The Dàodéjīng: A 2022 Translation

Religions

This article investigates the translation of De 德 in the English translation of the Daodejing, compares and analyzes several representative translations, and tries to present the complexity and richness of the meaning of De in the thought of the Daodejing. The article is divided into three parts. First, it briefly traces the concept of De back to the Shang 商 and Zhou 周 periods, thus laying the foundation for subsequent study. Second, taking Chapter 51 of the Daodejing as an example, it explores the meaning of “virtue”, which is the most important and common translation of De, in the context of the Daodejing and examines related terms such as “potency” and “inner power”. Finally, two representative translations of “Xuan De” 玄德 are examined and discussed.

2004

The Journal of East Asian Philosophy

This article suggests that the writings of the Huang Lao tradition embody an ethic in the sense of a guiding philosophy of life. This ethic is based on the Laozi-the initial text in the tradition that is textually presented in paradoxes. While the paradoxical expression could make readers forgo an ethic, we claim that it is the other way around. The paradoxes, as we explain in this article, are inherent to the tradition, and reflect a unique reasoning described here as riddles lived by or living riddles. We suggest that Laozi 1 suggests riddle reasoning that is based on an understanding Dao as at once kedao可道 ("can be daoed") and changdao常道 (constant Dao). While changdao is the ineffable unity, kedao is plurality, hence it may be expressed as familiar moral ways when alone. Only when unified with changdao, Dao opens a gate to the mysteries of life. The mystery suggested here is a "model of modeling" as suggested in Laozi 25 that represents the unified Dao riddle reasoning rather than dichotomizing (kedao) reasoning. According to the model we refer to, the Laozi'an De as self-so (ziran自然) that serves as foundation for an ethic that is not dichotomizing and has no dependence whatsoever on morality. We suggest that this ethic can serve as a basis for the analysis of the Huang Lao tradition as a whole.

The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, 2015

There has been an impressive revival of virtue ethics in the West, as a challenge to ethics of duty and consequentialism that have been dominating modern dis- courses of ethics. Many attempts have thus been made to explore the potential of virtue ethics in Asian traditions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and, most prominently, Confucianism. However, little attention has been paid to the virtue ethics potential in Chinese Daoism. This chapter on Daoist virtue ethics thus cannot but be experimental. While the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi are the two greatest and yet quite different classics in philosophical Daoism, this chapter will draw on the latter only.

Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 2021

The introduction to this special issue describes the emergence of the virtue ethics approach within the study of Confucian virtues in recent decades. It will first examine scholarly contributions to the discussion of Confucian virtue ethics and then raises questions concerning whether or not de 德 in early Confucian texts is identical with arête or virtue. It will then investigate the meaning and implication of de in Confucian contexts and make an argument for a new type of Confucian de ethics. It will finally come to the project on de and virtue ethics in early Confucian texts and define its purpose and boundaries.

Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 13.2 (June 2014)., 2014

Norton Introduction to Ethics

A discussion of Daoist challenges to Confucian views of virtue, and the unique forms of virtue we find in Daoist texts. Unabridged version of forthcoming article on early Daoist conceptions of virtue in the Norton Introduction to Ethics.

2008

Religions

The Daodejing is counted among the greatest works of world philosophy and literature, but it is a short work that is exceedingly difficult to comprehend. Among several reasons for this is that no one knows the actual words and form of its original text. Assessing the differences between any two editions of it is a simple task when they are laid next to each other, but it is not possible to lay any edition of the Daodejing next to its original text to assess their differences, because no one has ever seen the original text of the Daodejing, and no one knows its actual words and form. Approaching the original text is only made possible through its representations and reflections in later editions that we do possess, some of them transmitted and others excavated. Any possible access to the original text, to any degree whatsoever, is dependent on how these later editions are managed. Sinology manages them with the recension category whereas Laozi Studies manages them with the version ca...

2011