A PLURALISTIC VIRTUE-CENTERED THEORY OF JUDGING

Routledge eBooks, 2017

The main focus of this essay is the development of a virtue-centred theory of judging. The exposition of the theory begins with exploration of defects in judicial character, such as corruption and incompetence. Next, an account of judicial virtue is introduced. This includes judicial wisdom, a form of phronesis, or sound practical judgement. A virtue-centred account of justice is defended against the argument that theories of fairness are prior to theories of justice. The centrality of virtue as a character trait can be drawn out by analysing the virtue of justice into constituent elements. These include judicial impartiality (even-handed sympathy for those affected by adjudication) and judicial integrity (respect for the law and concern for its coherence). The essay argues that a virtue-centred theory accounts for the role that virtuous practical judgement plays in the application of rules to particular fact situations. Moreover, it contends that a virtue-centred theory of judging can best account for the phenomenon of lawful judicial disagreement. Finally, a virtue-centred approach best accounts for the practice of equity, departure from the rules based on the judge's appreciation of the particular characteristics of individual fact situations.

From Morality to Law and Back Again: Liber Amicorum for John Gardner, 2022

John Gardner is not identified with virtue jurisprudence, even though his work provides important insights on virtue and law. This chapter will focus on one main tenet of his virtue jurisprudence, namely, the claim that virtues are foils to each other. Gardner's virtues-as-foils view is an original thesis that illuminates important aspects of the nature, structure, and phenomenology of virtue. Nonetheless, it is also problematic. It is in tension with central tenets of virtue theory, i.e., that virtues are constitutive components of the good life and that the virtuous person embodies a valuable normative ideal; it is also questionable from a phenomenological and developmental point of view; and it has troubling implications as an account of institutional virtue. Despite these problems, the virtues-as-foils thesis is of paramount importance for virtue-oriented work in law, in that it paves the way for the development of a pluralistic version of virtue jurisprudence.

Jurisprudence, 2018

Law, Virtue and Justice, Amalia Amaya and Ho Hock Lai (eds), 2012

New Waves in the Philosophy of Law, Maksymillian del Mar, ed., 2011

G. Villa Rosas and J. Fabra (eds.), Objectivity in Law (Edward Elgar), 2022

This paper claims that, contrary to what some critics some claimed, a virtue approach to legal reasoning does not inject subjectivity in legal decision-making, however, it puts forward a conception of objectivity that importantly differs from the ‘methodical’ one that is generally assumed in legal scholarship. In contrast to this conception, which situates objectivity in impersonal methods of reasoning, virtue jurisprudence advances a ‘dialectical’ conception of objectivity, in which subjective features of decision-makers are partly constitutive of the objectivity of legal judgments. More specifically, the virtuous legal decision-maker provides, in this view, an objective standard for evaluating legal judgment. It may be argued that this standard fails to be objective as it may validate incompatible decisions in cases of disagreement and ambivalence. The paper examines this objection and argues that the possibility of normative conflict among and within virtuous legal decision-makers does not succeed in showing that virtue theory is committed to relativism, but it suggests the plausibility of developing a pluralistic virtue jurisprudence.

Law, Virtue and Justice, Amalia Amaya and Ho Hock Lai (eds), 2012

The concept of virtue is central in contemporary discussions over the nature of justification.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2017

Several commentators have noted that " justice has not fared well in the revival of virtue ethics " (David O'Connor); it " has become damagingly marginalized " and " no longer has a starring role " (Christopher Miles Coope). Given its traditional place among the four cardinal virtues this is a remarkable state of affairs, and yet exactly why this has occurred has not been adequately explored or explained. In this paper, I take up this question and argue that the particular moral virtue of justice has been largely disregarded by the contemporary virtue theorists primarily because their conception of justice is so different from Aristotle's. Accordingly, they simply do not need the virtue of justice to do the kind of explanatory work in their systems that it does in Aristotle's.

2008