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Asia-Pacific Journal of Elections and Democracy
How do oligarchs finance local elections, and what motivates their involvement? This study aims to examine the involvement of oligarchs in funding elections campaigns in Central Sulawesi. The research design uses case studies. This study found that oligarchs were, directly and indirectly, involved in local election activities. They become part of candidates’ campaign teams, finance political activities, play a role in issuing parties’ recommendations, mobilise mass campaigns, pay political consultants, control public opinion, distribute social assistance and design political parties coalitions. The involvement of oligarchs in local election activities is motivated by their desire to promote political parties in Central Sulawesi and the interests of running a business. This orientation of growing political parties is more dominant in influencing oligarchs to be involved in local elections, rather than the orientation of maintaining their business continuity. This finding shows that t...
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 2016
Press. 472 pages. ISBN-13: 978-9814722049. Paperback, $34.00. Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (eds.). 2016. "Unity in diversity" "from Sabang to Merauke"-if the two slogans that represent Indonesia's heterogeneity and geographical reach have become clich es, forgive me for combining the two to describe the fascinating edited volume Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientism at the Grassroots by Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati. The volume certainly comes very close to covering Indonesia's geographic expanse, although Eastern Indonesia gets short shrift as Sumatra and Java comprise the bulk of the cases, but the first slogan is certainly manifest in Electoral Dynamics. It is an exploration of two aspects of patronage in the Indonesian electoral system-the diversity of its implementation throughout the archipelago as well as its "unity," so to speak, in its persistence among victors and losers alike. Toward this end, several research teams examined 22 legislative elections in 2014 with an eye to studying patron-client ties. After a description of the volume's research goals and a discussion of the Indonesian party system, varieties of patronage and descriptions of mobilization networks, the case studies begin. Since the onset of democratization and the messiness that comes with it, Indonesian voters have many different parties to choose from (although among these parties there is little ideological diversity) and many opportunities for patronage windfalls at election time. "Success teams" are tasked with distributing patronage, and, as the book points out, voters are savvy enough to occasionally take the goods or benefit from broader patronage programs such as assistance to sports clubs and other community projects, or promises of development, without delivering a vote-in short, free riding. At the same time, authors argue that cultural norms of reciprocity or obligation may factor into a party's success as it is bolstered by kinship or ethnic relations, a common village heritage, or religious ties. Mostly absent from the analysis are connections to structural, institutional, or cultural approaches to the study of democracy and democratization. Francis Fukuyama receives a nod in the discussion of culture, but the examples are predominantly straightforward narratives of the campaigns and results. The volume, nevertheless, provides ample case studies for others to dissect, with an eye on these theoretical approaches. Lest one think that Indonesian politics is simply about delivering cash, goods or other benefits to (potential) constituents, the volume describes the strategies
Political parties in Indonesia and in other parts of Southeast Asia have become vitally dependent on the financial support of individuals or conglomerates with large private fortunes. A remarkable new development is that some of the billion-aires who have long sponsored political parties have decided to out themselves as political leaders, and thus to adopt the style of oligarchs. I define an oligarchy as a society featuring systematic conflation of political and economic power within the same individuals or within small, elite groups of such individuals in a manner that is visible, tolerated and hence legitimated. The gradual shift from clandestine money politics to open oligarchy is a significant challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conflicts of interest between the demands of public office and their private interests would seem difficult to avoid for politicians who also run large business empires and own great estates. On the other hand, for billionaire sponsors of political parties to come forward and stand for public office personally also means that their hitherto clandestine influence is becoming more transparent, and their conduct and decisions more subject to public scrutiny and accountability. This article describes how both direct and indirect ways of conducting money politics operate and coexist within different types of political parties in Indonesia today, and what the significance of these differences is and what is changing; with special reference to the 2014 parliamentary elections in Indonesia.
Nur Hidayat Sardini, 2019
This article scrutinizes the phenomenon of Local Government Election (Local election) of a regency at the easternmost province in Indonesia, Jayapura Regency of Papua. During the election period, there was a great number of violations against election rules which were not only sporadic but also designed on a structured, systematic and massive scale-using the term of Indonesian Constitutional Courts. The violations were related to the role of the oligarchs who cooperatively worked hand in hand to win the political contestation. The activities of the oligarchs which involved clerical-technical issues are undoubtedly prohibited by the Law of Pilkada. The clerical-technical issues include unlawful activities such as replacing some officials of polling station a day before the election, manipulating the official report documents like voting and the calculation of the votes forms, certificates of results and holographic forms of the votes calculation details and records of the results of valid vote calculation at the polling stations in massive numbers. In the Jayapura Regency Election, it is found that the practice of the election administration regime is defied by an electoral shadow structure played by the Oligarchs. Thus, this article argues that the political decentralization results in a powerful control of the local oligarchs on the Local Elections which must be solved for the sake of Indonesia's democratization. Keywords: the role of local oligarchs, electoral integrity, structured, systematic and massive violations
PCD Journal, 2018
Financial gifts have been an important, albeit not the only, factor in gathering voter support during regional elections in Indonesia. This article seeks to explore the 'dawn attacks' (serangan fajar) of vote buying in Bolaang Mongondow Regency, a practice that is socially required to gain votes during regional elections. Furthermore, this article explores how vote buying through personal finances and bureaucratic mobilisation has become a dominant factor in regional elections, far more important than institutional resources and conservative political instruments such as political parties. Despite Bolaang Mongondow being a region expected to offer little political and economic potential for vote buying at a massive scale—this regency is far from the national political mainstream, and most residents live quite prosperous and could fulfil their basic needs—these 'dawn attacks' have continued on a massive scale during regional elections. Furthermore, this article explai...
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Social and Political Development (ICOSOP 2017), 2018
The existence of informal actors like local strongman and the like is another consequent of localizing democracy in Indonesia nationwide. This research-based paper aims to analyze the existence of informal actors in influencing and shaping electoral process namely local election in Bangka Selatan, Sumatra, Indonesia. To acknowledge the local-informal actor in this case, researchers employ some theoretical frameworks like informal politics, elites, and Bourdieu's theory of capitals, in concerning the post-authoritarian state and transitional democracy in Indonesia which is signed by informal actors, process and also patronage model. It is obvious then, that money is not always a central actor within electoral process but another factor like informal networks is quite effective and significant ones. This finding will be very contributive to get better and factual understanding in seeing local politics dynamic in the contemporary democratic regime in Indonesia.
PERSPEKTIF
This study aims to see the relationship between patterns of patronage, clientelism, money politics, and campaign financing within the framework of patronage democracy that occurs in Indonesia. This paper uses the literature review method, the use of this method is related to the practice of patronage democracy and campaign financing which limits researchers in data collection. Data collection is done by collecting various books, scientific articles or journals related to the problem and research objectives. The results of this paper describe the pattern of patronage causing the large campaign costs incurred by each party and the candidate it nominates. The amount of money spent on campaigns can lead to acts of corruption. The solution offered in this paper has two points. First, campaign funding is financed 100% by the state, meaning that no other source of funds is allowed to enter the party. Thus, parties and candidates do not need to look for other sources of funds, so as to avoi...
Jurnal Studi Sosial dan Politik
The election of regional heads is actually a place to take choices directly by the people or voters in the regions. But in fact, the choice of voters is much influenced, even manipulated by political brokers. This study was conducted to reveal the models of political brokers and their operating patterns in regional head elections in Indonesia. Political brokers have hijacked direct democracy in local elections. The regional head should have a direct contract with the voters, related to the work program at the time of contestation and accountability at the time of election. But the process was hijacked midway by political brokers. Political brokers have long operated in the process in Indonesia, both general elections, presidential elections, village head elections, and regional head elections. This research used descriptive qualitative method. Data was collected through in-depth interviews with informants who were directly involved in the regional head election. From the research co...
2020
The most crucial issue of money politics in the election is the high cost of contestation borne by candidates in the election process. The study's objective is to analyze the causes of high political costs in regional head elections in Indonesia and the steps to reform the regional election system in the future. The study used a qualitative-descriptive method with a desk study technique, namely examining data sourced from literature and regulations and those related to the elections. The study found that political costs are high in regional head elections because, first, oligarchs control political parties because of the party's power to recruit candidates. In practice, recruiting candidates by political parties and coalitions of political parties are closed, elitist, and undemocratic. Party elites or oligarchs have the power to select and determine candidate pairs to fight in the regional elections. The nomination of candidates is not an arena for contesting capacities and ...
NOMOI Law Review, 2021
Political money are a forms of abuse, p olitik money can be done by granting the form of money or goods such as food to the people in order for them to vote for the party concerned a tau may also mean vote-buying in the political process and power and the act of handing out money either privately or by a party to influence the voter's vote. The method used in this paper is normative juridical legal research. In Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning Elections Article 1 point 1 that Elections are a means of people's sovereignty to elect members of the DPR, DPD members, the President and vicepresident and to elect members of the DPRD which are carried out directly, publicly, freely, confidentially, honestly and fairly. in the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Thus, elections are an important means for the people in the life of the state, namely by electing their representatives who in turn will control the wheels of government. However, in reality, few people are aware of the importance of the community's role in elections. As a result, it is difficult to prove the practice of money politics , thus making the candidates who will be elected freely practice money politics with the aim of getting the most votes in the implementation of the election .
International Journal of Business, Law, and Education
Elections for Village Heads, Regional Heads, Legislative Elections and General Elections in Indonesia should be carried out without being coloured by political money fraud, because of the dangers of political money for a clean democratic process ahead of the election of village heads, regional heads, legislative elections and general elections in Indonesia 2024, to achieve that power and victory, they used all kinds of methods. And that power will later be used to recover losses due to money politics. For this reason, Money Politics is considered a serious crime in the world of politics that must be fought and eliminated together. Money politics is the biggest enemy of democracy and is a 'bogey' that is familiar with holding elections in Indonesia. In the implementation of post-reform elections, money politics is a violation that is always in the spotlight. Uniquely, both election participants and the public are both involved in money politics circles. To fight the practice ...
Journal of Government and Politics, 2017
The study aims to describe the political party's local elite in Malang, East Java, Indonesia. Previous researchers found outthatthere were variation, relation and interaction among political elites at the local level. In Malang, a district of East Java Province, there are some local power of politics in practice namely Blater elite and Lora elite. Blater is a group of local strongmen who has strong collaboration with the elite oligarchy at the level local. Both of them have done unfair practice of nepotism in the field of politics to achieve power of Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) at the local level. On the other hand, Lora elite is a group of local strongmen, working together in synergy with the democratic elite to have access to power of the political party. In short, both of the political elites have been competitive to get the power of PAN. In order to describe the dynamics of political party local elites, the requirement is to fulfill a research methodology that would result in descriptive data in the form of words or utterances from individuals or behavior being observed. Interviews, focus group discussions, and documentary data were applied. The following are the findings of the research: 1) The existence of political party strongmen shows that the capacity of individual of the elites has the authority to determine various power context of the political party; 2) In the context of power, the existence of political party strongmen can limit and reduce the implementation of the political party regulation in the internal dynamics of the local inner circle of political party; and 3) Close relations depends upon a symbiotic relationship and the expression of mutual interest between the strongmen blater and the oligarchy so that patron-client relation could take place.
Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, 2023
Direct regional head elections or direct election give rise to two faces for Indonesian politics. On the one hand, a positive face towards democracy; on the other hand, it displays a negative impact. Its positive impacts include efforts to strengthen the political legitimacy of local governments; achieving political empowerment of citizens; institutionalizing checks and balances mechanisms between institutions in the region; and the emergence of female regional heads. Meanwhile, among the negative impacts of direct elections are the high costs of politics. The research presents a qualitative approach with data collection techniques in the form of literature studies, observations, and interviews. This paper marks aspects high costs were caused by several factors, such as candidacy buying, campaign costs, witness fees during the election, political consultant fees, and appeal fees to the Constitutional Court. Therefore, it is not surprising that the winning contestants will try to ret...
PCD Journal, 2017
This paper aims to map out practices of political financing in Indonesia from the political to the socio-historical perspective. Arguing about the party financing and the corruption of politicians and the parties, this paper also proposes about strategies at the individual level for performing financing politics, as well as factors that help to explain their performance. It compares cases in three different periods of Indonesian history: the postindependence, the Suharto (New Order) era, and reformasi after the fall of Suharto in 1998. This paper discusses and analyses the financing politics belonging to the political and socio-historical perspective, the issue of financing politics, the results of mapping students' theses from three universities in Java together with relevant papers by LIPI (the Indonesian Sciences Institute), and directly presents three case studies of individual performing financing politics. Two of the case studies concern with politicians from the post-independence and Suharto era, while the third concerns a member of the city of Solo's local parliament. This paper shows how financing politics would be no longer relevant, as the cultural capital, political capital, and social capital also may contribute in supporting one's political career.
This paper assesses the patterns of financing politics in democratizing Indonesia at both the national and local level. In doing so, it explores practices of money politics in three areas, namely political parties, elections, and parliaments. Money politics in political parties works in selecting leaders and candidates for the legislative and executive branches. This paper shows that party financing in Indonesia is based on the elite party model. Money politics in elections has to do with candidates' efforts to mobilize voters. Vote buying is the most popular electoral strategy in legislative elections as well as in direct regional elections. Meanwhile, money politics in parliament refers to the behavior of members of parliament and of governors, mayors, and regents when they try to gain access to State resources, and the consequences of their behavior. This paper argues that money politics in these three areas is interrelated. Money politics in one area generates money politics in other areas. Consequently, the way politicians manage their political financing has influenced democracy in post-Suharto Indonesia.
Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review
Circulating debates concerning the intense influence of direct local election towards money politics remains ongoing among Indonesian scholars. This article demonstrates several aspects indicating the relationship between direct local election (Pilkada) and money politics. In more specific rhetoric, current practices in money politics tend to occur before and during the election day, engaging political actors, voters, and soaring capital. As the novelty of this article, the findings reveal that the likelihood of money politics would most occur within the environment where the existing regulation encourages corruption. Hence, people have less concern to support a fair election, inevitably due to the weak law enforcement, exacerbated by disengagement of political parties.
This study aims to undestand the influence of money politics to voting behaviours in Enrekang local election 2013. This topic is interesting because there were many money politics practiced during the election. Money was used as tool. To influence political behaviours of the voters during the campaign. Giving presents in the forms of cash, goods, political pledges were used to win the contestation. Due to the money politics practices, as described in the background, the author attempted to answer the research question: “How are the influences of money politics to voting behaviours in the Enrekang local election 2013 ?” The theory used to answer in the question is money in the political contestation, the existence of money democracy party arena, as described by political scientists. Besides this research using voting behavioral theory with sociological, psychological, rational choice as supporting theories factors approach. This study uses quantitative analys, while using sield survey as research survey as research method. Besides, the recearchr conducted interview to sather more deef information. The data were taken primary and secondary. Data gathering teorique undertaken by questionaires, interviews, and documentations study. The unit of analysis of the research the voters, where using multi stage random sampling as the sampling technique, and the number of responden were 276. Money politics practices involved all socio-economi sesments of the society. The practices invated by a candidate had trigger the others to do the same. However, en though the practices existed in the entine, regency, not all voters influenced by the aimstance. There are some area where the voters preter to a a candidate who either orisivaely from the some, village or districts, based on the candidater’s vision and mission, personalty, programs, personal relationship, team relation, or the candidate’s ability in program solving. More oves, in general, money politics tend to influence political behaviors. In some to the area most important factors for the voters to sine their vote. More oves, in saveral money politics tent to influence political behavior. In some area, money had became the most important factor to be considered to give votes. The result of regresion test of money politics rational voting behaviors is 0,429 with significansy value 0,05. If the money politics value increases by 1, the voting behaviors value increases by 0,261, with is the influence of money politics to voting behaviors is 26,1%. Keywords: Enrekang local election, money politics, voting bihavioral
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