Democratic theory and individual autonomy

Joseph Schumpeter is evoked during studies of democratic theories for the remarkable relevance his expositions have borne in furthering the understanding of the concept. Though his writings on democracy were confined to four chapters in the book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, and he took up discussion on democracy only to make connections with the larger theme of his book, his ideas on democracy hold three crucial aspects that make it significant.

Political Studies, 2015

In this article, it is argued that existing democracies might establish popular rule even if Joseph Schumpeter’s notoriously unflattering picture of ordinary citizens is accurate. Some degree of popular rule is in principle compatible with apathetic, ignorant and suggestible citizens, contrary to what Schumpeter and others have maintained. The people may have control over policy, and their control may constitute popular rule, even if citizens lack definite policy opinions and even if their opinions result in part from elites’ efforts to manipulate these opinions. Thus, even a purely descriptive, ‘realist’ account of democracy of the kind that Schumpeter professed to offer may need to concede that there is no democracy without some degree of popular rule.

Political Theory, 2010

Schumpeter’s theory of democracy can be read through the lens of the cognitive approach to rationality. Schumpeter himself constructed his theory on the basis of his (neglected) conception of conscious rationality, which considers the process of thinking as composed of conscious/deliberate and unconscious/automatic components. The prevalence of the deliberate over the automatic component can occur in different degrees; as a consequence, individuals exhibit different levels of conscious rationality. Schumpeter makes clear that an essential attribute of democracy is its being a system of government capable of working notwithstanding a low degree of conscious rationality among its citizens. Given this condition, the process of political communication and persuasion can lead to two very different outcomes: a fair social construction of the democratic institutions, in which the struggle for the vote is achieved through a critical debate among leaders and citizens; and an unfair construction, based on the prevalence of emotive forces of persuasion over rationality and on cheating of the leaders at the expense of their citizens. Schumpeter suggests that the main element that fosters a fair construction is the effectiveness of competition, which can advance the rational elements in the political debate and the self-determination of the citizens’ will: a slow process that – he warns - may be effective only in the long run, and does not preserve democracy from the risk of decline.

1991

In this article, it is argued that existing democracies might establish popular rule even if Joseph Schumpeter's notoriously unflattering picture of ordinary citizens is accurate. Some degree of popular rule is in principle compatible with apathetic, ignorant and suggestible citizens, contrary to what Schumpeter and others have maintained. The people may have control over policy, and their control may constitute popular rule, even if citizens lack definite policy opinions and even if their opinions result in part from elites' efforts to manipulate these opinions. Thus, even a purely descriptive, 'realist' account of democracy of the kind that Schumpeter professed to offer may need to concede that there is no democracy without some degree of popular rule. Joseph Schumpeter famously offers a minimalist account of democracy that shears it of its traditional connotations of popular rule and self-government and identifies it solely with the selection of rulers through competitive elections. Democracy, he tells us, 'does not and cannot mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of "people" and "rule"'. Instead, it 'means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them'. His deflationary identification of democracy with electoral competition is supposed to be 'truer to life' than the view according to which democracy implies popular self-rule (Schumpeter, 1942, pp. 284, 285 and 269). In Britain, the US and other countries that we call democracies, there is nothing recognizable as popular rule; thus, popular rule cannot be a necessary condition of democracy. But these regimes do hold competitive elections in which the people accept or refuse bids for leadership. If we want to identify the distinctive features of these regimes that set them apart from non-democracies, their method of selecting leaders through competitive elections has the advantage over popular rule of being a feature they actually exhibit. In this article I argue that existing democracies might well be instances of popular rule even if most of what Schumpeter presents as evidence against this view is true. They might establish a meaningful form of popular rule even if their citizens lack definite policy opinions and even if their opinions result in part from elites' efforts to manipulate them. Democracies can be fairly described as establishing popular rule, I will claim, if they establish popular control over policy and no agent or group of agents has dominating control over public opinion. Popular control over policy requires a particular causal relationship between policy and citizens' policy opinions, but this relationship may hold even when citizens have no policy opinions and even when the opinions they do have result from elite manipulation. This control may not amount to popular rule if elites have not merely influence but also dominating control over public opinion. But, I will argue, there is no reason to expect elites to have dominating control over public opinion if the political environment is genuinely competitive.

2017

In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter contrasted his definition of democracy against what he called its “Classical Doctrine.” Received scholarly wisdom holds either that the classical doctrine had no real historical embodiments, or that it is a composite of historical arguments pieced together only so that Schumpeter could knock them down. Arguably, however, Schumpeter actually drew the classical doctrine from a very real source: Carl Schmitt.

Schumpeter's highly influential theory of democracy, developed in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, is less a market-based theory of party competition than it is a theory of strong leadership, conceptualized as warfare. As such, it is a weak foundation for rebuilding a democratic theory of party politics. Moreover, Schumpeter's demolition of the " Classical Doctrine of Democracy " knocks down a straw-man theory: a hybrid of Bentham's utilitarianism and Rousseau's communitarianism that few contemporary theorists of democracy would be willing to defend.

Constellations, 1996

I would like to sketch a proceduralist view of democracy and deliberative politics which differs in relevant aspects from both the liberal and the republican paradigm. Let me (1) remind you the opposite features of these two established models. I will then (2) introduce a new proceduralist conception by way of a critique of the "ethical overload" of the republican view. The last part of the paper further elaborates (3) the three normative models of democracy by comparing their corresponding images of state and society.

“Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political- legislative and administrative- decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions.” (Schumpeter, 1947) In saying so, Schumpeter argues that democracy isn’t an ideal but merely a process of achieving political equilibriums through peaceful competition, constrained only by the institutions and the context in which it functions. In his book, “Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy” (1947), Schumpeter dismisses the link between good governance and democracy, which is to say that democracy is compatible with good governance, however, it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition. This paper seeks to justify Schumpeter’s conception of democracy as a “means”, and not an “end in itself”. In doing so, I will be analysing democracy as a value neutral process that produces outcomes through a competitive mechanism of choosing representatives. Furthermore, this paper attempts to analyse how the will of people translates into political action in a democratic society. Much like Schumpeter’s analysis, this paper rejects the utilitarian preconceptions of a unanimous “common good” and argues against the preoccupation that democracy automatically leads to a society that does not discriminate, and champions liberty. Simultaneously, the paper seeks to bring out the fallacies within the classical doctrine of democracy and posits an elite theory of democracy. It draws on examples from the contemporary world in an attempts to validate them in the paradigm of Schumpeter’s idea of democracy. This paper refers to the works of Joseph A. Schumpeter, Thomas R. Dye, Jack L. Walker, Robert Dahl, J.S. Mill, Aristotle, and James Madison among others.