Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
2015, Current Federal Reserve Policy Under the Lens of Economic History
Michael D. Bordo has helped to define the modern field of monetary history, drawing from it important policy lessons for current practitioners. For his seventieth year, we survey his contributions to our understanding of the Great Depression, money and the economy in historical perspective, exchange rate regimes including the gold standard, Bretton Woods, and the European Monetary Union, globalization, financial crises, the Canadian monetary experience, and historical guidance for monetary policy.
Essays to Commemorate the Federal Reserve System's Centennial, 2015
Michael D. Bordo has helped to define the modern field of monetary history, drawing from it important policy lessons for current practitioners. For his seventieth year, we survey his contributions to our understanding of the Great Depression, money and the economy in historical perspective, exchange rate regimes including the gold standard, Bretton Woods, and the European Monetary Union, globalization, financial crises, the Canadian monetary experience, and historical guidance for monetary policy.
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2013
The economic crisis that began in 2007 and still lingers has invited comparison with the Great Depression of the 1930s. It has also generated renewed interest in Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's explanation of the latter as mainly the consequence of the Fed's failure as a lender of last resort at its onset, and the ineptitude of its policies thereafter. This explanation is reassessed in the light of events since 2007, and it is argued that its plausibility emerges enhanced, even though policy debates in recent years have paid more attention to interest rates and credit markets than to Friedman and Schwartz's key variable, the quantity of money
2013
The economic crisis that began in 2007 and still lingers has invited comparison with the Great Depression of the 1930s. It has also generated renewed interest in Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's explanation of the latter as mainly the consequence of the Fed's failure as a lender of last resort at its onset, and the ineptitude of its policies thereafter. This explanation is reassessed in the light of events since 2007, and it is argued that, in some important, but not all respects, its plausibility emerges enhanced, even though policy debates in recent years have paid more attention to interest rates and credit markets than to Friedman and Schwartz's key variable, the quantity of money
2010
Nevertheless, the views expressed here are entirely my own responsibility. 1 A revival of the age-old debate about the inherent stability or otherwise of a decentralized economic system based on private property and voluntary exchange -a market economy as it is usually called -has been one of the very few positive consequences of the economic crisis that began in the summer of 2007. For three decades now, the prevailing tendency among mainstream economists, particularly in North America and even more particularly among those concerned with analyzing monetary policy issues, has been to take the capacity of such an economy to maintain continuous co-ordination of the maximizing choices of agents at all times as an axiomatic starting point for theorizing, rather than as a matter worthy of investigation in its own right. This was a logically necessary implication of elevating dynamic general equilibrium modeling methods deriving from the essentially Walrasian microeconomics of Arrow and Debreu to the status of the best, perhaps indeed the only acceptable, professional practice. 1 While the "Great Moderation" in much of the world economy persisted, the fact, noted by Lucas (2004), that this approach could be of no help in understanding the episodes of instability that had so often arisen in earlier times and/or in faroff places, did not seem to matter very much. The study and explanation of such events was left to economic historians such as, for example, Charles Kindleberger (1978, 5 th ed. 2005) whose work retained a marginal foothold in some versions of the standard graduate syllabus, and perhaps also to historians of macroeconomic thought, for example Don , or outright heretics such as Hyman , whose work by and large did not. Economic instability has now struck much too close to home for all this to be any longer acceptable, and in this lecture, I shall explore some of the things that an analysis of the monetary economy grounded in the historical literature dealing with such issues might have to say about these and similar events. I shall do so, not with the intention of instructing my fellow historians, for they know all about these matters already, but in the hope that practitioners of today's monetary economics will take some notice. This Paper's Themes This paper's themes are easily summarized. First, a monetary economy has long been understood by those who have studied it to have properties that cannot be analyzed using the tools of Arrow-Debreu style equilibrium modeling, and Keynes's economics, far from being an aberration in an orderly progress from Adam Smith to today's macroeconomic orthodoxy, was part of a long tradition that addressed these issues, and to which Smith himself had contributed; second, a critical property of a monetary economy is its proclivity to permit trading to take place at prices that do not keep markets cleared, false prices as they are usually termed; and third, an understanding of economic crises such as we have recently experienced should be sought in this proclivity, which encompasses not only the economics of depression found in the General 1 Robert E. Lucas Jr. ( ) discusses the rise of these methods, which are the basis of work commonly labeled "New-Keynesian" as well as "New-Classical". Beyond doubt, they have produced much interesting analysis, some of which has been of practical policy significance as well. Consider, for example, Michael Woodford (2003). But as I have argued at some length in an earlier paper (Laidler 2010), they have also been intellectually limiting. However, I did not intend then, or now, to issue any blanket indictment of modern monetary theory. Non-Walrasian approaches to the analysis of the monetary economy that build on the pioneering work of and Kocherlakota (1998) among others have not yet, to the best of my knowledge, developed to the point having any influence on the analysis of monetary policy, but they may well end up providing a micro-theoretic basis for some of the older ideas about the properties of a monetary economy canvassed in this paper that do at least permit these and related issues to be discussed.
Scottish Journal of Political …, 1996
2007
Pillars of Globalization: A history of monetary policy targets, 1797-1997* This paper studies the evolution of monetary policy targets over the course of the past 200 years. We argue that policy targets are set as part of an assignment procedure that is intended to address both time consistency and monitoring problems. As a result, central banks, after having been assigned to target the exchange rate in the 19th century, are now entrusted with targeting the rate of inflation. Critical advances in the measurement of inflation have proved decisive in bringing about this radical transformation.
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 2013
Summary In this paper, we provide some reflections on the development of monetary theory and monetary policy over the last 150 years. Rather than presenting an encompassing overview, which would be overambitious, we simply concentrate on a few selected aspects that we view as milestones in the development of this subject.We also try to illustrate some of the interactions with the political and financial system, academic discussion and the views and actions of central banks.
ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЕ ВОЗРОЖДЕНИЕ РОССИИ (Economic Revival of Russia) периодическое научное Издание (Scientific Periodical), EKONOMICHESKOYe VOZROZHDENIYe ROSSII periodicheskoye nauchnoye Izdaniye,, 2019
Despite signs over the decades that the world role of the dollar has been problematic, and much recent commentary pointing to signs that de-dollarization is happening, questioning of the role of the dollar in the international monetary system has been remarkably untheoretical and unhistorical fashion. Since no heap of facts, no matter how large, can amount to an argument, this is a serious intellectual liability. Moreover, the world has been paying, at least the 1980s, a heavy price for this lack of understanding. The purpose of this paper is to clear up this misunderstanding by pointing to the largely ignored intimate and necessary relationship between financialization-of the Western economies and the pressures they generate for the rest of the world to follow suit, exposing them to dangerous financial and currency volatility-and the dollar-centred international monetary system. This relationship can only be understood by putting the dollar's world role in the longer historical perspective of the modern international monetary system, going back to the role of the pound sterling under to so-called international gold standard.
Revista de Economia Política
The paper aims to establish interfaces between the Great Depression of the 1930s under the Gold Standard and the recent European Crisis under the Euro. It is argued that, despite their specificities, both crises revealed the potentially harmful effects, in economic and social terms, of institutional arrangements that considerably reduce the autonomy of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies of participating countries, without being accompanied by increased cooperation between them, which should be led by a global (in the case of the Great Depression) or regional (in the case of the European Crisis) hegemonic power, which is not only capable of, but is also willing to act as a buyer and lender of last resort, especially in circumstances characterized by increased uncertainty, the deterioration of the general state of expectations and increased liquidity preference. In fact, central European countries in the past and peripheral European countries nowadays were effectively pushed ...
1997
I n the early 1960s the Federal Reserve (Fed) was little known outside of the financial services industry and university economics departments. Twenty years later Fed Chairman Paul Volcker was one of the most recognized names in American public life. Now hardly a week goes by when the Fed is not featured prominently in the business news. The Fed was thrust into the limelight in the intervening years when the public came to associate it with inflation-fighting policy actions that raised interest rates and weakened economic activity. Even though inflation has been held in check since the mid-1980s, the public remains acutely aware of Fed policy today. Monetary economists and central bankers alike now understand that effective monetary policy must be built on a consistent commitment to low inflation. That is why in recent years the Fed has made low inflation a particularly high priority. The large fraction of the public having first-hand experience with high inflation naturally supports the view that inflation must be contained. As the collective memory of inflation fades, however, public support for low inflation will become increasingly difficult to sustain. A permanent national commitment to price stability requires that citizens personally unfamiliar with the trauma of high inflation understand the rationale for price stability and the tactical policy actions needed to maintain it.
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on 'Macro-Economic Management (M-EM)'.
2006
This paper provides a brief overview of the introduction and development of the international monetary system (IMS) from its inception in the 5th century BC to the present era. Particular reference is made from the establishment of the gold standard in the early 19th century under British hegemony to the Bretton Woods system under American hegemony and its evolution into the current system of fiat money, floating exchange rates and global financial flows. It explains the role and significance of the IMS for monetary stability and prosperity, and discusses the current challenges and its future outlook.
Ассоциация «Некоммерческое партнерство по содействию в проведении научных исследований «Институт нового индустриального развития им. С. Ю. Витте», 2019
Despite signs over the decades that the world role of the dollar has been problematic, and much recent commentary pointing to signs that de-dollarization is happening, questioning of the role of the dollar in the international monetary system has been remarkably untheoretical and unhistorical fashion. Since no heap of facts, no matter how large, can amount to an argument, this is a serious intellectual liability. Moreover, the world has been paying, at least the 1980s, a heavy price for this lack of understanding. The purpose of this paper is to clear up this misunderstanding by pointing to the largely ignored intimate and necessary relationship between financialization-of the Western economies and the pressures they generate for the rest of the world to follow suit, exposing them to dangerous financial and currency volatility-and the dollar-centred international monetary system. This relationship can only be understood by putting the dollar's world role in the longer historical perspective of the modern international monetary system, going back to the role of the pound sterling under to so-called international gold standard.
This article explores the ways in which the classical gold standard established the foundations for a modern international monetary system with its distinctive forms of crisis and regulatory frameworks. The specific nature of this transformation is often overlooked because of a tendency in the literature to compare the gold standard in relation to subsequent monetary systems, such as BrettonWoods. To remedy this historical bias, the classical gold standard is compared with previous monetary systems and it is concluded that it contributed to expand the array of monetary instruments for conducting monetary policy. By progressively subjecting the management of fiduciary money to state control the institutions of the gold standard created a new monetary framework that opened the way for central banking. However, the commitments taken to this effect, such as provisions on the convertibility of banknotes, created new opportunities for speculation. I argue that this new weakness would become the main preoccupation of monetary policy in the 20th century and lay down the foundations for international cooperation and its novel emphasis on monetary stability.
In the analysis of the present day crisis, the paper considers a result of commercial banks deregulation: blowing financial transactions, widespread new Keynesian flow of marginal monetary basis, jumpstarting financial instruments, short-term based financial program trading speculation. In this way, the research starts from the last market bubbles collapsed in the years 2000 and 2007-2008: dot-com, subprime and derivatives. Its results confirm the effect of the general persistence of wrong monetary policies, triggering irreversible liquidity, fiscal and interest zero rates traps. The conclusion is that an everlasting crisis is not the consequence of some isolate deregulation of some institution and markets activity in general, neither likely due to some new financial innovative product fallout. On the contrary, what surfaces in August 2007, is the result, after 40 years of monetary debasement and quantitative mismanagement, excessive faith in macroeconomics dangerous ideas and disregard of minor micro-economic laws, associated with the appearance of the huge Eastern competing world, once frozen in the planned economy, a global market oriented environment. The Western welfare State seems likely to finally collapse in a completely free surfacing new market economy. The present paper explores the history and grounds of recent monetary turmoil considering some preliminary factors affecting the debasement of the US dollar in the year 1971 and the unexpected consequences arising from such a controversial decision. After World War I and 30 years of unsuccessful efforts to reach a stable international payment system, the recurring clearing agreements, the final establishment of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, the GATT and the World Bank, Europe seemed to be finding an alternative solution to the autarchy and tight custom barriers, which led to World War II. Several monetary plans, drawn and discussed at Bretton Woods in July 1944 and, after World War II: the European monetary union, the Werner plan, the issuing of the European Currency Unit (ECU), the final financial markets liberalization in the year 1990 culminated in the EMS and the Euro project. The European monetary system led to the issue of the Euro that made likely a debased monetary instrument as final unique solution, within the Single European Payment Area run over the Swift—Target platforms. According to the Mario Pines, full professor,
The international monetary system is the structure within which foreign exchange rates are determined, international trade and capital flows are accommodated, and balance-of-payments adjustments made. This article will discuss the evolution of the international monetary regimes starting from the pre 1875, metalism standard to date when the flexible exchange rate regime now operating since 1973. The other regimes are the classical gold standard, inter war period, the fixed dollar exchange rate regime under the Bretton Woods system after the WWII. When discussing the monetary regimes highlights of the strengths and weaknesses of each regime will be brought out, and thereafter form a conclusion about the most beneficial and stable regime.
Mundorama (n. 91, ISSN: 2175-2052), 2014
Hartford, 27 outubro 2014, 7 p. Book Review of Carol M. Connell: Reforming the World Monetary System: Fritz Machlup and the Bellagio Group (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013. xii + 272 pp.; ISBN 978-1-84893-360-6; Financial History series n. 21, $99.00; hardcover). Publicado em Mundorama (n. 91, 22/03/2015; ISSN: 2175-2052). Relação de Publicados n. 1164
Free Banking and Monetary Reform, 1989
Loading Preview
Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.