Aristotelian Definition and the Discovery of Archai

2019

2020

In his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle articulates a theory of 'science' (epistēmē) according to which each science is organized around certain indemonstrable principles (archai) concerning the kinds studied by that science. The most prominent of the three types of principles discussed by Aristotle are definitions (horismoi). In this dissertation, I clarify Aristotle's account of how we can come to know what the definition of a kind is. I examine three existing interpretations of Aristotle's views on this issue, namely, the Intuitionist Interpretation (defended by Frede, Irwin, and Ross), the Explanationist Interpretation (defended by Bolton, Charles, and Lennox), and the Socratic Interpretation (defended by Bronstein). I argue that the Explanationist Interpretation is superior to its competitors. In doing so, I provide new arguments against the Intuitionist Interpretation and a serious challenge to the Socratic Interpretation, addressing in particular the as of yet u...

1994

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 1985

In II.7-10 of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle discusses various characteristics of definitions, and a question which has garnered attention is over the possible place and function of “nominal definitions.” Some , such as Robert Bolton, argue that Aristotle does include nominal definitions. This comes largely from the view that the kind of definition Aristotle lists at the beginning of II.10 (93b29), which is described as “an account of what a thing is,” (Ὁρισμὸς δʼ ἐπειδὴ λέγεται εἶναι λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι), refers to the third kind of definition Aristotle gives at 94a14 which is “the conclusion of a syllogism which demonstrates the essence.” This view leads to the conclusion that there cannot be a definition of kinds which do not exist. My intention is to argue against this interpretation by showing that, at 93b29, Aristotle is speaking of “definition” in a broader sense than he does at 94a14. In doing this, I will first give a brief account of the relevant sections of II.7-10. Next, I will directly address the question of whether or not Aristotle describes nominal definitions in II.10, and if so, how the kind of definition which he speaks of at 93b29 relates to the three kinds he gives at 94a11-14. Then, I will consider how Aristotle would use a nominal definition in his discussion of discovering the definition of both an eclipse and thunder. Finally, I will argue that, due to the interpretation of Aristotle already given, Aristotle would allow that there be a type of definition for non-existent kinds which is merely the meaning of a word. This type of definition, however, is not found in the stricter kind of definition Aristotle gives at 94a11-14. I shall conclude with a review of the important points of our discussion and its relevance to contemporary thought.

Definition has the following features in Aristotle's philosophy: 1. Each thing has only one definition and 'it is impossible that there should be more than one definition for the same thing.

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1986

MICHAEL J. LOUX hroughout his philosophical career, Aristotle insisted on the ontological priority T of familiar concrete objects, and in his most mature writings, he encapsulated this category preference for the things he called substances in the thesis that 'being' has pros hen equivocity or focal meaning.' This thesis has frequently been understood as a claim about existential statements, the claim ( I ) that 'exists' has a different meaning or sense when predicated of logical subjects from different Aristotelian categories and (2) that, among these distinct senses, that appropriate to substances is primary or basic. The proponent of this interpretation would spell out the doctrine by telling us that 'exists' has a different meaning in each of the following:

2008

By a "concept", I mean a unitary thought (of the sort normally represented by a word) that applies to a plurality of differing objects, and by "The Problem of Concepts" I mean the pervasive philosophical questions of how such thoughts are to be explained and by what standards they are to be evaluated. Aristotle is generally held to have been a Moderate Realist, who held that a concept is a putative grasp of a mind-independent universal object that exists somehow in or derivatively on the many particular objects to which the concept applies. I argue that Aristotle rejected the posit of such universal objects and instead understood universality as a feature of thought, which has a basis in reality and a function in cognition. With some notable exceptions, concepts are based on relations of difference in "the more and the less" between their instances and on the causal relations between the various parts and characteristics of each instance. A concept's function is to serve as a term in deductions which enable us to represent the necessity of causal connections. I go on, then, to explore the manner in which, on Aristotle's view, concepts compose propositions and bodies of knowledge and the way in which they are formed.