Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity

Ratio Juris, 2024

This article examines the application of the ought-implies-can principle in the legal domain, especially in the relationship between obligations and responsibility. It addresses the challenge of cases in which an agent cannot do what is required of her, and yet it seems plausible to say that she has an obligation. To deal with these cases, two parallel distinctions are made: between rules of conduct and rules of imputation, and between doings and things done. It is proposed that these distinctions show that the principle operates in two different but complementary ways: as part of prescriptive relations and as part of responsibility practices.

Synthese, 2011

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish 'objective' from 'subjective' oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent's beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of 'ought': 'warranted oughts'. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective 'oughts'. Sections 2-3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective 'oughts' with objective 'wide-scope oughts' operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted 'ought' and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted 'oughts'. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.

The debate concerning the proper way of understanding, and hence solving, the “is-ought problem” produced two mutually exclusive positions. One position claims that it is entirely impossible to deduce an imperative statement from a set of factual statements. The other position holds a contrary view to the effect that one can naturally derive an imperative statement from a set of factual statements under certain conditions. Although these two positions have opposing views concerning the problem, it should be evident that they both accept that the “is-ought problem” is concerned with the deducibility of imperative statements from factual statements. Later I will argue that this should not be our concern when we try to make sense of the way we reason about morality

The late work of John Searle opens up a fascinating general theory of the sources of normativity within human civilizations. A classic criticism of Searle’s view reproaches to his “institutionalism” a residual form of conventionalism, preventing Searle to really bridge the gap between contingent facts and ideally universally valid norms. This paper explores an alternative foundation of normativity on “laws of essence” (as opposed to constitutive rules) by answering the crucial question of the place of essences (and values) in a world of facts. Classical phenomenology is shown to be an ontology of concreteness, but this, far from making it irrelevant to the foundation of ideals and norms – even practical, ethical, political ones – makes it the philosophy of ideals, and relative “oughts”, par excellence.

Ethical theory and moral practice, 2012

Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim "you ought to help others" is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the prudential maxim "you ought to brush your teeth twice a day". But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of course, to explain the difference. In the second part of this paper, I suggest that metaethical expressivists can provide a good explanation: by extending the analysis of ordinary (nonnormative) demands and recommendations to normative judgments, they can formulate a convincing account that captures the key differences between morality and rationality.

Business Ethics Quarterly, 2015

In this article we investigate a philosophical problem for normative business ethics theory suggested by a phenomenon that contemporary psychologists call “bounded ethicality,” which can be identified with the putative fact that well-intentioned people, constrained by psychological limitations, make ethical choices inconsistent with their own ethical beliefs and commitments. When one combines the idea that bounded ethicality is pervasive with the idea that a person morally ought to do something only if she can, it raises a doubt about the practical relevance of the moral principles that business ethics theory prescribes. We call this doubt the Radical Behavioral Challenge. It consists in the idea that people cannot generally conform to the normative ethical principles that business ethics theorists prescribe, and that these principles are therefore practically irrelevant. We answer the Radical Behavioral Challenge and explore normative implications of our answer.

Logique et Analyse

A belief is correct if and only if the believed proposition is true. Some philosophers argued that from this standard of correctness it is possible to derive the statement of a norm, a claim about what a subject ought to do. Many formulations of the standard in terms of an ‘ought’-claim have been suggested, but all resulted affected by some problem. My aim in this article is to suggest a new formulation of the standard in ‘ought’-terms based on an analysis of the relations occurring between the notions of correctness and ‘ought’. My suggested formulation is that, for any subject S and proposition p, according to the standard of correctness, given that S believes that p, it ought to be that p.

Sanne Taekema, Bart van Klink and Wouter de Been (eds.), Facts and Norms in Law, Edward Elgar 2016, p. 23-49, 2016

Philosophical and methodological discussions with regard to normative and value judgment presuppose the availability of a set of clear concepts by means of which these discussions can be made fruitful. To provide such a framework, or at least its beginnings, the present paper makes and explains distinctions between, amongst others, facts and descriptions thereof, kinds of objectivity of facts, deontic facts and norms, kinds of deontic facts, kinds of rules, and facts and values. By means of some examples, the usefulness of the clear concepts for methodological issues is illustrated.

2021

Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via a threat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Haji’s argument requires not only that we embrace an “ought” implies “can” principle, but also that we adopt the principle that “ought” implies “able not to”. I argue that we have little reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deontic morality might be destroyed on the basis of the more commonly embraced “ought” implies “can” principle alone. I argue that despite what look like initially compelling reasons why we might suppose that this weaker conclusion is similarly destructive to deontic morality, we actually have good reason to doubt that it has any practical relevance for moral deliberation at all.