ENHANCED ADAPTIVE SECURITY PROTOCOL IN LTE AKA

fidel uwaya

ENHANCED ADAPTIVE SECURITY PROTOCOL IN LTE AKA

fidel uwaya

visibility

…

description

11 pages

link

1 file

AI-generated Abstract

The paper addresses the security concerns surrounding the deployment of the LTE-A (4G) network, emphasizing the evolution of mobile technology security from 1G to 4G. It critiques the existing vulnerabilities in earlier generations, particularly focusing on the limitations of GSM and the enhancements introduced by the 3GPP AKA for UMTS and relationship to the LTE security framework. By analyzing past research and proposing an enhanced adaptive security protocol for LTE, the study aims to address known weaknesses and improve authentication processes while maintaining performance amid evolving cryptographic threats.

Figures (6)

Keys are never reused in LTE AKA.LTE provides integrity, replay protection and encryption between UE
and eNB for radio specific signaling. Internet key exchange (IKE) and IPSec protects the backhaul
between eNB and MME and it also provides end to end protection of signaling between MME and
UE.IKE/IPsec also protect backhaul from eNB to Serving gateway (S-GW) via user plane traffic. Only
encryption is efficient in user plane between UE and eNB as bandwidth overhead is expensive for
integrity protection here. For the handover in LTE, between two eNBs, eNB needs transfer security
parameter to the target eNB while simultaneously restoring forward and backward security should there
pe any security branch at any of the eNB. In either case of compromise, core network can provide the
target eNB with a new key unknown in the source eNB. Same security context used during Handover
between UE and LTE /other 3GPP technologies when initiated. May also be transferred when UE moves
between legacy systems like GSM/GERAN, and UTRAN, since LTE includes caching of security
contexts as it saves on the number of times a subscriber must be authenticated when a UE rapidly moves
pack and forth between LTE and UTRAN. — Keys are never reused in LTE AKA.LTE provides integrity, replay protection and encryption between UE and eNB for radio specific signaling. Internet key exchange (IKE) and IPSec protects the backhaul between eNB and MME and it also provides end to end protection of signaling between MME and UE.IKE/IPsec also protect backhaul from eNB to Serving gateway (S-GW) via user plane traffic. Only encryption is efficient in user plane between UE and eNB as bandwidth overhead is expensive for integrity protection here. For the handover in LTE, between two eNBs, eNB needs transfer security parameter to the target eNB while simultaneously restoring forward and backward security should there pe any security branch at any of the eNB. In either case of compromise, core network can provide the target eNB with a new key unknown in the source eNB. Same security context used during Handover between UE and LTE /other 3GPP technologies when initiated. May also be transferred when UE moves between legacy systems like GSM/GERAN, and UTRAN, since LTE includes caching of security contexts as it saves on the number of times a subscriber must be authenticated when a UE rapidly moves pack and forth between LTE and UTRAN.

LTE utilizes 5 different keys, each used for a specific purpose and valid only for certain duration
Different keys are used for communication in the E-UTRAN and the EPS. We believe this approacl
greatly reduces the effect of any possible security compromise. All the keys are derived using the Key}
Derivation Function (KDF) [9]. The 5 critical security keys derive their basis from the K key with «
number of intermediate keys utilized as well. K is the permanent key stored on the USIM (Universa
Subscriber Identity Module) on the UE. CK and IK are the pair of keys derived on the USIM during ar
AKA exchange. Subsequently, the KASME key is derived from the CK, IK and SN identity using a KDI
[9]. The 5 keys are: (i) KNASint and KNASenc integrity and encryption keys respectively are used tc
protect NAS traffic between the UE and MME (ii) KUPenc key is used to encrypt user data traffic
between the UE and eNodeB (iii) KRRCint and KRRCenc integrity and encryption keys respectively ar
used to protect RRC (Radio Resource Control) traffic between the UE and the eNodeB. [9] — LTE utilizes 5 different keys, each used for a specific purpose and valid only for certain duration Different keys are used for communication in the E-UTRAN and the EPS. We believe this approacl greatly reduces the effect of any possible security compromise. All the keys are derived using the Key} Derivation Function (KDF) [9]. The 5 critical security keys derive their basis from the K key with « number of intermediate keys utilized as well. K is the permanent key stored on the USIM (Universa Subscriber Identity Module) on the UE. CK and IK are the pair of keys derived on the USIM during ar AKA exchange. Subsequently, the KASME key is derived from the CK, IK and SN identity using a KDI [9]. The 5 keys are: (i) KNASint and KNASenc integrity and encryption keys respectively are used tc protect NAS traffic between the UE and MME (ii) KUPenc key is used to encrypt user data traffic between the UE and eNodeB (iii) KRRCint and KRRCenc integrity and encryption keys respectively ar used to protect RRC (Radio Resource Control) traffic between the UE and the eNodeB. [9]

The concept. of this paper is implemented and different results are shown below, The proposed paper is
implemented in Java technology on a Pentium-IV PC with minimum 20 GB hard-disk and 1GB RAM.
The propose paper’s concepts shows efficient results and has been efficiently tested on different Datasets. — The concept. of this paper is implemented and different results are shown below, The proposed paper is implemented in Java technology on a Pentium-IV PC with minimum 20 GB hard-disk and 1GB RAM. The propose paper’s concepts shows efficient results and has been efficiently tested on different Datasets.

Figure 3: Delay Vs Time Instance (A ttack Mode)
Memory consumed at different instances of t. Memory consumed in loading protocol after the first dro
while consumes large amount of memory but later times , t1,t2,t3, t4.... Memory utilization increase
gradually due t communication transfer which needs to save in mobile for some period of time. — Figure 3: Delay Vs Time Instance (A ttack Mode) Memory consumed at different instances of t. Memory consumed in loading protocol after the first dro while consumes large amount of memory but later times , t1,t2,t3, t4.... Memory utilization increase gradually due t communication transfer which needs to save in mobile for some period of time.

This graph shows what happens when an attack node is initiated plotted against when protocol is about to
be initiated. So it high at initial point but when loaded its uniform. It observed that when protocol is
loaded its delay is uniform meaning even with an attack node delay in communication is same. So proves
that attack is null and void. No attack can happen with this protocol.

The graph in figure 4 shows what happens with memory usage when attack node is applied, at initial node
its same as delay as protocol is yet to be loaded and when protocol is loaded and attack is initiated, with
different time limits, memory usage is insignificantly different. Meaning that an attack will not affect
memory usage, so no attack could happen within our enhanced security adaptive protocol.
This paper investigates the security with the LTE AKA protocol and also examines the operational
difficulty associated with the string number operations. The LTE AKA protocol is based on the structure
of 3GPP AKA and expects to wipe out real and also perceived attacks, especially the so-called false base
place attack. Within this paper, we demonstrated that LTE AKA is susceptible to a version of false base
station attack. The weaknesses allow an adversary to redirect user traffic derived from one of network to
another. It in addition allows an adversary to utilize authentication vectors at a corrupted foreign network
to impersonate some other networks. Also, the usage of synchronization in between a cellular station and
home circle incurs sizeable difficulty with the normal operation of LTE AKA. To deal with the safety
measures problems and supply further development on LTE AKA, we presented a fresh authentication
and also key arrangement protocol (SEAP-AKA) which can defeat the redirection strike and drastically
mitigates the impact involving network data corruption. The protocol SEAP-AKA in addition eliminates
the synchronization between the mobile station plus the home circle. Depending on the execution
atmosphere, entities inside protocol hold the flexibility involving adaptively picking flows with regard to
execution. We show that the adaptability allows you optimize the efficiency involving SEAP-AKA in the
home circle and foreign networks. we also showed removal of synchronization between a cell station and
its home system improves efficiency without compromising security. — This graph shows what happens when an attack node is initiated plotted against when protocol is about to be initiated. So it high at initial point but when loaded its uniform. It observed that when protocol is loaded its delay is uniform meaning even with an attack node delay in communication is same. So proves that attack is null and void. No attack can happen with this protocol. The graph in figure 4 shows what happens with memory usage when attack node is applied, at initial node its same as delay as protocol is yet to be loaded and when protocol is loaded and attack is initiated, with different time limits, memory usage is insignificantly different. Meaning that an attack will not affect memory usage, so no attack could happen within our enhanced security adaptive protocol. This paper investigates the security with the LTE AKA protocol and also examines the operational difficulty associated with the string number operations. The LTE AKA protocol is based on the structure of 3GPP AKA and expects to wipe out real and also perceived attacks, especially the so-called false base place attack. Within this paper, we demonstrated that LTE AKA is susceptible to a version of false base station attack. The weaknesses allow an adversary to redirect user traffic derived from one of network to another. It in addition allows an adversary to utilize authentication vectors at a corrupted foreign network to impersonate some other networks. Also, the usage of synchronization in between a cellular station and home circle incurs sizeable difficulty with the normal operation of LTE AKA. To deal with the safety measures problems and supply further development on LTE AKA, we presented a fresh authentication and also key arrangement protocol (SEAP-AKA) which can defeat the redirection strike and drastically mitigates the impact involving network data corruption. The protocol SEAP-AKA in addition eliminates the synchronization between the mobile station plus the home circle. Depending on the execution atmosphere, entities inside protocol hold the flexibility involving adaptively picking flows with regard to execution. We show that the adaptability allows you optimize the efficiency involving SEAP-AKA in the home circle and foreign networks. we also showed removal of synchronization between a cell station and its home system improves efficiency without compromising security.

Key takeaways

Vendors can integrate this modules as one device or separately as 3GPP standard demands [9].Part of the LTE security architecture evolution is the EAP AKA Authentication and Key Agreement scheme (LTE-AKA) which defines the protocol through which the User Equipment (UE) and the Home Network (HN) are mutually authenticated and the mechanism through which the master encryption keys are generated.
Source: [11] Keys are never reused in LTE AKA.LTE provides integrity, replay protection and encryption between UE and eNB for radio specific signaling.
The initialization of SEAP-AKA is aiming at security flaws, this module proposes a Security-Enhanced Authentication and Key Agreement protocol (SE-APA AKA) based on WPKI, using existing 128 bit key encryption as in 3GPP AKA where CA: denotes the Certification Agency; K : denotes the long term key shared between UE and HSS; PK : denotes the public key of UE, MME and HSS; SK: denotes the cipher key of UE, MME and HSS; f 3, f 4, s10 : denotes the key generating functions; ASME K : denotes the intermediate key; ASME KSI : denotes, the key identification allocated by MME for ASME KSI；sig m : denotes the signature to message m.
Using the same method, the authentication of MME to UE is also can be validated.
To deal with the safety measures problems and supply further development on LTE AKA, we presented a fresh authentication and also key arrangement protocol (SEAP-AKA) which can defeat the redirection strike and drastically mitigates the impact involving network data corruption.

Log In

ENHANCED ADAPTIVE SECURITY PROTOCOL IN LTE AKA

Sign up for access to the world's latest research

AI-generated Abstract

Figures (6)

Key takeaways

Related papers

Related papers

Related topics