III-Ethics for Possible Futures

In this paper, I begin by considering the ground or foundation upon which a life of moral action firmly establishes itself for a modern thinker such as Kant and then turn to Aristotle with this type of foundational moment in mind. In so doing, a stark contrast emerges, which provides us with a new, clearer, and, I think, surprising view of Aristotelian ethics. First, whereas the ground on which moral life is based for Kant is perfectly, indeed timelessly present, for Aristotle this ground exists in human life strictly speaking only in the past and in the future. That is, the temporal modes of the foundational dynamic in these two practical philosophies are radically different. Second, whereas for Kant human reason gives us perfect and unmediated access to this ground, for Aristotle the ground of ethical action is irremediably withdrawn, distant from our grasp, although never completely absent. With Aristotle we have before us an ethic that is indeed “grounded” in what is truly good, but it is so in what for us must seem strange and questionworthy ways.

South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (2010): 357-372

ABSTRACT: Growth in human happiness seems to do in part with insights gained through attentive emotional engagement with fictional characters and their identities. For this reason it is important to pay attention to the critique that founding ethics on what we cannot but affirm of ourselves, our identity (rationality and sociability, in Nussbaum’s reading of Aristotle), amounts to a moral elitism, excluding those who fail to meet these marks of human identity. This objec- tion throws light on the importance of the shift towards thematizing ‘subjec- tivity’ in modern and contemporary philosophy. Ethics takes place at the level of the deliberating subject, intending the good. The foundational ele- ment is grasped through moral commitment and not at all ‘neutrally’, in a disengaged attitude alien to human aspirations – something disturbingly overlooked in much normative ethics today. The criteria picked out as essen- tial to our humanity are clarifications of this commitment, and involve an at- titude of inclusivity. In our own non-classical philosophical framework this needs spelling out, in a manner not made clear in Nussbaum’s ‘self-validating’ arguments, in terms of the exigencies of self-enactment and personal identity. This also answers critics who would disallow the conflation of identity and judgments of value.

Philosophy and Public Issues Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche, 2014

The Anthropocene Review, 2022

In the Anthropocene, humanity faces a pressing question: ‘what should we do?’ Here we are interested in the underlying sense and reference of the normative ‘should’ as it applies to ethics with respect to different actors. To excavate ‘should’, we unearth the foundations of three conventional groupings of normative ethical systems: Mill’s utilitarianism, Kantian deontological ethics and Aristotelian virtue ethics. Each provides a normative basis for saying what humans ‘should’ do. We draw on specific examples from the private sector to argue that debates on the role of ethics in business are dominated by consequentialist and deontological accounts which, while essential, entail certain limitations regarding the realities of this new geological epoch. Identifying the comparative benefits of Aristotelian virtue ethics enables us to develop new insights and suggestions for ethics in the Anthropocene. We identify three distinctive features of Aristotelian virtue ethics: (i) a focus on a...

The Review of Politics, 2022

2000

For the last thirty years or so, there has been a search underway for a theory that canaccommodate our intuitions in regard to moral duties to future generations. The object ofthis search has prove ...

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1997

This review focuses upon three themes from Aristotle's Economic Thought (Meikle, 1995) to reveal how (i) Aristotle's essentiaUst metaphysics can assist in clarifying contemporary issues in (ii) value theory and (iii) economics as ethics. Essentialism allows one to pose (adequately) the central question of value, namely: what is the entity that renders incommensurable commodities commensurable? Essentialism, by discouraging the elision of differences between activities with different aims, sharply differentiates between those activities which aim at use value, and those which aim at exchange value. Pursuit of the latter encourages neglect of the former, making it difficult for society to pursue ethical aims.

The two-fold objective of this Department is to prepare students for graduate or professional study in the fields of philosophy and religious studies and to enable them to satisfy the College requirements in the general education program. The courses in philosophy and religion seek to provide the student not only with a firm base in these two academic disciplines, but also with a means for self-examination and selforientation. The work in philosophy aims to develop a critical and analytical approach to all the major areas of human inquiry. The work in religion aims to describe, analyze and evaluate the role of religion in the life of humans since earliest times and how the religious quest continues as a variegated and often tortuous climb toward human growth and fulfillment.