COVID-19: a dual challenge to European liberal democracy

2021

The pandemic caused by the rapid spread of the Covid-19 virus has revealed impacts well beyond those linked to health. Indeed, it has established itself as what Mauss called a "total social fact", that is, an event that affects every single aspect of society. In this editorial we present some initial reflections on the myriad ways in which the pandemic will affect the State and the relationship between States and citizens as played out in spheres of everyday life. We begin with a brief historical overview of pandemics and the patterns, contradictions and lessons they have left, before looking at the crisis context in which the current pandemic is unfolding. We then take a look at the myriad ways in which the pandemic underlines, emphasises and exacerbates a fundamental rift in the relationship between states and citizens by discussing risk, expertise, communication, de- and re-politicisation and more. We conclude by asking ourselves if - beyond the liberal democracy vs aut...

East European Politics, 2022

This paper explores how democracies handle the trade-off between public safety and fundamental democratic principles. We show that an exogenous shock, like the pandemic, creates incentives for governing elites to deploy self-empowering mechanisms to avoid institutional checks and balanceswith lasting consequences for democratic performance. We examine this prospect in Italy and Romania. These cases have a long history of institutional gridlock; such history reinforces incentives to work around traditional institutions in responding to the pandemic. While the two cases vary in terms of the quality and resilience of their democratic institutions, we find that elites displayed a similar propensity to overlook the intricate institutional balances during a moment of crisis. In Italy, the executive strengthened its power relative to the legislature; in Romania, the strengthening is relative to the judiciary. This finding has implications in assessing the risk for falling standards of liberal democracy across the European Union.

Democratic Theory

In the past 70 years, situations that featured a lack of solidarity were always followed by the communitization of structures in the European Union. This contribution reflects on possible consequences of the COVID-19 crisis for the European Union. Even though the initial response from the EU looked unpromising and was driven at the nation-state level, the crisis may lead to new forms of solidarity through communitization. We argue that the EU needs equality for all EU citizens as well as institutionalized solidarity in order to finally become a real European democracy.

Journal of European Integration

After initial responses that appeared to be a disappointing replay of previous crises, EU governance in the Covid-19 crisis may very well result in paradigmatic change toward deeper European integration in some areas, incremental change in others, or even reversal toward disintegration in yet others. It is therefore important to evaluate what changed in terms of policies and who governed in what ways during the pandemic. This concluding article does so by building on the other articles in this SI. It first sheds light on policy change during the crisis using a historical institutionalist framework, then on governance by asking which EU actors, intergovernmental or supranational, drove integration and how, using rational choice and discursive institutionalist frameworks. Finally, it also considers the effects of post-functionalist politicization to elucidate the more positive dynamics of interaction among EU actors during the pandemic, in contrast to the Eurozone.

Politics and Governance, 2021

Based on a normative orientation and an interdisciplinary perspective, this is a comparative study, using the process tracing methodology, between the EU responses to Eurozone and Covid-19 crises to assess if, despite different outcomes, institutional decision-making processes evidence a change. The study concluded that the EU democratic deficit remains, which assumes special features in economic crises, providing a political oversize power to the economically hegemonic states, thus constraining ideological debate and making national interest prevail over politicisation. This perpetuates the conversion of structural economic positions into political power at the expense of political representative power and democracy.

West European Politics

Successive crises in the European Union have led critics to identify a pervasive tendency to emergency politics, where democratic deliberation gives way to policy decisions forced through by executive authority. By contrast, in this article it is argued that crises may stimulate deliberation and compromise, even when preceded by open conflict and an evident collective action failure. Drawing on a new dataset of 1759 policy-related actions covering the EU and its member states' responses to COVID-19 between March and July 2020, the timing, sequencing and origins of policy claims and steps are traced. Both urgent epidemiological responses are found, where emergency measures were in evidence; and responses to anticipated economic challenges that had to overcome disagreement concerning necessary institutional reforms. The findings depict a multifaceted crisis response. The European Commission acted swiftly but also bought time for member state governments to deliberate. This casts doubt on the many-crises-one-script account of EU emergency politics. KEYWORDS COVID-19; crisis politics; emergency politics; EU; policy coding; recovery fund In July 2019, future European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that 'we have moved out of the era of crisis management and can now look forward' (von der Leyen 2019). Such confidence now feels almost prophetic in its wrongness. COVID-19 has prompted the latest and most large-scale crisis management programme the EU has ever embarked on, extending the 'seemingly permanent crisis' facing contemporary Europe (Voltolini et al. 2020: 609). COVID-19 presents multiple policy problems, most saliently concerning public health and the economy. European policy making geared up to address both issues between March and July 2020, a period bookended by the commencement of the EU's public health response and its settlement on a budget and recovery fund.

West European Politics, 2021

Codebook: Variables, description and sources THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY AND COMPONENTS DQ Democratic quality: Final index of the quality of democracies. See codebook of the Democracy Barometer for more specific information on the conceptualization, aggregation and measurement. Democracy Barometer Version 7 INDLIB The protection of individual liberties based on-RIGHT TO PHYSICAL INTEGRITY (Constitutional provisions guaranteeing physical integrity, no transgressions by the state, mutual acceptance of right to physical integrity by citizens)-RIGHT TO FREE CONDUCT OF LIFE (Constitutional provisions guaranteeing right to freedom of conduct of life , freedom of conduct of life, effective property rights) Democracy Barometer Version 7 RULEOFLAW Rule of law based on-EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW (Constitutional provisions for impartial courts, effective independence of the judiciary, effective impartiality of the legal system)-QUALITY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM (Constitutional provisions for judicial professionalism, confidence in the justice system, confidence in the police) Democracy Barometer Version 7 MUTUCONS Mutual constraints of constitutional powers:-CHECKS BETWEEN THREE POWERS (Balance of checks between executive and legislative powers, balance between executive and legislative powers, judicial review)-VERTICAL CHECKS OF POWER (Degree of Federalism, subnational fiscal autonomy) Democracy Barometer Version 7 RESTRICTION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (restrict_freedom_index) cross-sectional and cross-temporal C4_Restrictions.on.gatherings 0-no restrictions 1-restrictions on very large gatherings (>1000 people) 2-restrictions on gatherings between 101-1000 people 3-restrictions on gatherings between 11-100 people 4-restrictions on gatherings of 10 people or less OxCGRT C6_Stay.at.home.requirements 0-no measures 1-recommended not leaving house 2-require not leaving house with exceptions for daily exercise, grocery shopping, and 'essential' trips 3-require not leaving house with minimal exceptions (e.g. allowed to leave once a week, or only one person can leave at a time, etc.) OxCGRT C7_Restrictions on internal movement 0-no measures 1-recommend not to travel between regions/cities 2-internal movement restrictions in place OxCGRT C8_International travel controls 0-no restrictions 1-screening arrivals 2-quarantine arrivals from some or all regions 3-ban arrivals from some regions 4-ban on all regions or total border closure OxCGRT POWER CONCENTRATION (power_concentration_index) cross-sectional emlimit Does implementation of the legal instrument used as the main national-level response to Covid-19 have an officially declared time limit? (binary 1=yes; 0=no; reversed in index PanDem V4 March-June 2020 emlegapp Did the legislature approve the implementation of the legal instrument used as the main national-level response to COVID-19? (binary) 1=yes; 0=no; reversed in index PanDem V4 March-Sept 2020 leglimit Legislature limitations: Since 11 March 2020, to what extent have any of the emergency measures with reference to Covid-19 limited the lawmaking role of the legislature? 0-Not at all. The lawmaking role of the national legislature is not affected. 1-Very little. The legislature has given the executive branch the power to relatively widely interpret COVID-19 related laws, but not to rule by decree. 2-Somewhat. The executive branch has the right to rule by decree on several, narrowly Covid-19 related issues such as deciding on physical distance measures and measures to support the health system. 3-To a large extent. The executive branch has the right to rule by decree on many issues, which may exceed Covid-19 related issues due to vague formulation in emergency laws. 4-Completely. The legislature has been dissolved, suspended or equivalent with reference to Covid-19. PanDem V4 March-June 2020 melim De iure Media limitations: Since 11 March 2020, to what extent do any emergency measures de-jure limit media freedom? (ordinal) 0-Not at all. Media freedoms are not affected by the emergency measures. 1-Somewhat. The emergency measures de-jure allow the government to put some limitations on how the media can report on Covid-19. These provisions are explicitly limited to stopping disinformation on Covid-19, such as closing news websites that misreport on the origins or how the disease spreads. 2-To a large extent. The emergency measures de-jure put strict limitations on how the media can report on Covid-19. These provisions are not limited to stopping the spread of disinformation on Covid-19, but include any reporting on Covid-19 such as the prevalence of the virus and the government response. PanDem V4 March-June 2020 merepfact De facto Media limitations: Since 11 March 2020, has the government placed defacto limitations on media reporting about the nature of the COVID-19 virus?? (binary) 1=yes; 0=no PanDem V4 March-June 2020 merepgov De facto Media limitations about government response: Since 11 March 2020, has the government placed de-facto limitations on media reporting about the government response to the COVID-19 pandemic? (binary) 1=yes; 0=no PanDem V4 March-June 2020 merepoth De facto Media limitations about non-covid-19 related news: Since 11 March 2020, has the government placed de-facto limitations on media reporting about non-COVID-19 related news, but with reference to the pandemic? (binary) 1=yes; 0=no PanDem V4

Applied Spatial Analysis and Policy

The emergence of the current global crisis induced by the rapid spread of the COVID-19 pandemic brings about an urgent need to rethink and reshape recovery strategies adapted to this specific challenging context. Neglecting this reconfiguration could lead to system lockdown, affecting all sectors, both on medium and long term. The coronavirus has penetrated various countries with different degrees of intensity, thus being spatially diversified; even within the same country, with the same lockdown measures, an enormous variety in cases is encountered. Subsequently, even if crises may manifest heterogeneously and the long-term impact of implementing recovery policies cannot be accurately known ex ante by governments, institutions could adapt themselves to changing circumstances and respond promptly and appropriately to emerging shocks only if their functioning framework had been well set up by the outbreak of the crisis. Considering these aspects, the main questions that this paper aims to answer are: How effective have governmental measures in European countries been in combating the COVID-19 crisis?; Could the solutions offered by the European states' governments have an influence on diminishing the intensity of negative effects of a possible more serious return of this health crisis? What more could national authorities and international actors do to control the epidemiological evolution of SARS-CoV-2? Is a generic European Union policy helpful or should there be a case for local policy? Based on these issues, a comprehensive picture of the differences between the East and the West of Europe in terms of some medical, socioeconomic , institutional and cultural factors will be outlined, in order to emphasize which of the two groups better-handled the COVID-19 situation in the first wave, covering the lockdown period (March 1, 2020-June 1, 2020) and the relaxation period (June 1, 2020-September 1, 2020); at the same time, some policy recommendations on how governments should more effectively manage future similar crises to generate a higher resilience of the systems will be provided.

Central European Journal of Public Policy, 2020

The European continent faces an apocalyptic pandemic that poses mortal danger to millions of citizens. This paper seeks to address the role played by European public policy in addressing the Covid-19 pandemic. Currently, each Member State across Europe is applying its own measures to deal with the coronavirus; namely, decentralised decision-making that could trigger political tensions among the states. The paper argues that European public policy must change rapidly and fundamentally if these tensions are to be successfully managed; otherwise, such policy might simply cease to exist. Moreover, the known and notorious problem of collective action, information asymmetries, irrationality, negative externalities and the related free-riding phenomenon persistently are distorting the Member States’ combined efforts, resulting in deficient attempts to contain the spread of Covid-19. The paper also argues that the current unprecedented outbreak of this superspreading virus calls for a bigge...

Rethinking governance after the Covid19 crisis – Post-Covid Europe #1, 2021

The public health crisis generated by the Covid19 pandemic and its consequences, along with the crisis management measures put in place by the European States and Union, deserve an analysis. The brutal socioeconomic and health impacts of this unforeseen crisis should make us reflect, among other things, on crisis management and social protection models, our public policies, political systems and the relationship between technology and human rights. For this reason, the Coppieters Foundation will be releasing a series of papers by experts to reflect on various topics related to post-Covid19 Europe. In this paper, Serafin Pazos-Vidal, PhD in European Union writing in a personal capacity, explores challenges and opportunities for power devolution and self-government. The pandemic makes the structural weaknesses and internal stresses of the EU plainly evident. The first half of 2020 has seen renationalising instincts to fight the pandemic. At the same time, the decision that was taken to incur into shared borrowing in order to finance Next Generation EU proves that big shifts happen during major crises. This, to the author, will herald more EU intervention in the national sphere under the guise of “structural reform”. The contestation between the EU and national courts, along with violations of the rule of law in some countries is becoming unsustainable. Given all of these elements, the author explains why the scope of enhancing the substate dimension through the Conference on the Future of Europe looks rather limited.