Evil Revisited

Open Theology

1993

In this examination of the benevolent God and the existence of evil dilemma we will, perhaps from necessity, focus our attention not so much upon the enigma of God, but—in the belief that clarifying one might clarify both—upon the more accessible nature of evil. Augustine begins his examination of evil by tackling the problem inherent in accepting that the original of “Original Sin” must function in its temporal as well as its religious sense.

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2016

In his article 'Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil' recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: (i) the doingallowing distinction exists and (ii) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim's attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil. In his article 'Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil' recently published in this journal, 1 Daniel Lim observes that 'the so-called Problem of Evil (PoE) is seen by many to be the most formidable problem for theistic belief.'(p.2). He notes that many people hold the following assumption: 'ASSUMPTION: The only way to defend theistic belief given the PoE is to assume God does not actively bring about everything that happens. God merely allows some things, in particular evil, to happen' (p.4). Lim explains that this assumption is at odds with a view which he labels as 'PROVIDENCE': 'PROVIDENCE: God actively brings about everything that happens in the world' (p.2). He argues that ASSUMPTION depends on two claims: (i) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (ii) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. 2 In the rest of his paper he attempts to undermine both of these claims. He concludes that broadly Kantian 1 DOI 10.1007/s11153-016-9569-y . 2 Lim refers to the overview of the current literature on the doing-allowing distinction and its moral status in Woollard (2012a, 2012b).

Boston Catholic Journal, 2022

No single factor is invoked more often in people turning away from God, or in their failing to believe in Him, than the occurrence — note that I do not say “existence” *— of evil, especially as it manifests itself in suffering. The occurrence of evil appears incompatible with God, or at least a coherent conception of God as both — and simultaneously — absolutely good and absolutely powerful. That God and the occurrence of evil should coexist appears logically contradictory and ontologically incompatible. The one is effectively the abrogation of the other. The existence of God, it is argued, precludes (or ought to preclude) the occurrence of evil and the occurrence of evil precludes (or ought to preclude) the existence of God. While we can readily adduce empirical evidence, that is to say, tangible instances, of evil to discredit the existence of God, the availability of evidence to corroborate the existence of God, on the other hand, is so exiguous that even when such instances are invoked they are deemed extraordinary events in the affairs of men; indeed, events so far from commonplace that we call them miraculous — that is to say, inexplicable interventions conditionally attributed to God in the absence of alternate explanations that may yet be forthcoming. Whether or not this is a sufficient, if concise, summary, the general implication is clear: evidence of evil overwhelmingly exceeds evidence of God. If sheer preponderance is the criterion to which we appeal, God loses. Evil comes as a scandal to the believer who asks, “How can this be, given the existence of God?” To the disbeliever no such scandal arises — only scorn for the believer who is left in perplexity, unable to deny the existence of God on the one hand while equally unable to deny the occurrence of evil on the other. We appear to be consigned to either nihilistic resignation in the one camp (evil is somehow ontologically inherent and rampant in the universe although we cannot explain why), or an unreasoned and therefore untenable affirmation of the existence of God — despite the contradictory concurrence of evil — in the other. Both appear to be damned to perplexity. Neither has satisfactorily answered the question implicit within every occurrence of evil: “Why?” 2. The Problem ... and why we must respond to it Before we begin our attempt to arrive at an answer to the problem of evil, we must first clearly summarize and completely understand the nature of the problem itself. While this may appear obvious, all too often our efforts to make sense of the experience of evil in our lives and in the world fail to adequately address implicit or unstated premises apart from which no answer is either forthcoming or possible. Failing to follow the premises, we fail to reach a conclusion. Instead, we reflexively seize what is incontrovertible (the occurrences of evil) and, understanding nothing of its antecedents, satisfy ourselves that it is entirely a mystery — in other words, utterly incomprehensible to us — in fact, so opaque to our ability to reason it through (which we do not) that we throw up our hands in either frustration or despair, declaring that either it is the will of God in a way we do not understand, or that there can be no God in light of the enormities that we experience. In either case — whether we affirm that God exists despite them, or deny that He exists because of them — we confront the experience of evil as an impenetrable mystery. Such a facile answer, I suggest, is not a satisfactory state of affairs at all.

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 1988

It is no secret that the major objection to believing that God exists is the plentiful presence of pain, suffering and dysfunction in the world. One need only visit a hospital's cancer ward or talk to the parent of a child dying from leukemia to sense the struggle of faith. If God is all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient) and wholly good, how can we explain this suffering? As J.L. Mackie, a noted critic of theism, put it, "It is true that there is no explicit contradiction between the statements that there is an omnipotent and wholly good god and that there is evil. But if we add the at least initially plausible premisses that good is opposed to evil in such a way that a being who is wholly good eliminates evil as far as he can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do, then we do have a contradiction. A wholly good omnipotent being would eliminate evil completely; if there really are evils, then there cannot be any such being. ''1 This argument against God's existence can be posed in either an inductive or a deductive form. According to the inductive argument form, the variety, severity and profusion of evil in the world make God's existence improbable or unlikely. It is not the mere existence of evil which creates intellectual difficulties for the theist, but its amount and intensity. This, the traditional formulation of the objection, is the weaker of the two forms, for its soundness depends upon three things: (1) the judgment of how severe and prevalent evil is in the world, compared with the quantity of good; (2) the strength of contrary evidence for the existence of God, evidence which may or may not form part of the background knowledge of the disputants; and (3) whether it is reasonable to believe that there are evils which, if God did exist, he could have eliminated without losing a greater good or producing an equal or greater evil. 2

2015

The contemporary debate originates with the publishing of J. L. Mackie's "Evil and Omnipotence." 2 In this article, Mackie articulates the standard version of the logical argument from evil by claiming that the three core tenants of theism ("God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists") are logically inconsistent. 3 H. J. McCloskey follows Mackie by taking a more general approach to the problem and examining a wider range of potential solutions. 4 The logical argument's momentum comes to a screeching halt with the publication of Alvin Plantiga's landmark work, The Nature of Necessity. 5 In this work Plantinga employs modal logic and possible world semantics to demonstrate "that it is possible that God could not have created a universe containing moral good without creating one containing moral evil." 6 By demonstrating this possibility, Plantinga shows that there is no necessary logical inconsistency between the existence of God and evil. Using this demonstration, he accomplishes a rare feat in the contemporary philosophical landscape: near universal agreement. Robert Adams states, "It is fair to say that Plantinga has solved this problem." 7 William Alston agrees: "It is now acknowledged on (almost) 2

2024

No single factor is invoked more often in people turning away from God, or in their failing to believe in Him, than the occurrence — note that I do not say the “existence” of evil, especially as it manifests itself in suffering. The occurrence — not the existence — of evil appears incompatible with God, or at least a coherent conception of God as both — and simultaneously — absolutely good and absolutely powerful. That God and the occurrence of evil should coexist appears logically contradictory and ontologically incompatible. The one is effectively the abrogation of the other. The existence of God, it is argued, precludes (or ought to preclude) the occurrence of evil, and the occurrence of evil precludes (or ought to preclude) the existence of God. While we can readily adduce empirical evidence, that is to say, tangible instances, of evil to discredit the existence of God, the availability of evidence to corroborate the existence of God, on the other hand, is so exiguous that even when such instances are invoked, they are deemed extraordinary events in the affairs of men; indeed, events so far from commonplace that we call them miraculous — that is to say, inexplicable interventions conditionally attributed to God in the absence of alternate explanations that may yet be forthcoming. Whether or not this is a sufficient, if concise, summary, the general implication is clear: evidence of evil overwhelmingly exceeds evidence of God. If sheer preponderance is the criterion to which we appeal, God loses. Evil comes as a scandal to the believer who asks, “How can this be, given the existence of God?” To the disbeliever no such scandal arises — only scorn for the believer who is left in perplexity, unable to deny the existence of God on the one hand … while equally unable to deny the occurrence of evil on the other.

Philosophia, 1984