Freedom and Totality: How Hegel Became Hegel
Shterna Friedman2024, History of Political Thought
https://doi.org/10.53765/20512988.45.1.124visibility
…
description
33 pages
link
1 file
Sign up for access to the world's latest research
checkGet notified about relevant papers
checkSave papers to use in your research
checkJoin the discussion with peers
checkTrack your impact
Abstract
Hegel saw freedom not primarily as a property of the individual’s will, but of a totality (from which individual freedom is metaphysically derived). This aspect of Hegel’s political theory stemmed from his attempt to construct a state that could foster a renewal of Christian spirituality. This project had to confront the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire, which Hegel attributed to the self-interestedness of its component parts. This historical case for the priority of the whole over its parts, however, was soon supplanted by a philosophical argument for a political totality whose freedom entailed its subordination of conflicting parts within itself.
Related papers
Hegel’s contributions to modern individualism and totalitarianism
OGIRISI: a New Journal of African Studies, 2017
The need for reconciliation of individualism and communitarianism in search for an ideal state has been the main preoccupation of social and political philosophers. Unlike other philosophers like Hobbes and Locke that view the individual and the state as being incompatible and therefore seek to achieve some sort of compromise between the two principles, Hegel believes that the individual and the state are mutually independent. For him, individual freedom understood as rational freedom is achieved through the rational institutions of the state. Thus, the state's institutions must harmonise truly the collective interest with the objective good of individuals. The will of the state, the universal will is the good; it is the realisation of freedom and so is unquestionable. This paper discusses how Hegel reconciles individual freedom with the authority of the state. Besides, it argues that the absolutism of the Hegel's state tends to restrict individual right and freedom which, in Hegel's view, must be actualised in the state. Finally, this paper contends that Hegel's reduction of freedom to rationality tends to encourage indiscriminate utilisation of human reason to create things that can erode human dignity and values. It suggests that the recognition of the place of God in human thought and life would make life meaningful and valuable.
Commentary on Hegel's Freedom and Exaltation of The State
Commentary, 2022
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was born in Stuttgart, Germany in 1770. He became the outstanding German philosopher of his day and was renowned throughout Europe. His major works, The Philosophy of Right and The Philosophy of History, contain the most important elements of his political philosophy. Hegel was an absolute Idealist. His most famous quote, "the rational is actual and the actual is rational," is the basis for his position. Bed-rocked on this, the writer conceptualized Hegel's idea of individual freedom and the absolute power of the state on individuals.
The Substantial Subject: The Logic and Appearance of Freedom in Hegel
2024
While it is widely agreed that Hegel’s philosophy is a philosophy of freedom, the significance and scope of Hegel’s theory of freedom is disputed. Most scholarly work on this topic has been devoted to the socio-political philosophy of the Philosophy of Right. But Hegel also speaks of freedom in a way which extends beyond the concerns of his socio-political thought. This dissertation demonstrates how Hegel’s theory of freedom is more fully grasped when it is understood as a comprehensive philosophy which also involves an ontology (a logic of being) and a phenomenology (a direct experience of this logic). The free state which Hegel outlines in the Philosophy of Right is still only a limited manifestation of a freedom which also pervades other aspects of human experience. A way of thinking which is “free” (in the sense that it does not restrict itself by assuming false methodological limitations) is itself essential to our capacity for rational self-determination. Moreover, this “speculative” perspective has only been achieved through the gradual cultivation (Bildung) of the free personality throughout history. This dissertation therefore investigates why Hegel thinks that freedom is at issue in abstract philosophical thought (in his logical works) as well as in concrete historical phenomena (in the Phenomenology of Spirit). This logic and appearance of freedom explicates Hegel’s statement in the Preface of the Phenomenology that the absolute is not only substance, but also subject. Having shown that both the ancient freedom of the “social substance” and the modern freedom of the “pure I” are untenable on their own terms, Hegel advances a logical and phenomenological theory of freedom in which these one-sided truths are reconciled with each other. The “substantial subject” of Hegelian freedom more fully actualizes the purely subjective freedom of the Enlightenment, enabling true individual self-determination. Freedom appears not just as the right to make arbitrary choices, but as substantial thought and conviction.
Hegelianism
John Eatwell et al. (eds) The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economic Theory and Doctrine, 1987
The origins and concerns of the political ideas of the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) are traditionally thought to be religious rather than economic. However, a preoccupation with issues of political economy is present in his earliest theological writings and lies at the centre of his wider philosophical project (Hegel 1793–1800). Broadly speaking, Hegel wished to construct an ethical theory appropriate for the specific problems of the modern world. He believed ancient and medieval societies had been bound together by a communal code of behaviour, with social roles mirroring a putative natural or divine order. The harmony of the natural macrocosm and the social microcosm had been sundered in modern societies by a growing awareness of individuality on the part of their members. Hegel traced this development to two sources: the primacy accorded to the individual conscience within Christianity, especially the Lutheranism he personally espoused, and the individualism encouraged by the capitalist mode of production. Contrary to recent influential critics (e.g. Popper 1945), Hegel did not wish to stifle individual liberty by returning to the organic community theorized by Plato. Instead, he sought to describe the conditions necessary for the freedom of each person to be compatible with the freedom of all.
Individuals: the revisionary logic of Hegel's politics
The paper analyses the logical category of the individual in Hegel's work, argues that it is not a metaphysical simple, but rather it is treated by Hegel as an incomplete term. The paper concludes with an examination of the political implications of Hegel's use of this category.
Foul or Free Play: Freedom as a process restoring self-identity in Hegel's absolute idealism
A "historical" reading of the idea of freedom in Hegel should not contradict a "metaphysical" reading. "Freiheit" is discovered by the dialectics of reason in the Logic to be the foundation of all being and thinking. Multiplicity or manifoldness, determinism and necessity, even desire and finitude are not adverse, but rather conducive, for the evolution of infinite freedom. * MA Thesis submitted 12 September at King's College London.
Related topics
Related papers
Hegel's Theory of Freedom
Philosophy Compass, 2007
Hegel's theory of freedom is complex and sweeping, and while most interpreters of Hegel will readily agree that it is the centerpiece of his political philosophy, perhaps also of his social philosophy and philosophy of history, they will just as readily disagree about what exactly the theory claims. Such interpretive disagreements have fueled, in large part, the resurgence of interest in Hegelian philosophy over the last few decades.
Should Hegelian Political Philosophy Jettison the Absolute? Hegel's Political Philosophy Two-hundred Years Later
Crisis and Critique, 2021
Since Hegel’s own day, critics have claimed that Hegel’s insistence on having the absolute as the linchpin of his system was the system’s undoing. Habermas has argued that any such system with an absolute will go wrong, and that any attempt to rid Hegel of an absolute or water it down will only decapitate Hegel and render his systematic claims useless. Against this, it is here argued that not only is Hegel’s system fundamentally anti-conservative, it attempts to establish the baselines of any social and political setup much meet to show it is aimed at the actualization of equal, maximal freedom. This has to do with Hegel’s conceptions of self-conscious life and his way of combining the “I” with the “We” that preserves the determinateness of each side without collapsing the one into the other. Hegel’s conception of a moral ethos (Sittlichkeit) is supposed to provide the concrete institutions in which freedom can be actualized, but it is here argued that Hegel’ attempt fails for reasons that point forward to how a Hegelian system that still incorporates the “absolute” must go forward. Keywords: dialectic, forms of life, Habermas, Hegel, I and We, Kant, moral ethos, political philosophy, political theory, Sittlichkeit
HEGEL AND THE EMBODIMENT OF FREEDOM
The conception of Hegel in this paper builds upon the themes of participation, reciprocity and community. The attempt is made to extract the potentials for participatory public life contained in Hegel’s system of differentiated representation.
Review: Peter C. Hodgson, Shapes of Freedom. Hegel’s Philosophy of World History in Theological Perspective, OUP 2012
Plurilogue, vol.4 (1), 2014
`Hegel's Conception of the State and Political Philosophy in a Post-Hegelian World'
Political Science, XXXVIII, (1986) pp. 99 112
Beyond the Totalitarian: Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion in Recent Hegel Scholarship
Religion Compass, 2008
Recent developments in Hegel scholarship have been dominated by two waves. Focusing on his complex conception of freedom, the first has transformed the dominant view of his ethical and political thought. The second, which has dramatic consequences for the interpretation of his philosophy of religion, reads Hegel as extending rather than repudiating Kant's critical project. These 'post-Kantian' interpretations have rejected the view of Hegel's logic as principally metaphysical in favor of a reading that focuses on the spontaneous and social character of thought.
MA dissertation: On the Impossibility of Freedom in Hegel's Philosophy
According to Hegel, the development of consciousness is determined by God the absolute and the process of development must be rational and necessary, which provides little room for individual's freedom. However, like other philosophers, due to the consideration on the problem of retribution of ethical responsibility to individuals, Hegel tries to argue that individual's freedom is still compatible with his deterministic philosophy of history. However, based upon Kosch's interpretation of Kierkegaard's two senses of freedom, this paper argue that under Hegel's philosophy of history freedom is impossible. For under Hegel's philosophy he must deny the individual's freedom as capacity to form intentions that are independent from determination by prior events (including mental states), and therefore individuals cannot posit choices on their own. However, without the ability to posit choices, individuals cannot have real freedom. Therefore individual's freedom is incompatible with Hegel's philosophy of history. If we think individual's freedom really exist, than we must reject Hegel's philosophy. This paper only argues that the Hegel's philosophy must imply there is no individual freedom, instead of proving the existence of individual's freedom or denying the system of Hegel's philosophy.
Loading Preview
Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.