PROBLEMS OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS
José Luis Calvo Martínez, JLC2006
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Abstract
ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτ᾽ ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1 (1155a) In Homage to José García López φιλίας χάριν Summary: The paper aims to raise certain questions of Aristotelian Ethics focusing mainly on the Nicomachean Ethics, it being the author's purpose to "contextualize" Aristotle's ethical thought and his writings on it. In the first place the structure and the links between the different books, which prove a late conflation of NE, are analyzed. Secondly, regards content, the sources of Aristotle after his rejection of Platonic Ethics are taken into consideration: these reveal a partial return to the aristocratic morals in the concepts both of eudaimonia and areté, and through the catalogue of virtues in Book IV. Finally, problems both lexical and semantic of Aristotle's ethic vocabulary are raised.
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