Drones, state terrorism and international law

The recent practice consisting in the use of drones in combat operations against non-state actors has provoked a large debate among international actors and legal scholars. Considered a nontraditional instrument of the use of force, the first issue of concern regards the ius ad bellum, which is the legal grounds of recourse to force and, on the other side, the ius in bello which explains the modalities of the use of force, once an armed conflict already exists. For these reasons, beside the fulfillment of the criteria established by art. 51 and Chapter VII of UN Charter on the use of force, the use of drones should also, in the context of legitimate armed attack, fully respect the criteria imposed by humanitarian international law such as proportionality, necessity and immediacy. With regard to self-defense, the use of drones under international law raises several legal questions mostly related to the pre-emptive or anticipatory nature of the use of force. Under current conventional and customary international law, the pre-emptive use of force is severally prohibited and thus, considered a violation of art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter. Self-defense, in order to be considered in conformity with art. 51 of the Charter, could be exercised in anticipatory way if an armed attack of the counter-part has already started. Outside the cases of self-defense and SC authorization, the use of drones (as a form of use of force) could be acceptable only in case of express territorial state consent. In the areas outside the combat zone (where ius in bello applies) the use of drones is not lawful. In these cases applies enforcement measures law and the drone targeted killings are to be considered "extra-judicial killings". For these reasons, the practice of the use of drones in different areas of the world not Rivista elettronica del Centro di Documentazione Europea dell'Università Kore di Enna 2 involved in an armed conflict contrast with current international law and compromise the achievement of global security. Keywords: drones, ius in bello, ius ad bellum, international law, global security, use of force, selfdefense, armed attack. Content: 1. Global security and use of force: introductive considerations -2. Use of drones between ius ad bellum and ius in bello -3. Legality of targeted killings by using drones

Open Journal of Political Science, 2014

There is a notable absence of legal approaches to the discourse evaluating use of drones. Even when drones are discussed in a legal context, arguments assert that drones require a new legal regime to adapt to modern qualities and circumstances. In the alternative, this paper argues that drones compatibly fit into existing legal regimes, particularly international criminal law (ICL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) in accordance with general principles of international law. This paper argues that use of drones in armed conflict fits within existing laws governing use of force as the frameworks in use today. It demonstrates that ICL and IHL provide flexible guidelines appropriately suitable to particulars of drones, such as types and capabilities, but more importantly, they continue to provide legal governance applicable to drones as weapons. Legal uncertainty as to the use of drones is thus evaluated within the hypothetical exploration of drone usage culminating in a war crime before the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Open Journal of Political Science, 2014

There is a notable absence of legal approaches to the discourse evaluating use of drones. Even when drones are discussed in a legal context, arguments assert that drones require a new legal regime to adapt to modern qualities and circumstances. In the alternative, this paper argues that drones compatibly fit into existing legal regimes, particularly international criminal law (ICL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) in accordance with general principles of international law. This paper argues that use of drones in armed conflict fits within existing laws governing use of force as the frameworks in use today. It demonstrates that ICL and IHL provide flexible guidelines appropriately suitable to particulars of drones, such as types and capabilities, but more importantly, they continue to provide legal governance applicable to drones as weapons. Legal uncertainty as to the use of drones is thus evaluated within the hypothetical exploration of drone usage culminating in a war crime before the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Defence Studies, 2020

Scholarship on the proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (or drones) mainly focuses on states’ use, sidestepping the consequential proliferation of drone technology to violent nonstate actors (VNSAs). Meanwhile, an increasing corpus of media, military, and policy publications underscores the latter’s importance. The source of the gap is that existing proliferation models overlook civilian drone technologies. Applying supply- and demand-side proliferation models, we confirm conventional wisdom that military-grade drones are not likely to proliferate to VNSAs. Including civilian drones inverts proliferation logic across the boards. Shifting from cost-prohibitive, inaccessible, and technically complex military technologies to cheap, simple civilian platforms, we demonstrate that VNSAs have the resources, capacity, and interest to effectively incorporate drone programs to advance their aims. Furthermore, in context of state and nonstate actors’ security environments and normative constraints, the proliferation of civilian drones matters for international security. Norm-abiding states need expensive, high-performance, norm-enabling drones. For norm-defying VNSAs, civilian platforms are sufficient, even efficient, to advance their agendas.

Air & Space Power Journal, 2020

2020

Reason(s) for writing and research problem(s): The lack of research on drone attacks in the West Balkans, but also within the European Union, has influenced our decision to conduct case study analysis of drone incidents occurring in the world, but also in our surrounding, in order to think how to prevent those in our own "backyard". Aims of the paper (scientific and/or social): This article intends to present significant security and operational information on drone attacks from cases detected in various surroundings. Methodology/Design: Methodology used in the paper includes case studies of drone attacks in certain countries, in order to evaluate these incidents from security and operational aspects. Research/paper limitations: Limitations refer to possible unregistered activities in the form of new modus operandi of perpetrators involving drone attacks. Results/Findings: The findings presented in this paper show a cross-section of attack vectors and modus operandi used by perpetrators, as well as vulnerabilities found at targeted institutions and objects. Those findings are to be considered for future prevention of perpetrators activities. General conclusion: There is a real need to improve and modernize general security measures related to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. This article points to such necessity at several different levels and aspects through the analysis of attack vectors, modus operandi, and the weaknesses of the attacked targets. Research/paper validity: Findings presented in this article can be used to direct future research in this field, in order to strengthen and develop various measures to combat existing and persistent threats posed by drones.

2014

This collection aims to clarify the effects of drones on the conduct of modern warfare. Its editors (all Univ. of Notre Dame) and ten of fourteen contributors work at law and policy-oriented institutions and academic departments, mostly in the United States. Their specific objectives, according to the preface by United Nations Special Rapporteur Cristof Heyns (Univ. of Pretoria), is to enhance precaution standards, suggest a role for the UN, improve monitoring of drone killings, and shed light on state complicity in drone strikes. Though these are global issues, the authors concentrate on US policies and practice in light of ethical norms embodied in international law and just war theory (6). Following Cortright and Fairhurst's chapter 1 overview, "Assessing the Debate on Drone Warfare," the book's other chapters concern three major subjects: the morality of drone warfare; its strategic implications for counterterrorism policy; and its impacts on political accountability, freedom of information, and human rights. In chapter 2, "The Morality of 'Drone Warfare,'" Jennifer Welsh (European Univ. Inst., Florence) proffers an astute analysis of the human dimension of drone killing. She attempts to redefine "combatant" and to assess the difference between killings in war and non-war situations. She criticizes the loose equivalence between "imminence of" and "generally engaged in" terrorist activity. She concludes that drone killing is neither good nor bad in itself and may be a legitimate instrument of war in some circumstances. Martin Cook (US Naval War College), in chapter 3, "Drone Warfare and Military Ethics," addresses the morality of drone killing, through tactical, operational, and strategic "lenses," before turning to international law and grand strategy. He approves of drones as a means to an end, except in the case of "signature" strikes against all fighting age males. Operationally, he believes drone use has been appropriate in Afghanistan, but not always elsewhere. Strategically, drones often do more harm than good to users regardless of their tactical and operational efficacy. Some US attacks on al-Qaeda have conformed to international law, but not, Cook writes, the George W. Bush administration's concept of "anticipatory self-defense" (National Security Strategy of 2002). Since the United States is no longer the sole user of military drones (62), meaningful international standards for their deployment are a pressing need. In chapter 4, "International Law and Drone Attacks beyond Armed Conflict Zones," Mary Ellen O'Connell (Notre Dame School of Law) refutes eight supposed legal justifications of drone killings outside combat zones, arguing notably that appeals to some global war are counterfactual even as to Afghanistan; so a self-defense justification based on such a war fails (65-68). For example, a nation's "consent" to an outsider's intervention because it is "unable or unwilling" to deal with terrorists inside its borders is no legitimate reason for such intervention. Other justifications do not comply with the International Committee of the Red Cross definition of "continuous combat functions." Karen Greenberg (Fordham Univ.), in chapter 5, "Drone Strikes and the Law," exposes legal flaws in US drone policy. Under George W. Bush, "enemy" might denote not just a given nation but also

STATE CRIME , 2014