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2005, Cell
AI
Pandemic influenza viruses, particularly the H5N1 strain, pose a significant public health concern due to their potential for human-to-human transmission. Recent studies by Taubenberger et al. (2005) and Tumpey et al. (2005) have revealed crucial genomic similarities between the 1918 Spanish influenza virus and avian strains, suggesting two primary pathways for the emergence of pandemic strains: gene reassortment involving co-infection with human and avian viruses, or direct mutation of avian influenza viruses. Understanding the molecular basis of these processes is critical for predicting and preventing future influenza pandemics.
Indian Journal of Microbiology, 2009
Influenza A virus is a potent pathogen of annual respiratory illness with huge potential of causing occasional pandemics of catastrophic consequences. In April 2009, a novel, swine-origin influenza A H1N1/09 virus was identified in Mexico which continued to spread globally. This unique virus emerged from an avian, human, Eurasian swine viral strain and a North American swine strain belonging to the lineage of the 1930 swine virus. Till date H1N1/09 pandemic has been relatively mild and lacks the previously described molecular markers of influenza A pathogenicity and transmissibility. In this review, we will discuss the molecular and antigenic determinants of this virus and its designation as a low pathogenic strain, which carries the potential to develop into a devastating strain with subsequent mutations and reassortments.
New England Journal of Medicine, 2005
BioEssays, 2011
The emergence of the 2009 H1N1 virus pandemic was unexpected, since it had been predicted that the next pandemic would be caused by subtype H5N1. We also had to learn that a pandemic does not necessarily require the introduction of a new virus subtype into the human population, but that it may result from antigenic shift within the same subtype. The new variant was derived from human and animal viruses by genetic reassortment in the pig, supporting the concept that this animal is the mixing vessel for the generation of new human influenza viruses. Although it is generally believed that the 2009 outbreak was mild, there have been severe cases particularly among the young and the middleaged. Pathogenicity and host range are determined to a large extent by the polymerase, the haemagglutinin and the NS1 protein of influenza A viruses. There is evidence that mutations of these proteins may change the pathogenicity of the new virus.
Archives of Virology, 1998
Bulletin of the Pan American Health Organization, 1976
Journal of Virology, 2005
We recently analyzed a series of H5N1 viruses isolated from healthy ducks in southern China since 1999 and found that these viruses had progressively acquired the ability to replicate and cause disease in mice. In the present study, we explored the genetic basis of this change in host range by comparing two of the viruses that are genetically similar but differ in their ability to infect mice and have different pathogenicity in mice.
Journal of Virology, 2002
(1-aminoadamantane hydrochloride)-resistant human viruses and amantadine-sensitive avian strains. By using antisera against the human virus HAs and amantadine, we selected reassortants containing the human virus M gene and the avian virus HA gene. In our system, high virus yields and large, well-defined plaques indicated that the avian HAs and the human M gene products could cooperate effectively; low virus yields and small, turbid plaques indicated that cooperation was poor. The M gene products are among the primary components that determine the species specificities of influenza A viruses. Therefore, our system also indicated whether the avian HA genes effectively reassorted into the genome and replaced the HA gene of the prevailing human influenza A viruses. Most of the avian HAs that we tested efficiently cooperated with the M gene products of the early human A/PR/8/34 (H1N1) virus; however, the avian HAs did not effectively cooperate with the most recently isolated human virus that we tested, A/Nanchang/933/95 (H3N2). Cooperation between the avian HAs and the M proteins of the human A/Singapore/57 (H2N2) virus was moderate. These results suggest that the currently prevailing human influenza A viruses might have lost their ability to undergo antigenic shift and therefore are unable to form new pandemic viruses that contain an avian HA, a finding that is of great interest for pandemic planning.
Journal of Virology, 2015
The H2N2/1957 and H3N2/1968 pandemic influenza viruses emerged via the exchange of genomic RNA segments between human and avian viruses. The avian hemagglutinin (HA) allowed the hybrid viruses to escape preexisting immunity in the human population. Both pandemic viruses further received the PB1 gene segment from the avian parent (Y. Kawaoka, S. Krauss, and R. G. Webster, J Virol 63:4603-4608, 1989), but the biological significance of this observation was not understood. To assess whether the avian-origin PB1 segment provided pandemic viruses with some selective advantage, either on its own or via cooperation with the homologous HA segment, we modeled by reverse genetics the reassortment event that led to the emergence of the
Biotechnology Journal, 2006
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2014
Journal of Medical Virology, 2002
In order to identify molecular changes associated with the transmission of avian influenza A H5N1 and H9N2 viruses to humans, the internal genes from these viruses were compared to sequences from other avian and human influenza A isolates. Phylogenetically, each of the internal genes of all sixteen of the human H5N1 and both of the H9N2 isolates were closely related to one another and fell into a distinct clade separate from clades formed by the same genes of other avian and human viruses. All six internal genes were most closely related to those of avian isolates circulating in Asia, indicating that reassortment with human strains had not occurred for any of these 18 isolates. Amino acids previously identified as host-specific residues were predominantly avian in the human isolates although most of the proteins also contained residues observed previously only in sequences of human influenza viruses. For the majority of the nonglycoprotein genes, three distinct subgroups could be distinguished on bootstrap analyses of the nucleotide sequences, suggesting multiple introductions of avian virus strains capable of infecting humans. The shared nonglycoprotein gene constellations of the human H5N1 and H9N2 isolates and their detection in avian isolates only since 1997 when the first human infections were detected suggest that this particular gene combination may confer the ability to infect humans and cause disease. J. Med. Virol. 66:107–114, 2002. Published 2002 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
Eurosurveillance, 2014
mBio, 2014
Zoonotic avian influenza virus infections may lead to epidemics or pandemics. The 1918 pandemic influenza virus has an avian influenza virus-like genome, and its H1 hemagglutinin was identified as a key mammalian virulence factor. A chimeric 1918 virus expressing a contemporary avian H1 hemagglutinin, however, displayed murine pathogenicity indistinguishable from that of the 1918 virus. Here, isogenic chimeric avian influenza viruses were constructed on an avian influenza virus backbone, differing only by hemagglutinin subtype expressed. Viruses expressing the avian H1, H6, H7, H10, and H15 subtypes were pathogenic in mice and cytopathic in normal human bronchial epithelial cells, in contrast to H2-, H3-, H5-, H9-, H11-, H13-, H14-, and H16-expressing viruses. Mouse pathogenicity was associated with pulmonary macrophage and neutrophil recruitment. These data suggest that avian influenza virus hemagglutinins H1, H6, H7, H10, and H15 contain inherent mammalian virulence factors and li...
The Journal of …, 2006
H5N1 infl uenza viruses transmitted from poultry to humans in Asia cause high mortality and pose a pandemic threat. Viral genes important for cell tropism and replication efficiency must be identifi ed to elucidate and target virulence factors. We applied reverse genetics to generate H5N1 reassortants combining genes of lethal A/Vietnam/1203/04 (VN1203), a fatal human case isolate, and nonlethal A/chicken/Vietnam/C58/04 (CH58) and tested their pathogenicity in ferrets and mice. The viruses' hemagglutinins have six amino acids differences, identical cleavage sites, and avian-like-(2,3)-linked receptor specifi city. Surprisingly, exchanging hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes did not alter pathogenicity, but substituting CH58 polymerase genes completely attenuated VN1203 virulence and reduced viral polymerase activity. CH58's NS gene partially attenuated VN1203 in ferrets but not in mice. Our fi ndings suggest that for high virulence in mammalian species an avian H5N1 virus with a cleavable hemagglutinin requires adaptive changes in polymerase genes to overcome the species barrier. Thus, novel antivirals targeting polymerase proteins should be developed.
2010
Pandemic influenza has posed an increasing threat to public health worldwide in the last decade. In the 20th century, three human pandemic influenza outbreaks occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968, causing significant mortality. A number of hypotheses have been proposed for the emergence and development of pandemic viruses, including direct introduction into humans from an avian origin and reassortment between avian and previously circulating human viruses, either directly in humans or via an intermediate mammalian host. However, the evolutionary history of the pandemic viruses has been controversial, largely due to the lack of background genetic information and rigorous phylogenetic analyses. The pandemic that emerged in early April 2009 in North America provides a unique opportunity to investigate its emergence and development both in human and animal aspects. Recent genetic analyses of data accumulated through long-term influenza surveillance provided insights into the emergence of this novel pandemic virus. In this review, we summarise the recent literature that describes the evolutionary pathway of the pandemic viruses. We also discuss the implications of these findings on the early detection and control of future pandemics.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b underwent an explosive geographic expansion in 2021, with the viruses being detected in wild birds and domestic poultry across Asia, Europe, and Africa. In 2022, viruses of this clade were detected in North America, signifying further intercontinental spread. Here, we show that the western movement of clade 2.3.4.4b was quickly followed by reassortment with local circulating viruses, resulting in the acquisition of novel polymerase gene cassettes. These reassortant A(H5N1) viruses are genotypically and phenotypically diverse, with many causing severe disease with dramatic neurologic involvement, in mammals. The proclivity of the current A(H5N1) 2.3.4.4b virus lineage to reassort and target the central nervous system warrants concerted planning to combat the spread and evolution of the virus within the continent and to mitigate the impact of a potential influenza pandemic that could originate from similar A(H5N1) rea...
Viruses and Viral Infections in Developing Countries, 2020
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