Technology and Epistemic Possibility

Rationalists assign primacy to rational thought, not to action; irrationalists dispute this. This discrepancy should be recast in view of recent modifications of rationalism.

Philosophica, 1999

The possibility of formulating a logic of discovery appeared to have been discarded given the attitude adopted in this regard by the philosophers who developed the standard conception of science. Beginning several decades ago, nonetheless, reactions against this conception have revived interest in the problem. Nowadays, there is a notable tendency to consider the philosophical relevance of the problem of discovery and, as a consequence, 'proposals have been advanced for characterizing the procedures which lead to scientific discoveries. Disconformity with the classical view resides, mainly, in the belief that its principal proponents have utilized a conception that is too narrow in a rational sense and, thus, have excluded from their analysis those aspects of scientific activity that do not conform to a strict logical examination. It is not simple, however, to establish the terms of this debate. There are various interlocking questions and diverse nuances that emerge. Hence, some authors identify rationality with the existence of rules such as those in deductive or inductive logic 1. Others, in contrast, conceive of rationality in a broader sense that includes the consideration of facts, objectives, values, scientific traditions, etc. A third group of authors shares with the more orthodox thinkers the idea that logic should be interpreted in a restricted sense; but I In the present text, for reasons of space, we are not concerned with research carried out in the field of Artificial Intelligence as related to the problem of scientific discovery. However, we consider that the interesting contributions resulting from the design of computer programs which permit the reconstruction of certain scientific discoveries (cf. Langley e.a. 1987) would not alter, fundamentally, our conclusions.

2016

This paper considers new technologies and their role in the production of knowledge. The main objective is to show that there is not a single angle from which to examine the issue. There must also be, as a starting point, the assumption that to deal with the new configuration of the world and the relations established by and under its mainstreams is to deal with the existence of human beings from an ontological point of view. In this sense, the paper argues for the imperative necessity of a philosophical approach in discussing the ways the contemporary world has brought knowledge to bear. (Author/MES) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. '..kr'ERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND

It is generally understood that Martin Heidegger's reflections on technology did much to initiate a philosophical discourse known as the 'philosophy of technology'. Rather than illuminating Heidegger's approach, however, this literature has contributed to the concealment of its primary insight, namely, that in the modern age being is conceived technologically. Heidegger is not interested in technology per se. It is because in the modern age being reveals itself technologically that Heidegger takes up the question concerning technology. If we approach technology as a discrete problem among other philosophical questions, then we will fail to see the continuity between the question of being and the question of technology. Consequently, the question of technological agency is raised apart from the general philosophical problem of human freedom. This paper argues that the incapacity of the philosophy of technology to enter into the fundamental problem of human freedom reflects a technological tendency to conceal the fundamental mystery behind the unity of freedom and destiny. It is only by way of hermeneutics, and finally theology, that we catch sight of this unity. Let us begin with a question that explicitly fuses the concerns of the theologian and the philosopher while remaining implicit in the work of the philosophy of technology.

Axiomathes, vol. 24 (2014), pp. 517-532., 2014

From antiquity several philosophers have claimed that the goal of natural science is truth. In particular, this is a basic tenet of contemporary scientific realism. However, all concepts of truth that have been put forward are inadequate to modern science because they do not provide a criterion of truth. This means that we will generally be unable to recognize a scientific truth when we reach it. As an alternative, this paper argues that the goal of natural science is plausibility and considers some characters of plausibility.

William Mary Law Review, 1985

In this essay, I will examine how technological progress affects the responsibilities of human agents. To this end, I will distinguish between two interpretations of the concept of responsibility, viz. responsibility as attributability and substantive responsibility. On the former interpretation, responsibility has to do with the idea of authorship. When we say that a person is responsible for her actions we mean that she is to be seen as the author of these actions. They can be attributed to her, such that she can be normatively appraised – i.e. blamed, praised, etc. – on that basis. In discussing this kind of responsibility I will show that the responsibi- lity of human agents tends to increase as their technologies progress. This claim is often taken for granted, but seldom clarified and argued for. I will give it a clear interpretation and provide a semi-formal rea- soning that supports it. The second interpretation of responsibility that I will discuss is substantive responsibility. It has to do with the norma- tive demands that confront us – with what we are required to do. I will argue that technological change can affect, firstly, what our substantive responsibilities are on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, I will try to show that it can affect the way we think about our substantive responsibilities at the level of theoretical normative ethics.

CORELA. Cognition Représentation Langage, 2016

This paper emphasises that there is a deep unity underlying Pierre-Yves Raccah’s theory of argumentation, ethics, moral epistemology, general epistemology, philosophy of science and cognitive psychology. First I show that – on the background of his argumentative conception of justifications – Raccah’s moral antifoundationalism is a consequence of the importance he assigns to responsibility in ethics, and in particular to the meta-ethical requirement that we are fully responsible of the moral positions we hold and of the actions we perform in observance to them. Then I explain why his anticonventionalism, as well as his account of how humans can form higher-order effective metapreferences, play a very important role in achieving the target of safeguarding our full responsibility in the prescriptive realm. Finally, I argue that also Raccah’s general epistemology is aimed at supporting the thesis that we are morally responsible of both the scientific theories and the empirical statements we do accept as true. I show how Raccah can successfully assign such a key role to responsibility also in the descriptive realm without abandoning empiricism.

39-49, in: Challenges Facing Philosophy In United Europe, Ed.: S. Kaneva, IPhR – BAS, Sofia, 2004

Based on recent trends in philosophy of science, in philosophy of technology, and in technosience studies it can be concluded that the following formula expresses a significant relationship of the relevant disciplines: science is equal to technology plus philosophy. In order to disclose the meaning of this relationship first of all we have to characterize a kind of philosophy of technology. In this view, the human rule over technological situations and the creation/use of tools play a fundamental role. The tools are created by interpretation, and any technological praxis is situation-bound. The characteristics of sciences are very different – or even the opposite – ones: in sciences we want to reach a situation-free knowledge. Scientific knowledge is not situation-bound, it is universally valid. The question is: how can we use the situation-bound technological praxis for building up of situation-free scientific knowledge? It can be shown that a specific application of philosophical principles and ideas makes this possible. Philosophy can create worlds from situations. Consequently, following certain prescriptions of both technology and philosophy, we can perform a scientific praxis. In this paper, some historical and philosophical arguments will be presented to show this interrelatedness, the most fundamental relationships between science, technology, and philosophy

This paper gives an overview of various attempts to spell out how technological knowledge is 'of a different nature' than scientific knowledge. I argue that all such attempts to place technological knowledge into an epistemic category of its own run into problems, and conclude with offering an agenda for more productive philosophical research on technological knowledge.

Technology and Society studies, 2006

Technology is frequently considered in terms of its impact on entities outside its essential nature: as the impact of technology on the environment and society, but also the impact of human values and needs on technology. By taking particular social implications of technology into account, the Science-Technology relationship can be extended to the field of Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies. STS studies are grounded in socio-technological understanding, that is, systematic knowledge of the mutual relationship between technical objects, the natural environment and social practice. Because technology is a key element of STS, it is expected that the philosophy of technology will have implications for STS studies. The dynamic nature of technology as such leaves its own philosophy in a tentative or flexible state. However, the implications of the philosophy of technology, being in a development phase at the moment with changes in emphasis occuring, for STS studies ought to be determined continuously. The aim of the article is to identify and discuss possible implications of the the philosophy of technology for STS. In order to deduce these implications, the relevant theoretical framework underpinning the article will be discussed in broad outlines. Seeing that the philosophy of technology is such a wide field a delineation of the field needs to be done. Mitcham's proposed preliminary framework is taken as point of departure for the article. Technology as knowledge (epistemology/theory of knowledge) and technology as activity (design methodology) will be discussed as two key aspects of the modern philosophy of technology which could provide implications for STS. A theory of knowledge usually includes methodology, but seeing that Mitcham classified methodology as one of the modes in which technology is manifested, it is dealt with separately. The epistemology and methodology of technology will each be discussed from a philosophical, historical and practicebased methodological perspective. Some implications of the philosophy for STS are identified and discussed.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1983

University of Georgia. He has published articles on conceptual change, rationality, intelligibility and discovery in ihe history of science, and is currently working on a book Scientific Discovery: A Theory of the Rationality of Scientific Research. This essay is an outline of the program developed in the Book.

Computing and Philosophy Conference (CAP 2003), Department of Philosophy and HATII (Humanities Advanced Technology Information Institute), University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK, 2003

Abstract: More than a hundred years ago, the American philosopher CS Peirce suggested the idea of pragmatism as a logical criterion to analyze what words and concepts express through their practical meaning. Many words have been said on creative processes and reasoning, especially in the case of scientific practices. In fact, philosophers have usually offered a number of ways of construing hypotheses generation, but all aim at demonstrating that the activity of generating hypotheses is paradoxical, illusory or obscure, and then not ...

2007

The technological advances of contemporary society have outpaced our moral understanding of the problems that they create. How will we deal with profound ecological changes, human cloning, hybrid people, and eroding cyberprivacy, just to name a few issues? In this book, Lorenzo Magnani argues that existing moral constructs often can not be applied to new technology. He proposes an entirely new ethical approach, one that blends epistemology with cognitive science.

AFRREV STECH: An International Journal of Science and Technology, 2015

Technology is a basic tool of development, which is so dynamic that man seems to be at a lost to the value of this creation. Technology is indeed human’s creation, but it seems beyond the control of man. The implication of this is that technology seems to be controlling man that created it. The reason for this inability of man to control technology is largely due to the fact that, technology has been viewed and approached solely from the standpoint of the scientific. What this means is that technology is only established on the platform of science and this has denied it, its epistemological foundation. This paper therefore seeks to establish the epistemological foundation and significance of technology, and argues that it is only through the cognitive understanding of technology that its values and danger could be identified. This way, man will be in a better position to reflect on technology, and thereby control it.