Phenomenology of Religion

2005

When Gods Spoke: Researches and Reflections on Religious Phenomena and Artefacts, 2015

Phenomenology of religion as a research project has fallen out of favour in the past few decades. Yet discussions about the feasibility and relevance of the phenomenological approach continue. In one way or another most of the current approaches in the study of religion rely on the disciplinary background of the earlier phe-nomenologies. This article analyses a couple of the more recent proposals that have reconsidered the relevance of the phenomenological approach, aiming to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of these proposals in relation to the goals of the study of religion. Based on this review and analysis of current discussions I argue in the second half of my article that the phenomenology of religion can still serve as an important part of the study of religion and avoid criticisms it previously invited if it is remodelled into an endeavour of 'typologi-cal analysis' in the sense explained in the second half of this article. In one way or another all contemporary approaches to the study of religion relate to the phenomenology of religion. The most prevalent way is certainly conceptual: many (if not most) of the conceptual tools, their meanings and their supposed universality have been taken from the ty-pological and categorical distinctions of earlier generalized phenomenol-ogies. This is apparent from postmodernist approaches, which strongly oppose the phenomenology of religion, to the modern cognitive study of religion that aims to analyse and explain religion as a general phenomenon by highlighting many of the same characteristics that earlier were central to the phenomenologies of religion. Aside from conceptual tools, there is also the understanding that one should maintain neutrality in

2000

Archivio di Filosofia LXXXII - 2015/3, pp. 47-57

Philosophy Papers and Journal Articles, 2008

FALSAFEH, The Iranian Journal of Philosophy, 2009

What follows is an attempt to see Otto the phenomenologist within wider developments in the field, and to take account of some recent criticisms. Everything that is said falls under the general headingof 'introduction to the study of religion'(or 'meta-religionswissenschaft') Within this wide field, we shall be specifically concerned with the possibility of a systematic phenomenology of religion, and with that phenomenology of religion which takes its starting point from Otto's awareness of the numinous in its non-rational and rational forms and manifestations. In addition to this central insight of Otto's and deriving to a large extent from it, are the morphological categories which can be traced back further than Otto to Chantepie de la Saussaye (1869-1937). These categories form part of classical phenomenology of religion down to Friedrich Heiler (1892-1967). We shall come back to these categories after looking at Otto's numinous as the starting point for a global phenomenology.

Religion, 1987

This two-volume reference work is presented as a `sequel' to J. Waardenburg's Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion published as volumes I and II in this same Mouton series (Reason and Religion). The work is meant to complement thè story' of the academic study of religion in its development up to 1945 implicit in the selections of representative scholars in the field gathered together by Waardenburg. The substance of these volumes does not, however, comprise select passages from key authors in `religious studies', that being virtually impossible given the extensive development of the field since 1945. Nor do these volumes present a unified historical narrative of that `further development' of religious studies. Rather, they contain the reflections of a `team' of scholars, each summarizing the character of the study of religion within the framework of various sub-disciplines, so to speak, that constitute that study. It is the aim of the editor (and most of the authors, it appears) not only to indicate the variety of legitimate research interests in religious studies, but also to show how that variety of approaches interrelate, or, at least, can be integrated so as to constitute a kind of unified theory of the nature of the study of religion. It soon becomes evident to the reader, however-and reluctantly admitted by the editorthat even with this two-volume assault on the problem there is no single paradigm for the study of religion even within sight let alone within our grasp. What unity does appear to exist derives more from the hopes expressed by the editor than from the substance of the essays. Volume I is focussed on `the humanities', i .e. on approaches to the study of religion that, as Whaling puts it in the introductions to the two volumes, transcend the positivism of the scientific approach to religious phenomena by means of the intuitive insight `that the study of religion has to do with man' (I : 25, 26 ; II : 12). In the introduction to the first volume, Whaling attempts to highlight, the contrasts between the classical and contemporary periods in the study of religion and enunciates some general methodological claims that seem to constitute a set of assumptions for all the authors. Five essays follow which cover the historical and phenomenological approaches to the study of religion (U. King), the comparative study of religion (F. Whaling), the study of religious texts and myth (K. Bolle), the scientific study of religion in its plurality (N. Smart), and the global context of the contemporary study of religions (F. Whaling). U. King's essay is more than merely descriptive. It is a polemical essay that argues for a historical and phenomenological study of religions that is more than a narrow, empirical approach to the phenomenon. Such an `empirical positivism', as she calls it, jeopardizes the autonomy of `religious studies' and is, moreover, inadequate to its subject matter. Her review of the methodological debates amongst historians and phenomenologists over the last 40 years, however, is thorough and stimulating .

Ars Disputandi

The present essay calls for a readjustment and extension of the eld of philosophy of religion as it is conceived by most of its practitioners. Philosophy of religion should not only pursue its old objectives of epistemology, ontology, and philosophy of religious language, to name just these examples, but consider religious phenomena in their entirety, including social and public dimensions. Social philosophy is a major area at the moment. Thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor write extensively on the importance of the public sphere in modern societies, and they even address the role of religion in this sphere. To leave the exploration of the social dimension of religion to social philosophers, historians, and sociologists of religion would be unwise and betrays a truncated view of religion and, thereby, of philosophy of religion. There is more to religion than its cognitive and moral aspects. This essay is an attempt to engage in a dialogue with modern scholarship on religion which rethinks its (re)location in (post)modernity. It is simply not true that the only proper place for religion in the modern world is the private sphere. The emergence of a public sphere since the Enlightenment offers also new opportunities for religion. Philosophers of religion ought to re ect about this kind of transformations.

The term "Philosophy of Religion" can be explained in two different senses, one of which has been used historically prior to the other. The first possible meaning of the term, derived from the Hegelian notion of philosophy of religion, is the study of absolute religion, i.e. the study of religion as a genus for concrete religions. The second meaning, which has been prevailed in contemporary philosophy of religion, is to explore problems of specific religions philosophically. Although the former meaning of the term is independent of any knowledge of specific religions, "philosophy of religion" in its latter meaning is relying on religious problems. In this sense, philosophy of religion could be religious, that is the philosopher can probe into problems of a concrete religion. Hence, philosophy of religion can simultaneously explore the general problems, which religions have in common, and the problems that belong to a concrete religion in particular. In the latter, when the problems are raised from a specific religion, the investigation of those problems would be a religious philosophy of religion. It should be noted that in this view of the notion, the term "religious" has not any apologetic implication, but it merely describes the sphere of the problems.