Liberalism and the Muslim-American Predicament

Contemporary Political Theory, 2012

In his provocative article, 'A Defense of Political Constructivism', Nicholas Tampio does two things: first, he demonstrates how Rawls's engagement with Hegel leads him to develop a metaethics that departs from Kant's more abstract and formal approach in favor of one that takes context and culture into account; second, he argues that Rawls's metaethical approach, political constructivism, provides a promising basis for addressing potential conflicts between 'Euro-American Muslims' and liberal culture and institutions. I think that Tampio largely succeeds in his first endeavor and will have little to say about it. However, I will argue in this brief response that his account of the normative implications of Rawls's political constructivism involves a misinterpretation of Rawls's theory. I then remark upon Tampio's focus on Islam as a paradigm case of a problem for political liberalism. Finally, I argue that Tampio does not show that Islam is illiberal or unreasonable, and if it were, Rawls's theory does not exhibit the kind of openness to dialogue with unreasonable doctrines that Tampio suggests.

2010

In this article, it is argued that a significant internal tension exists in John Rawls' political liberalism. He holds the following positions that might plausibly be considered incongruous: (1) a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; (2) a commitment to restricting this broad right if it is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence; and (3) a commitment to curbing this broad right only if there is a constitutional crisis. By supporting a broad right of freedom of political speech in Political Liberalism, he allows militant intolerant people such as Jihadists, White Supremacists and Neo-Nazis to advocate publicly their dangerously intolerant beliefs. Public advocacy of dangerously intolerant beliefs can be construed as subversive advocacy. As demonstrated by the historical examples of the Weimar Republic and the Second Spanish Republic, militant intolerant groups could use a right of subversive advocacy to threaten the stability of liberal democracies. Hence, by allowing them to exercise a broad right of freedom of political speech, Rawls could jeopardize that which he intends to defend, namely the actual political stability of a liberal democratic order. Lastly, Rawls' conception of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech, might be insufficient to deal effectively with the threat posed by militant intolerant groups. Yet a tradition of American constitutional interpretation that balances freedom of speech with other important constitutional and/or political values has overcome a civil war, two world wars, the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks without abandoning democracy or permanently renouncing those values. Still, Rawls' ideal approach to constitutional interpretation might, in hindsight, help us to understand some of the excesses and deficiencies of American jurisprudence in times of emergency. My argument in this article is divided into three parts. In the first part, I explain the notion of militant intolerant people and how they can be viewed as holding politically unreasonable beliefs. By virtue of holding these beliefs, they might challenge the stability of John Rawls' political liberalism, which depends on three commitments that might plausibly be considered incongruous: a commitment to tolerating a broad right of freedom of political speech, including a right of subversive advocacy; a commitment to restricting this right if it is intended to incite and is likely to bring about imminent violence; and a commitment to curbing this right only if there is a constitutional crisis. In the second part, I contend that while he argues for a broad right of freedom of political speech, he also allows for restricting it when its exercise is intended to incite and likely to bring about imminent violence. By allowing such restriction, he could be seen as intolerant, and hence, in the eyes of militant intolerant people, his toleration could be seen as a sham. But that need not be so. His intolerance can be seen as politically reasonable because he argues for the stability of a political order that in principle could protect the security of all citizens-tolerant and intolerant alike. Still, in the third and last part, I argue that his view of ideal constitutional interpretation, which privileges a broad right of freedom of political speech that can be curbed only if

This article examines how the American civil response to September 11 profoundly transformed the core of American Muslim political identity for a generation. I outline the evolving contours of the American Muslim as citizens after September 11 through an analysis of the impact of race and religion on two relationships: state to citizen and citizen to citizen. The American political response to September 11 had both positive and negative impacts for domiciled Muslims. At the national level, this event has forced American Muslims into a period of institution building and active citizenship while the federal government’s response has problematized the Muslim as a continuous potential security threat. One simmering question for the American citizenry in general concerns the loyalty of the American Muslim. In the future, the American Muslim political class will be engaged in a continued effort to write Muslims into the American narrative in the same way that previous immigrant groups have fought to reappropriate “Americanness.” The larger philosophical question in this process is how, in doing so, this group can prove its loyalty to the nation while maintaining a distinctive religious culture and heritage. What will be the future core of the maturing American Muslim as both a citizen of the republic and a servant of his or her god?

In this article I seek to establish what political liberalism demands of Muslim citizens living as minorities in liberal states by way of a doctrinal affirmation of citizenship. This is an inquiry of a special nature. My interests are not directly in what policies a liberal state should have, nor in what practices on the part of citizens are compatible with justice and equality, but rather in what views emerging from a comprehensive doctrine are reasonable responses to the liberal terms of social cooperation. My aim is to establish with as much precision as possible when it can be said that there is a consensus on the terms of social cooperation in a liberal society and thus that the comprehensive doctrine in question is providing its adherents with moral reasons for endorsing those terms. Thus, this is an inquiry into liberal political theory, but one inspired by the special concerns, misgivings and anxieties of a particular comprehensive doctrine.

Die Welt des Islams, 2013

In this article I ask a seemingly simple question—How can a Muslim be a liberal citizen? In order to explore this question I define who and what was indexed by the term “Muslim” at various points in United States history. I argue that the figure of the Muslim has existed as an existential other upon which otherness, violence, and suspicion was written. I ask how the historic construction of Muslim identities fuels contemporary surveillance programs predicated on an intrinsic fear of Muslim bodies. Drawing upon a decade of ethnographic research with Muslim communities across the United States, I examine Countering Violent Extremism programs. I argue that such policing function re-inscribe and normalize White supremacy and Muslim suspicion of, and within, Muslim communities. Finally, I examine the question of citizenship in neoliberal times and ask how we might understand citizenship rights, particularly for Muslim communities, in the contemporary United States.

Religions, 2023

American Muslims regularly encounter a tacit distinction between the civic and religious spheres of their daily lives. Islamic legal norms are not invoked incessantly to highlight the differences between Muslims and their fellow citizens, but instead are considered relevant for particular issues at particular times. Through examining examples of how Muslims engage with the American economic and legal system, it is shown that much of one’s engagement with the civic structures of American life is seen as unproblematic. Understanding this distinction helps Muslims participating in American life to properly conceptualize the relationship between their religious faith and their roles as citizens in the larger body politic.

forthcoming in Mohammed Hashas (ed.)Pluralism in Islamic Contexts: Ethics, Politics and Modern Challenges (Basel: Springer), 2020

In this chapter, I argue that there is an important structural similarity between the Liberal Pluralism of John Rawls' Theory of Justice and (a very broad 'Modernist' construal of) Political Islam. This structural similarity, so I argue, showcases an important problem concerning what I call higher-order disagreement-a problem that plagues Rawls' early version of Liberal Pluralism, a Liberalist understanding of Political Islam, as well as Rawls' "later" political conception of Liberal Pluralism. I end by suggesting how Medieval Islamic Philosophy (as articulated by al-Farabi, especially) may have given us the intellectual resources to solve this issue and towards articulating a "perfectionist" conception of Liberalism that is true to what the later Rawls calls "the fact of reasonable pluralism." In short, then, it is from Islamic Philosophy where we can find the resources for fixing some of the conceptual problems with pluralism in the Rawlsian tradition.