whether successfully or not I do not knowagainst the tendency in my

The seven essays collected in this volume address the sequence of sections §§ 1-88 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. They are intended to help the reader find her way through the forest of issues treated in this first sequence. They examine some of the ways in which the book’s characteristic modes of criticism are demonstrated, with special emphasis on “the method of § 2” (as Wittgenstein retrospectively calls it in PI § 48), also called the “method of language-games” (PI § 116). These essays develop, though in very different ways, the contention that language-games are exactly what Wittgenstein claims they are, namely, “objects of comparison” (PI §§ 130-131) or notational constructs, but not subparts of our language whose syntactical patterns dictate how we must talk on pain of lapsing into nonsense. Accordingly, many of the essays collected here, rejecting the suggestion that Wittgenstein was ever in the business of laying down a priori conditions of sense (restrictions on what we can think), attempt to extend to the text of the Philosophical Investigations the so-called “resolute” stance that some commentators have recently taken on the text of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. All of these essays evince the twofold conviction that the book’s form, being internal to its content, cannot be shunted to one side without courting exegetical disaster and, conversely, that the modes of criticism employing this form cannot be identified except through their enactment.

Welcome to the "Ways In" section of this Macat analysis. This is an introductory section, summarising the most important points of this work in one 10-minute read. Macat's Analyses are definitive studies of the most important books and papers in the humanities and social sciences. Each analysis is written by an academic specialist in the field. Each one harnesses the latest research to investigate the influences that led to the work being written, the ideas that make it important, and the impact that it has had in the world. A powerful resource for students, teachers and lifelong learners everywhere, our analyses are proven by the University of Cambridge to improve critical thinking skills. Read the whole of this analysis and explore our library at www.macat.com.

Auslegung: a Journal of Philosophy, 1983

The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd Edition Michael Starks, 2019

The aim of the 17 original papers here is to summarize and analyze Wittgenstein's thought. At the time these were being written, the Oxford/Intelex CDROM ($2040 on Amazon but available thru interlibrary loan and steeply discounted on the net) with 20,000 some pages of W's nachlass, as well as the various online versions of the nachlass, were not yet available, and only those fluent in German and willing to find and slog thru the incomplete Cornell microfilm were able to examine it. To this day, much of it remains untranslated from the German typescripts and handwritten manuscripts. I note this at the outset as W's untranslated or unpublished writings often shed crucial light on his thought and few to this day have made substantial use of them. In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century Viennese German into modern English. One must be a master of English, German, and Wittgenstein in order to do this and very few are up to it. Several of the current authors note unfortunate translation errors in the only available English editions and I have seen similar comments countless times. As is well known, W's thought changed dramatically between the publication of the Tractatus (TLP) in 1922 and the Philosophical Investigations (1953). The continuity or lack thereof between his early and late work is the subject of a vast literature and is taken up here by several authors. Ishiguro on the picture theory and Mounce on the logical system in TLP are good, but for me the endless discussions of exactly how he was mistaken in his early work is of as little interest as the mistakes in most previous philosophy. Ammereller on Intentionality is a good, if prosaic, summary of (mostly) the early and middle W on belief and interpretation which, like virtually everyone, totally fails to give an adequate overview of W's pioneering work. In giving the general outline of our innate evolutionary psychology (i.e., roughly our personality) and showing how this describes behavior, W represents a major milestone in human thought. There are unmistakeable indications of this even in his early writings (e.g., see p 40, 49-58 here) and it has been documented by Hacker (e.g., see his paper in The New Wittgenstein) and others but without any comprehensive account in book form to date (but see the many recent writings of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva etc.). Overall a good book for introducing W to a general philosophical audience but now very dated by the recent work of Hacker, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva, Hutto, Read and others. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) ,The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019).

This paper discusses the traditional philosophical problem of other minds and the notion of consciousness. Through an elucidation of Wittgenstein's works, focusing primarily on the later publishing of Philosophical Investigations (1953), it will be shown that rather than aligning with positions of either Cartesians of behaviorists, Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind strongly resembles that of early twentieth century phenomenologists in its insistence on the redefining of subjectivity. Further, consideration will be given to the method of enquiry Wittgenstein employs, and how the consistency of its usage results in his identifying of similar issues of intuition in the propositions of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics.

in: A.Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the 20th & 21st Centuries, Routldege, 2019