In Modernism and the Grounds of Law (hereinafter Modernism), Peter Fitzpatrick provides a deconstructive social theory of law in which the mythic foundations of the social contract as the central source of Western legal legitimacy is shown to rest on shaky foundations. In a critical sense it is the claims of legal positivism that are the symbolic and even phantasmatic target of Modernism . For example the protestations of globalisation (Modernism , pp. 183 /215) only reveal the claims of a global society that is structured around the ambivalent foundations of one version of the locale, that of Occidental neo-liberalism (Norrie, 2003, p. 124). As Alan Norrie notes this is a ‘patient depiction of the theoretical foibles of modernity’, and of the claims of positivism in both legal and sociological guise. It shows how legal discourse is thoroughly implicated not just in the discourse of race, but how the very identity of Western law was formed and continues to be generated through the relation with racialised forms of alterity. This argument will be of interest to anyone working with critical legal theory in general and for those researching in law and postcolonial studies comparative law specifically. Fitzpatrick’s approach to the questions of foundations is implicitly inspired by what Lyotard characterised as a consensus that is never reached for ‘somebody always comes along to distort the order of reason’ (1984, p. 61), and thus ensures that the search for an origin, the origin of modernity, of the universal, or of the nation is destined to remain structured by an aporia that signals the productive irresolution of signification (Derrida, 1982, p. 6). In a sense presence is always to arrive in the future. The absence of ground for Fitzpatrick is characterised by the phantasmatic core of legal positivism, the illusive beyond of law that functions as its paradoxical origin (Modernism , pp. 97 /101). Modernism opens by documenting the grounds of law that Freud essays in Totem and Taboo . This sets up the argument for the rest of the book. Civilisation must constantly repeat its foundational moment, but this act of repetition is always