Secure Public Key Protocol for Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks

Wireless Networks, 2006

The proper functioning of mobile ad hoc networks depends on the hypothesis that each individual node is ready to forward packets for others. This common assumption, however, might be undermined by the existence of selfish users who are reluctant to act as packet relays in order to save their own resources. Such non-cooperative behavior would cause the sharp degradation of network throughput. To address this problem, we propose a credit-based Secure Incentive Protocol (SIP) to stimulate cooperation among mobile nodes with individual interests. SIP can be implemented in a fully distributed way and does not require any pre-deployed infrastructure. In addition, SIP is immune to a wide range of attacks and is of low communication overhead by using a Bloom filter. Detailed simulation studies have confirmed the efficacy and efficiency of SIP.

2004

In an ad-hoc network, intermediate nodes on a communication path are expected to forward packets of other nodes so that the mobile nodes can communicate beyond their wireless transmission range. However, because wireless mobile nodes are usually constrained by limited power and computation resources, a selfish node may be unwilling to spend its resources in forwarding packets which are not of its direct interest, even though it expects other nodes to forward its packets to the destination. It has been shown that the presence of such selfish nodes degrades the overall performance of a non-cooperative ad hoc network. To address this problem, we propose a secure and objective reputation-based incentive (SORI) scheme to encourage packet forwarding and discipline selfish behavior. Different from the existing schemes, under our approach, the reputation of a node is quantified by objective measures, and the propagation of reputation is efficiently secured by a one-way-hash-chain-based authentication scheme. Armed with the reputation-based mechanism, we design a punishment scheme to penalize selfish nodes. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme can successfully identify selfish nodes and punish them accordingly.

2014

As part of the security within distributed systems, various services and resources need protection from unauthorized use. Remote authentication is the most commonly used method to determine the identity of a remote client. This paper investigates a systematic approach for authenticating clients by three factors, namely password, smart card, and biometrics. A generic and secure framework is proposed to upgrade two-factor authentication to three-factor authentication. In multihop wireless networks, selfish nodes do not relay other nodes' packets and make use of the cooperative nodes to relay their packets, which has negative impact on the network fairness and performance. Incentive protocols use credits to stimulate the selfish nodes' cooperation, but the existing protocols usually rely on the heavyweight public-key operations to secure the payment. In this paper, we propose secure cooperation incentive protocol that uses the public-key operations only for the first packet in ...

This paper presents a new public key distribution scheme adapted to ad hoc networks called TAKES for Trustful Authentication and Key Exchange Scheme. Its originality lies in performing authentication and key distribution with no need for a trusted authority or access to any infrastructure-based network, thanks to the use of Cryptographically Generated Addresses. Moreover the solution is very convenient having a simple operational mode at no extra hardware cost. TAKES aims to build a trust association between a person, his/her communicating device, the IP address of the device, and his/her public key. As a direct result, new security functions like associating a misbehaving node to its owner, securing end-toend communications through tunnels, or even implementing a light naming system can be enabled on top of ad hoc networks. TAKES is formally proven using BAN logic and a proof-ofconcept implementation demonstrates its feasibility within ad hoc networks.

Several schemes have been proposed for authenticating both the network and the mobile stations to one another in public access wireless networks. In this paper, we look at the weaknesses of such schemes and enumerate a set of four constraints for authentication in public access wireless networks. We then propose two authentication protocols that can overcome these weaknesses while satisfying the constraints. The first proposed protocol provides additional direct authentication to wireless clients to validate the network access point to prevent or to detect malicious attacks as early as possible. This adds additional burden to wireless devices whose resources are often limited. The second proposed protocol reduces the burden by providing indirect authentication with the help of a trusted server. In this paper, we also evaluate the performance of the existing schemes and the proposed schemes in terms of the size and number of messages, delay, energy consumption and security features.

2000

Ad hoc Networks are a new generation of networks offering unrestricted mobility without any underlying infrastructure. In these kinds of networks, all the nodes share the responsibility of network formation and management. As their principle application is in catastrophic environments, security is critical. Authentication, integrity and encryption are key issues pertaining to network security. Traditional authentication schemes cannot be effectively used in such decentralized networks. In this paper, we present an end-to-end data authentication scheme that relies on mutual trust between nodes. The basic strategy is to take advantage of the hierarchical architecture that is implemented for routing purposes. We have proposed an authentication scheme that uses TCP at transport layer and a hierarchical architecture at the IP layer so that the number of encryptions needed is minimized, thereby reducing the computational overheads. This also results in substantial savings as each node has to maintain keys for fewer nodes.

2007

Mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is a kind of wireless ad-hoc network. It is a self-configuring network of mobile nodes connected by wireless links, without the aid of any fixed infrastructure or centralized administration. Nodes within their wireless transmitter ranges can communicate with each other directly, while nodes outside the range rely on other nodes to relay messages resulting in a multi-hop scenario. As the low transmission power of each node limits its communication range, the nodes must assist and trust each other before getting involved into a real communication. However, this implied trust relationship can be threatened by malicious nodes. So far the majority of research work has been done to achieve a secure routing infrastructure, assuming the existence of an efficient node authentication mechanism which in turn is part of a key management scheme. This paper will analyze previous wo rk and then present a new node authentication mechanism which is fully distributed and has the ability to self-organize with out the requirement of any online trusted third party.

In mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), it is easy to launch wormhole, man-in-the-middle and denial of service (DoS) attacks, or to impersonate another node. Our studies show that there are performance and security problems with the existing authentication and keying mechanisms which are currently employed by wireless ad hoc networks. We propose a secure authentication scheme, namely BLS signature. This scheme eliminates the correlation among packets and thus provides the perfect resilience to packet loss, and it is also efficient in terms of latency, computation, and communication overhead due to an efficient cryptographic primitive called batch signature, which supports the authentication of any number of packets simultaneously. In addition to the actual authentication, a new pair wise session is generated as a result of this mechanism. We also point out that without any central authority, e.g., a central server (which is the nature of ad hoc networks); our authentication scheme can be carried out securely by any node at any time.

Our studies show that there are performance and security problems with the existing authentication and keying mechanisms which are currently employed by wireless ad hoc networks. We propose a new authentication protocol, which solves those problems using a combination of well known cryptographic tools in RSA and Diffie-Hellman. In addition to the actual authentication, a new pairwise session is generated as a result of this mechanism. We also point out that without any central authority, e.g., a central server (which is the nature of ad hoc networks), our authentication scheme can be carried out securely by any node at any time.

2006

The pervasiveness of wireless communication recently gave mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) a significant researcher's attention, due to its innate capabilities of instant communication in many time and mission critical applications. However, its natural advantages of networking in civilian and military environments make them vulnerable to security threats. Support for an anonymity in MANET is an orthogonal to security critical challenge we faced in this paper. We propose a new anonymous authentication protocol for mobile ad hoc networks enhanced with a distributed reputation system. The main its objective is to provide mechanisms concealing a real identity of communicating nodes with an ability of resist to known attacks. The distributed reputation system is incorporated for a trust management and malicious behavior detection in the network. The end-to-end anonymous authentication is conducted in three-pass handshake based on an asymmetric and symmetric key cryptography. After successfully finished authentication phase secure and multiple anonymous data channels are established. The anonymity is guarantied by randomly chosen pseudonyms owned by a user. Nodes of the network are publicly identified and are independent of users' pseudonyms. In this paper we presented an example of the protocol implementation.