GABCÍKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT CASE

The judgment of the international court of justice in 1997 over the conflict between Hungarian and Slovakian has set very important rules that match clearly with the Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict over Grand Renaissance Dam. This paper tries briefly to discuss if the Ethiopian side has breach their legal obligations and the chances to use this judgment by the Egyptian government in future to support their situation.

Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 1996

This is a brief written for national moot court competition held at Addis Ababa University in 2014 and selected as best memorial of the competition.

European Journal of International Law, 2007

International institutions are plagued by too many expectations and too little power. One striking example is the International Court of Justice. Its malcontents criticize the Court as an ineffective player in achieving international peace and security, largely because of its perceived inability to control state behaviour. Scholars have long blamed this on the ICJ's ' fl awed ' jurisdictional architecture, which is based entirely on consent. Anything less than a clear indication of consent by the defendant state in a given case is thought to run serious non-compliance risks. This article takes issue with that assessment. By analysing the ICJ's fi nal decisions since the landmark case of Nicaragua v. US, one fi nds that the manner in which the ICJ was seised of jurisdiction is actually a poor predictor of subsequent compliance. Rather, through complex mechanisms of authority signal and the political inertia induced by those decisions, almost all of the Court's decisions have achieved substantial, albeit imperfect, compliance. Thus, despite the likelihood that states will continue to reduce the scope of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, the World Court will remain a vital, if limited, tool in resolving inter-state disputes and a force for world public order.

Treaties establishing boundaries to exclusive economic or exclusive fisheries zones are generally based on environmental and economic circumstances. They delimit maritime entitlements, which are dependent upon coastal geography and they must, as a matter of law, represent equitable solutions. All perpetual treaties are based on the assumption that the circumstances leading to the conclusion of a treaty remain current as long as the treaty is enforceable. However, climate-related changes - such as sea level rise, coastal erosion, extreme weather events, ocean warming and ocean acidification - are altering the environmental circumstances that are essential to many maritime boundary agreements. An unforeseen fundamental change of circumstances can be invoked as grounds for terminating a treaty when the change relates to an essential basis of the treaty and radically transforms the obligations still to be performed. However, a fundamental change cannot justify termination of a treaty if it is caused by the party invoking it or if the treaty establishes a boundary. This rule is codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Treaties delimiting sovereign rights to fisheries are not boundary treaties, within the meaning of the Vienna Convention, because the travaux préparatoires suggest that the boundary exclusion covers only boundaries delimiting territorial sovereignty. Furthermore, the reason for excluding boundary treaties - the need for permanence and stability - is less pertinent for maritime frontiers that fluctuate until settled through treaties or adjudication. Therefore, maritime boundaries can be subject to termination when their essential basis is affected by fundamental environmental changes.

Technical documents in …, 2003