Cognitive aspects of tool use

The American psychologist

Humans have considerably modified their environment by making and building a number of tools, technologies, and constructions. This unique ability compared to other animals is the focus of researchers in different fields of psychology. However, there is confusion about the definitions proposed, generating difficulties in making connections between those different fields. This article presents the first unified framework (i.e., intoolligence) aiming to overcome these issues by focusing on the cognitive processes involved in the different forms taken by human tool use and technology, rather than on the overt behavior. To lay the foundation for intoolligence, we first address a series of epistemological misconceptions, which are the root cause for the current confusion. Particularly, we discuss the limitations of the widespread idea that tool use relies on specific cognitive skills, centered on the manipulative aspect of tool use. We develop, based on this analysis, details concerning ...

Psychological Review, 2010

2001

Adaptive Behavior, 2020

How the boundaries of the mind should be drawn with respect to action and the material world is a core research question that cognitive archaeology shares with contemporary cognitive sciences. The study of hominin technical thinking, as in the case of stone tool making, is a good way to bring that question to the fore. This article argues that archaeologists who study lithic artefacts and their transformations over the course of human evolution are uniquely well positioned to contribute to the ongoing debate about the marks of the mental. Adopting the material engagement approach, I propose to replace the internalist vision of mentality, that is, the vision of a brain-bound mind that is using the body to execute and externalise preconceived mental plan through the stone, with an ecological-enactive vision of participatory mentality where bodily acts and materials act together to generate rather than merely execute thought processes. I argue that the latter participatory view changes...

Philosophy & Technology

The notion that human activity can be characterised in terms of dynamic systems is a well-established alternative to motor schema approaches. Key to a dynamic systems approach is the idea that a system seeks to achieve stable states in the face of perturbation. While such an approach can apply to physical activity, it can be challenging to accept that dynamic systems also describe cognitive activity. In this paper, we argue that creativity, which could be construed as a 'cognitive' activity par excellence, arises from the dynamic systems involved in jewellery making. Knowing whether an action has been completed to a 'good' standard is a significant issue in considering acts in creative disciplines. When making a piece of jewellery, there a several criteria which can define 'good'. These are not only the aesthetics of the finished piece but also the impact of earlier actions on subsequent ones. This suggests that the manner in which an action is coordinated is influenced by the criteria by which the product is judged. We see these criteria as indicating states for the system, e.g. in terms of a space of 'good' outcomes and a complementary space of 'bad' outcomes. The skill of the craftworker is to navigate this space of available states in such a way as to minimise risk, effort and other costs and maximise benefit and quality of the outcome. In terms of postphenomonology, this paper explores Ihde's humantechnology relations and relates these to the concepts developed here.

Behavioral and Brain …, 2011

This article has two goals. The first is to assess, in the face of accruing reports on the ingenuity of great ape tool use, whether and in what sense human tool use still evidences unique, higher cognitive ability. To that effect, I offer a systematic comparison between humans and nonhuman primates with respect to nine cognitive capacities deemed crucial to tool use: enhanced hand-eye coordination, body schema plasticity, causal reasoning, function representation, executive control, social learning, teaching, social intelligence, and language. Since striking differences between humans and great apes stand firm in eight out of nine of these domains, I conclude that human tool use still marks a major cognitive discontinuity between us and our closest relatives. As a second goal of the paper, I address the evolution of human technologies. In particular, I show how the cognitive traits reviewed help to explain why technological accumulation evolved so markedly in humans, and so modestly in apes.

2019

We investigated how repeated, five-minute familiarization sessions occuring once a week over a 6-week period influenced 14 to 15 1/2 month-old infants’ ability to use a rake-like tool to retrieve an out of reach object. We found that infants, who were not allowed to touch the rake, but only to observe an adult retrieve an object with it, improved their performance. On the other hand, infants who were allowed to manually manipulate the rake and touch and move other objects with it did not improve their performance. The results, which were also replicated in a string-pulling task, suggest that cognitive rather than motor, limitations are mainly what prevent infants from succeeding in such tool-use tasks. Furthermore, infants can The Roles Of Observation and Manipulation In Tool Use overcome these cognitive limitations with only a few, very brief demonstrations spaced over several weeks. The Roles Of Observation and Manipulation In Tool Use

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 2003

PET was used to investigate the neural correlates of action knowledge in object representations, particularly the left lateralized network of activations previously implicated in the processing of tools and their associated actions: ventral premotor cortex (VPMCx), posterior middle temporal gyrus (PMTG), and intraparietal sulcus (IPS). Judgments were made about the actions and functions associated with manipulable man-made objects (e.g., hammer); this enabled us to measure activations in response to both explicit and implicit retrieval of knowledge about actions associated with manipulable tools. Function judgments were also made about nonmanipulable artifacts (e.g., traffic light) providing a direct comparison for manipulable objects. Although neither the left VPMCx nor the left PMTG were selective for tool stimuli (nonmanipulable objects also activated these areas relative to a visual control condition), both regions responded more strongly to manipulable objects, suggesting a rol...

International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 2013

Once considered only a human behavior, reports of tool use by a variety of animals have accumulated. Likewise, various definitions of tool use have also amassed. Although some researchers argue that understanding the evolutionary drivers of tool use is more important than identifying and describing these behaviors, the central issue of defining what constitutes tool use has not been fully addressed. Here we analyze prominent definitions of tool use and review the application of these definitions in scientific and educational literature. We demonstrate that many behaviors recently described as tool use do not meet criteria for prevalent definitions, while other neglected behaviors may constitute a form of tool use. These examples show how the use of inconsistent definitions of tool use in research can result in different conclusions from the same observations. Our aim is to demonstrate that a universally acceptable definition of tool use based on traditional, evolutionary, and operational understanding of behavior is needed. The rationale is that this review will stimulate the consistent and explicit use of specific terminology in tool use research. This would help define specific examples of each natural observation from a common measuring stick, allowing better comparative studies and classification of these unique behaviors.

Developmental psychology, 2016

Some grips on the handle of a tool can be planned on the basis of information directly available in the scene. Other grips, however, must be planned on the basis of the final position of the hand. "End-state comfort" grips require an awkward or uncomfortable initial grip so as to later implement the action comfortably and efficiently. From a cognitive perspective, planning for end-state comfort requires a consistent representation of the entire action sequence, including the latter part, which is not based on information directly available in the scene. Many investigators have found that young children fail to demonstrate planning for end-state comfort and that adultlike performance does not appear until about 12 years of age. In 2 experiments, we used a hammering task that engaged children in a goal-directed action with multiple steps. We assessed end-state-comfort planning in novel ways by measuring children's hand choice, grip choice, and tool implementation over mu...