Playing Hobbes. The Theory of Games and Hobbesian Political Theory

Utilitas, 2009

In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan, in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion that the sovereign must always punish the Foole, and even exclude her from the cooperative framework or take her life, if she defects once society is established, which is best expressed in the language of game theory by a grim strategy. That is, compared to existing game-theoretic interpretations of Hobbes, I argue that the sovereign plays a grim strategy with the citizens once society is established, and not the individuals with one another in the state of nature.

Philologia

This article explores the concept and function of power in the philosophy and politics of Thomas Hobbes and the ways in which he has subsequently been read and used. We look at how fear of violent death structures the contract model and how Hobbes mobilizes a spectacle of fear, a 'lesson of fear', to legitimate his system and convince his readers and we discuss his political psychology and the anthropological foundation of his thinking situating man as the eminently dangerous and killable being. Man is basically exposed and vulnerable and this is both the foundation and the selling point of his system. We then move onto his nominalism and the right of interpretation and naming as the premier attribute of sovereignty. It is a monopoly on decision and interpretation rather than violence which preoccupies Hobbes and defines his sovereign. Just like the fragility of flesh is used creatively so is religion both the problem and the solution. Hobbes develops a political theology using a minimalist and politicized definition of religion to block the attempts of religious scholars and proselytes to use religion against the sovereign but he also acknowledges the power of religion to persuade and legitimate so he inscribes the sovereign, the Leviathan, the mortal God, within a religious vocabulary and mysticism. Deep within his mechanistic philosophy a mystic religious core pulses. Hobbes' solution throughout is to turn the problem and source of disorder into the solution and foundation of order. This article explores how he did that.

UCAC, 2024

The History of Philosophy is characterized by the search for philosophical solutions to the problems that confront humanity. One of such problems is the question of sovereignty which constitutes the bedrock of present-day discourse in political philosophy. Political philosophy begins with the question: what ought to be a person’s relationship to society? The discussion of sovereignty is indispensable inasmuch as there are a people who ought to be governed. This is because human beings, as “political animals”, are surrounded by a political arena needing leadership as they inter-relate with one another. Consequently, the question of sovereignty is always very sensitive in the discussion of politics. But it is often confused by liberalists with selfishness and identified with exploitation. More often than not, the essence of sovereignty is questioned and efforts are most of the time geared toward minimizing its power in the society. In effect, Thomas Hobbes understands sovereignty and invites all to reflect on it. He wants us to think straight of the absolute sovereign as the restorer and preserver of peace. The concept of absolute sovereignty is the core of Hobbes’ political philosophy. Part 1 of Leviathan, which culminates in the discussion of the state of nature, is intended to establish the necessity of Hobbes’ theory of sovereignty, its nature and its justification. According to him, only a sovereign with absolute power can liberate individuals from the violence posed by the state of nature and to protect them from returning to it. As such, the alternative to this state of nature is, for Hobbes, the absolute sovereign whom he personifies as the “Leviathan.” He considers absolute sovereignty as the best political system in which peace, Hobbes’ overriding concern, could be best preserved. The peace Hobbes seeks is for the good of the people who are the objective of government action. Before continuing to prescribe the methodological framework of this dissertation, it will be important to clearly state its main objective. Our objective is to investigate whether there will be an ardent respect of God and for human dignity in a political system that practices absolute sovereignty as Hobbes portrays. This leads us to ask salient questions that the work seeks to answer following Hobbes’ political insight. To this end, the overriding question of focus is: what is the place of God and human dignity in a commonwealth that practices absolute sovereignty? Related to this are other minor questions that will be answered in the course of this work. They include: what is absolute sovereignty according to Hobbes and how should it run the state? What are the foundations that make sovereignty necessarily absolute? What type of state existed before an absolute sovereign state? And what relevance has Hobbes’ theory of absolute sovereignty to our present day society? Keywords: Sovereignty, Power, Common Good, Good Governance, Human Right and Freedom.

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2001

Some recent interpreters of Hobbes have deployed techniques of game theory in the service of showing that cooperation in the Hobbesian state of nature is possible. I argue against this strategy in two ways. First, I show that Hobbes did not intend the state of nature as a starting point of the theory from which the possibility of exit must be explained, but rather as a rhetorically useful depiction of the consequences of wrongful understandings of men's civil and religious duties. Secondly, I show that the game theoretic techniques of these interpreters can be used in a new way to demonstrate both the inherent tendency toward civil war in existing Christian states, and the superior stability of the Hobbesian political order.

2015

This study seeks to critically explore the link between sovereignty, violence and war in Gior- gio Agamben’s Homo Sacer series and Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. From a brief rereading of Leviathan’s main arguments that explicitly revolves around the Aristotelian distinction between actuality/ potentiality, it will conclude that Hobbesian pre-contractual violence is primarily based on what Hobbes terms “anticipatory reason” and the problem of future contingency. Relying on Foucauldian insights, it will be emphasized that the assumption of certain potentialities suffices in leading to Hobbes’s well-known conclusion that the state of nature is a “condition of Warre.” In a second step, this study considers some of Agamben’s arguments to account for how pre-contractual violence as envisioned by Hobbes cannot be rendered impotent through the integration of a sovereign. In specific, Agamben’s claims shed light on an irreducible, inextricable entwining between the state of nature and the state of law as “Siamese twins” (Virno). On a meta-level, Agamben thus implicitly shows how the “Hobbesian problem” cannot be merely reduced to a “problem of order” (Parsons). With re- gard to the current functioning of the stratagems of financial markets and the mechanisms of future-colonization underpinning global politics, this study finally argues that Hobbes ought to be reevaluated in particular regarding the problem of the future in his account. Partly responding to Agamben’s critical investigations, I suggest that a careful exploration of what will be coined “the prospects of an actualization of the potentiality not-to-be” might serve as a first theoretical step towards a productive form of criticism.

History of European Ideas, 1989

2020

Hobbes Studies, 2022

This article identifies an argument in Hobbes’s writings often overlooked but relevant to current philosophical debates. Political philosophers tend to categorize his thought as representing consent or rescue theories of political authority. Though these interpretations have textual support and are understandable, they leave out one of his most compelling arguments—what we call the lesser evil argument for political authority, expressed most explicitly in Chapter 20 of Leviathan. Hobbes frankly admits the state’s evils but appeals to the significant disparity between those evils and the greater evils outside the state as a basis for political authority. More than a passing observation, aspects of the lesser evil argument appear in each of his three major political works. In addition to outlining this argument, the article examines its significance both for Hobbes scholarship and recent philosophical debates on political authority.