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2019, Analysis
Some people claim that some instances of suffering are intrinsically bad in an impersonal way. If it were true, that claim might seem to count against virtue ethics and for consequentialism. Drawing on the works of Jason Kawall, Christine Swanton and Nietzsche, I consider some reasons for thinking that it is, however, false. I argue, moreover, that even if it were true, a virtue ethicist could consistently acknowledge its truth.
forthcoming in The Journal of Value Inquiry
Michael Brady's Suffering and Virtue (Oxford University Press, 2018) is a wonderfully rich, important, and meaningful book. Brady's detailed case study of suffering provides a specific and much-needed illustration of the significance of feelings and emotions for virtue and moral and intellectual life more generally. This paper evaluates Brady’s arguments, focusing on: (1) the desire account of suffering (Chapters 1 and 2); (2) the role of suffering in virtue-development (Chapter 4); (3) whether suffering is required for evaluative knowledge (Chapter 5); (4) heroism and selflessness (Chapter 6), and (5) the need to reduce suffering (Chapter 5).
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2017
Many commentators have said that Nietzsche is concerned, either in all or in some parts of his career, with providing a kind of "theodicy", or with justifying or finding meaning in suffering. This article examines these notions, questioning whether terms such as "theodicy" or "justifying suffering" are helpful in getting Nietzsche's views into focus, and exploring some unclarities concerning the way in which such terms themselves are understood. The article discusses the notion of "aesthetic justification" in The Birth of Tragedy, arguing that here "justification" is used in the very loose sense of "enabling a positive attitude toward." Nietzsche's retrospective "Attempt at a Self-Criticism" is then examined, and it is argued that here Nietzsche does not endorse his earlier notion of aesthetic justification, but rather praises The Birth of Tragedy for its refusal to find a moral meaning in existence. This negative virtue is presented in explicit contrast to Schopenhauer's claim that the world has a moral meaning that metaphysics can discover. Schopenhauer rejects the optimistic moral meaning provided by theism, but replaces it with a pessimistic meaning: the world is in itself such that its non-existence would have been better. This shows that there can be meaning in existence that does not correlate with affirmation. The later Nietzsche rejects the "metaphysical need" along with theism, and reaches a position in which neither metaphysical optimism nor metaphysical pessimism is viable. But since suffering still seems to be an "objection to life," the later Nietzsche argues that suffering need not be seen as bad in itself, paying particular attention to The Gay Science, Section 338. To view suffering as bad in istelf is to miss suffering's potential to be part of whole "sequence and interconnection" in which there is psychological growth. The article concludes that, while Nietzsche's later position is continuous with the tradition of theodicy in seeking to relate suffering's value to some wider whole, it is also discontinuous with that tradition because it does not hold that suffering as such has a fixed normative value, that suffering as such has a meaning, that it happens for a reason, or that it is justified, let alone that the world's containing suffering is in line with our interests, or that we ought because of suffering to value our lives one way or another. On Nietzsche's view there is nothing that guarantees meaning or specific normative value to suffering just because it is suffering. In all these senses Nietzsche has moved away from the tradition of theodicy.
Studies in Christian Ethics, 2023
This article aims to provide a response to the problem of suffering through an explication of a new theodicy termed the Exemplarist Theodicy. This specific theodicy will be formulated in light of the moral theory provided by Linda Zagzebski, termed the Exemplarist Moral Theory, the notion of transformative experience, as explicated by L.A. Paul, Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd, and the virtue-theoretic approach to suffering proposed by Michael Brady, which, in combination with some further precisifying philosophical concepts-namely, compensation, total empathy, and infinitely valuable connections-will provide us with a possible, morally sufficient reason for why God allows individuals to experience suffering.
The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 2003
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1986
Medical practice is animated by the intention to cure; it aims to relieve the immense variety of sufferings to which human beings are subject in virtue of the conditions of their embodied existence. My purpose here is to demonstrate how a philosophical analysis of the formal structures and kinds of human suffering provides an essential foundation for determining certain ethical dimensions of the physician's relation to his suffering patient. Can paternalism in medical practice be justified by the aim of relieving suffering? What are the scope and limits of the patient's responsibility for his suffering, and what difference does this make in the physician's response to it? How is the suffering that medical treatment itself exacts in the name of cure to be justified? Such questions can be answered only by an analysis of the sense or value of suffering in human life.
The Philosophy of Suffering, 2019
On the face of it, suffering from the loss of a loved one and suffering from intense pain are very different things. What makes them both experiences of suffering? I argue it’s neither their unpleasantness nor the fact that we desire not to have such experiences. Rather, what we suffer from negatively transforms the way our situation as a whole appears to us. To cash this out, I introduce the notion of negative affective construal, which involves practically perceiving our situation as calling for change, registering this perception with a felt desire for change, and believing that the change is not within our power. We (attitudinally) suffer when negative affective construal is pervasive, either because it colours a large swath of possibilities, as in the case of anxiety, or because it narrows our attention to what hurts, as in the case of grief. On this view, sensory or bodily suffering is a special case of attitudinal suffering: the unpleasantness of pain causes pervasive negative affective construal. Pain that doesn’t negatively transform our world doesn’t make for suffering.
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2014
This article develops a phenomenology of suffering with an emphasis on matters relevant to medical practice and bioethics. An attempt is made to explain how suffering can involve many different things—bodily pains, inability to carry out everyday actions, and failure to realize core life values—and yet be a distinct phenomenon. Proceeding from and expanding upon analyses found in the works of Eric Cassell and Elaine Scarry, suffering is found to be a potentially alienating mood overcoming the person and engaging her in a struggle to remain at home in the face of loss of meaning and purpose in life. Suffering involves painful experiences at different levels that are connected through the suffering-mood but are nevertheless distinguishable by being primarily about (1) my embodiment, (2) my engagements in the world together with others, and (3) my core life values. Suffering is in essence a feeling (a mood), but as such, it has implications for and involves the person's entire life: how she acts in the world, communicates with others, and understands and looks upon her priorities and goals in life. Suffering-moods are typically intense and painful in nature, but they may also display a rather subconscious quality in presenting things in the world and my life as a whole in an alienating way. In such situations, we are not focused directly upon the suffering-mood—as in the cases of pain and other bodily ailments—but rather, upon the things that the mood presents to us: not only our bodies, but also other things in the world that prevent us from having a good life and being the persons we want to be. Such suffering may in many cases be transformed or at least mitigated by a person's identifying and changing her core life values and in such a manner reinterpreting her life story to become an easier and more rewarding one to live under the present circumstances.
Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 1996
organize suffering into categories to help cope with it, but often these categories themselves conceal some forms of suffering, even contribute to them. This latter experience leads some to suspect that suffering is never entirely reducible to any determinate set of categories. To suffer is to bear, endure or undergo, to submit to something injurious, to become disoraanized. Suffering subsists on the underside of agency, mastery, wholeness, joy, and comfort. It is, therefore, ubiquitous. But there I go.., moving from the agony of suffering to a comforting reflection on it. Appropriating suffering to a reading of the human condition. For severe suffering exceeds every interpretation of it while persistently demanding interpretation. Without suffering, it is unlikely we would have much depth in our philosophies and religions. But with it, life is tough.., and miserable for many. Does the poly-cultural character of suffering reveal something about the human condition? And.how contestable and 3 culturally specific are the medical, psychological, religious, ethical, therapeutic, sociostructural, economic and political categories through which suffering is acknowledged and administered today? Is "sufferingn a porous universal, whose persistence as a cultural term reveals how conceptually discrete injuries, wounds, and agonies are experientially fungible, crossing and confounding the fragile boundaries we construct between them? Or is it a barren generality, seducing theorists into metaphysical explorations far removed from specific injuries in need of medical or moral or religious or political or therapeutic or military attention? Any response to this question draws upon one or more of the theoretical paradigms already noted. A political theorist might focus on power struggles between disparate professionals over the legitimate definition and treatment of suffering. An evangelist might minister instances that fit the Christian model. And a physician might medicate theorists and spiritualists burned out by the projects these faiths commend. Is the bottom line, then, that today people go to the doctor when they really need help? Perhaps. But they might pray after getting the treatment. Or file a malpractice suit. Or join a political movement to redesign the health care system. Sufferers are full of surprises. Among fieid contenders for primacy in the domain of suffering, ethical theory has pretty much dropped out of the running. The reason is clear, even if astonishing. Contemporary professional paradigms of ethics, represented fairly well by John
TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology, 2021
While the evidential problem of evil has been enormously influential within the contemporary philosophical literature—William Rowe’s 1979 formulation in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” being the most seminal—no academic research has explored what cognitive mechanisms might underwrite the appearance of pointlessness in target examples of suffering. In this exploratory paper, we show that the perception of pointlessness in the target examples of suffering that underwrite Rowe’s seminal formulation of the problem of evil is contingent on the absence of broader context. In other words, we show that when such suffering is presented alongside broader contextual information, the appearance of pointlessness, on average, significantly diminishes. In §1 we briefly elucidate Rowe’s formulation of the problem of evil and the thought experiment that motivates a key premise. In §2 and §3 respectively, we briefly explain our hypothesis regarding Rowe’s case and our methods for...
Forthcoming in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
Anastasia Scrutton offers an attractive account of two Christian theologies of depression and argues, cogently and compellingly, that forms of potentially transformative theologies are therapeutically and philosophically superior. My double aim here is to try to cash out the operative notion of 'transformation' by focusing on two features: first its multimodal character (ethical, aesthetic, existential, spiritual) and, second, the theme of a realisation of 'dependence', 'grounding', or of being 'anchored' in the world. I suggest that these two themes of multimodality and dependence can be understood, individually and together, if they are placed within an aretaic framework. The transformative effects of suffering consist of the cultivation and exercise of virtues - of being edified - in a way that transforms both one's character and one's relationship to the world. To be transformed by suffering is therefore to be edified and this account shows fidelity to both the case studies Scrutton discusses and to wider features of the Christian tradition. The paper ends by sketching out answers to Scrutton's questions about whether transformative suffering applies to somatic as well as to mental illness, and whether it provides a theodical justification of human suffering.
Philosophy Study, 2015
The notion of suffering carries with it aspects which are private and individual on the one hand, and social and lingual on the other. I would pay attention to the latter part of the suffering notion, where the notion of suffering is recognized to be primitive by almost all the theories of human values. This primitive character allows a commensurable basis on the basis of which most plural theories share something in common to talk objectively to each other. In this paper, I would like to offer three arguments in order to advance a thesis that one's suffering is redemptive of others. First, the conservation law of mass says that matter of a closed system can neither be created nor destroyed, although it may be differently rearranged. This may be applied to the experience of suffering, to allow the conservation law of suffering: My unjust self-interest costs pains in others to the level of the same amount but if I voluntarily suffer a sacrifice, others will have their pains lightened to the analogous level. Second, notion of yin-yang helps to support the redemptive thesis of suffering. The notion says that all things in the reality consist of two complementary opposite capacities that interact within a greater whole, as part of a dynamic system. Then, my acceptance of suffering and the decrease of other's pain are two complementary capacities of one reality. Third, any person is responsible for his own act, so is a society as a whole. Then, as an individual restores his damaged person, when he commits a crime, by being suffered or punished, a society restores itself to its own proper state, when any member of the society is wronged, by suffering communally in one way or other.
What does it mean to suffer? How are we to understand the sufferings we undergo? Etymologically, to suffer signifies to undergo and endure. Is there a sense, a purpose to our sufferings or does the very passivity, which they etymologically imply, robs them of all inherent meaning? In this paper, I shall argue against this Levinasian interpretation. My claim will be that suffering, exhibits a meaning beyond meaning, one embodied in the unique singularity of our flesh. This uniqueness is, in fact, an interruption. It signifies the suspension of all systems of exchange, all attempts to render good for good and evil for evil. It is in terms of such suspension that suffering—particularly as found in selfless sacrifice—finds its “use.” This “use” involves the possibility of forgiveness.
The American Journal of Biblical Theology, 2016
This paper will examine the problem of suffering as it arises from both moral and natural evil through a Christian philosophical and theological perspective. Suffering throughout our planet is pervasive. We all experience it in one form or another. In western culture, we are bombarded, through the media with the terrible tragedies that occur in our home country and abroad. Inevitably we ask ourselves, the following question, as Professor Ramon Martinez, probes into his book, Sin and Evil, " Why does God permit suffering? " In order to address the question of suffering and its relation to the God of Christianity, we must understand what suffering is and how it affects humanity.
2021
In this article my aim is to take up a thread from an article by Svend Brinkmann, wherein he is anxious to show that mental suffering cannot exclusively be explained within the narrow vocabulary of medical diagnosis systems, but can, an should be, be articulated through a large range of ‘interpretive vocabularies’ (Brinkmann 2014). In line with Brinkmann’s emphasis on the large range of possible interpretive vocabularies, I will engage the moral philosopher Iris Murdoch to show how the exploration of different possible interpretations of a particular client’s situation is in fact an ethical task, which requires the practitioner’s personal development of virtue in terms of selfless, loving attention as the precondition for a realistic interpretation of the client’s situation.
This essay proposes a critical investigation of the notion of suffering as a premise and warning for the Social and Political domains. Drawing from the writings of the contemporary French philosophers Levinas, Marion, Ricœur and Blanchot, comprising a corpus I refer to as “The Ethics of Suffering”, it treats this issue in four stages of analysis: terminological, phenomenological, ethical and political. The phenomenological analysis first reveals the tension resulting from the double nature of “Suffering”, defined both as a feeling and a long lasting condition. This duality leads then to question our social ability to simply apply suffering based on the fact that it is widespread and known to all, showing that the lack of a permanent substance or single essence causes its political prevention or propagation to remain totally arbitrary. On this account, the positive outcome of the ethical and phenomenological investigations consists in offering a standard ground for bridging between individual and social suffering while sustaining the tension coming from its dual nature. At the same time, their definition of suffering as a basis for solidarity (suffering is always ‘suffering with the others’) while insisting on the solitary mode of torment reveals a problematic double bind. Taking up the work of Adi Ophir on the evil, the essay goes as far as showing how this double bind affects the political thought and action, when exposing its rather limited power of manipulating the human threshold and using suffering as a political instrument. The paper thus seeks to contribute to the social and political discussion by examining our ability to regulate our conduct in the public and the political spheres through the understanding of suffering and by examining whether we can actually protect ourselves and cope with the danger of controlling individuals through the control of their suffering.
hurt, misery, sorrow, trouble, vexation, and a litany of other things. Essentially, Job is asking, "Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive suffering?" Suffering as we know it was birthed from the original sin of man. When God discovered the sin of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, He laid a curse upon them: Unto the woman He said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children … And unto Adam He said, because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying, thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life … (Gen. 3:16-17, KJV). The Hebrew word used here for "sorrow" is the word ʻetseb which signifies pain, hurt, toil, sorrow, labor, and hardship. 2 The curse of Adam is that of suffering. And yet, as image bearers of God, we are not alienated from His likeness due to suffering, in fact suffering is sine qua non to a Christian's Christlikeness. However, many philosophers from a variety of backgrounds have expounded upon the purpose that suffering serves, and it would do well to have an understanding of their arguments. For C.S. Lewis, the purpose of suffering is twofold: to produce divine humility within mankind and to break men of their will in order that they may submit said will unto God. "The first answer, then, to the question why our cure should be painful, is that to render back the will which we have so long claimed for our own, is in itself, wherever and however it is done, a grievous pain." 3 He notes that for mankind to surrender one's will, one's sense of selfgovernance, is all but impossible. When people are forced to surrender their will, they do not take it lightly. He goes on to say that "to surrender a self-will inflamed and swollen with years of usurpation is a kind of death. We all remember this self-will as it was in childhood: the bitter, prolonged rage at every thwarting, the burst of passionate tears, the black, Satanic wish to kill or 2
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