Epistemic Contextualism and the Context of an Argument

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2015

In epistemology, contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge claims vary with the contexts in which those claims are made. This article surveys the main arguments for contextualism, describes a variety of different approaches to developing the view, and discusses how contextualism has been used to treat the problem of radical skepticism. It then presents and responds to a range of objections to contextualism arising from aspects of the linguistic behavior of the word `know' and its cognates. Finally, several alternatives to contextualism are presented, including traditional invariantism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and relativism.

2014

According to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards govern contexts in which they defend their theory. In recent works, several authors have challenged the coherence of epistemic contextualism. 1 They hold that assuming the factivity of knowledge and epistemic closure, the contextualist cannot coherently assert, or know, the content of her theory. After presenting the objection in section 1, we will examine three responses we deem unsatisfactory in section 2, and then put forward our own solution in sections 3 and 4. In a nutshell, our solution rejects the idea that the contextualist should be construed as asserting that her theory is true. We also argue that the contextualist framework does not entail that high epistemic standards are in place in a context in which contextualism is presented. Let 'K(S, h)' stand for 'S knows that h,' where S is a contextualist and 'h' denotes the proposition that S has hands. According to contextualism, there are ordinary, low-standards, contexts (hereafter C L ) in which 'K(S, h)' is true. Now, contextualism holds that there is no such thing as knowing that p, simpliciter. On this view, in uttering 'K(S, h)' in C L , S asserts that she knows that h relative to low epistemic standards. 2 In other words, we have (1) K L (S, h), 1 See, among others, Brueckner (2004), Brendel (2005), Wright (2005), and Jäger (2012). 2 This notation is meant to be neutral between two linguistic accounts, one according to which the predicate 'know' is context-sensitive and designates a binary relation (between a person and a proposition) corresponding to different epistemic standards in different contexts, and another that holds that 'know' designates a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition and (context-dependent) epistemic standards.

Any contextualist approach to knowledge has to provide a plausible definition of the concept of context and spell out the mechanisms of context changes. Since it is the dynamics of context change that carry the main weight of the contextualist position, not every mechanism will be capable of filling that role. In particular, I argue that one class of mechanisms that is most popularly held to account for context changes, namely those that arise out of shifts of conversational parameters in discourses involving knowledge claims, are not suited to the job because they cannot account for the genuinely epistemic nature of the context shift. A form of epistemic contextualism that defines the context through the structure of our epistemic projects is suggested. Context changes in this account are linked to changes in the background assumptions operative in our epistemic projects and the methods used to carry out our inquiries.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017

Not all philosophical theses have the charm of epistemic contextualism, which, on one hand, offers appealing solutions to classical problems such as scepticism and, on the other hand, accounts for an immense range of phenomena comprising ordinary language, practical reasoning, and almost all that can be discussed in a philosophical 'conversation'. Given the scope of the topic and its extensive literature, epistemic contextualism has become remarkably difficult to fully defend. Peter Baumann has performed this task beyond expectation. His recent book systematically argues for epistemic contextualism on linguistic evidence [ch. 1] and theoretical grounds [chs 2, 3], with its problem-solving prospects [ch. 4] and extended significance for ethics [ch. 6]. Along with current objections to contextualism [ch. 7], Baumann also examines the 'knowability problem' that arises out of intercontextual knowledge-ascriptions [ch. 5]. Although many disputes over contextualism were due to the insufficient description of the purported cases, Baumann's selected examples of knowledge-ascription and knowledge-denial seem to be sophisticated enough to resist alternative explanations. Moreover, they illustrate the parameters and the determinants of the attributor's epistemic context. In addition to the stakes of the subject, Baumann has shown that the required levels of evidence, reliability, and credence for knowledge also depend on the ascriber's purpose, intention, and the norms that govern his conversation. Instead of putting 'too much weight on the argument from cases' [32], Baumann proceeds to defend contextualism with more theoretical considerations. The first theoretical argument begins with the reliability requirement of knowledge. Via the contextsensitivity of reliability, it concludes that knowledge is also context-sensitive [ch. 2]. The context-dependency of reliability is motivated by the contextualist solution to the well-known generality problem. For any particular belief, it always seems possible to individuate the belief's cognitive method so that it is reliably acquired. Thus, one should find a principled way of individuating cognitive methods; otherwise, the reliability condition would be trivial. Mark Heller has first suggested a contextualist way out of the trouble [1995]. That is, 'reliable' is context-dependent, and whether a process is reliable is already obvious in each context. Baumann follows this idea by extending the issue to the individuation of topics. In fact, the object of one's belief can also be indeterminate, which could affect the resultant reliability even when the cognitive method is fixed. The method of 'looking around', for instance, is good for 'figuring out whether a red coffee mug is in front of me', but is inadequate for determining 'whether my favorite red coffee mug with the piece missing in the handle is in front of me' [43]. Underneath the generality problem for the method and the topic is the indeterminacy of the reference class. Here, Baumann's favoured example concerns the life expectancy of a bus driver who lives in Glasgow, smokes two packets of cigarettes a day, regularly plays golf, etc. Provided that the groups by those properties do not have the same life expectancy, there is an 'irreducible and genuine indeterminacy' about which group it is to which we should refer [51-4, 145-6].

According to the thesis of epistemological contextualism, the truth conditions of sentences of the form 'S knows that P' and 'S does not know that P' vary according to the context in which they are uttered, where this variation is due to the semantics of 'knows'. Among the linguistic data that have been offered in support of epistemological contextualism are cases that are ordinary in the sense that they involve a consideration neither of skeptical hypotheses nor of skeptical arguments. Both Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose, contextualism's two most prominent proponents, provide such cases. In a recent paper, DeRose goes so far as to claim that such cases provide the best grounds for accepting contextualism. 1 In what follows, we argue that these cases do not support contextualism. In fact, they point in the direction of epistemological invariantism-the thesis that sentences of the form 'S knows that P' and 'S does not know that P' do not vary according to the context in which they are uttered.

Metaphilosophy, 2020

The debate concerning epistemic contextualism represents a kind of linguistic turn in epistemology, where the focus has shifted from theorising about knowledge to theorising about knowledge attributions. Such a shift may well prove valuable, but only if we are clear on what the relationship is between a semantic analysis of knowledge attributions and a philosophical analysis of knowledge. One plausible approach is to claim that the semantic analysis entails and is entailed by the philosophical analysis. Yet this view-referred to here as the default view-has been explicitly adopted by few in the contextualism debate. This paper considers a form of argument in favour of the default view, and then considers the challenges that arise from either accepting or rejecting the default view.

Philosophical Studies, 2000

The paper I gave at the conference has subsequently split into two papers. The other descendant of the original paper (Stanley (forthcoming)) focuses on developing a noncontextualist account of knowledge that captures the intuitive data as well as contextualism. Discussion with the participants at the conference at the University of Massachusetts was very helpful. I should single out John Hawthorne and my commentator Barbara Partee for special mention; e-mails with Stewart Cohen since then have also been invaluable. I am also indebted for discussion to Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies Contextualism in epistemology is the doctrine that the proposition expressed by a knowledge attribution relative to a context is determined in part by the standards of justification salient in that context. The (non-skeptical) contextualist allows that in some context c, a speaker may truly attribute knowledge at a time of a proposition p to Hannah, despite her possession of only weak inductive evidence for the truth of that proposition. Relative to another context, someone may make the very same knowledge attribution to Hannah, yet be speaking falsely, because the epistemic standards in that context are higher. The reason this is possible, according to the contextualist, is that the two knowledge attributions express different propositions.

The recent popularity of contextualist treatments of the key epistemic concepts has tended to obscure the differences that exist between the various kinds of contextualist theses on offer. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards rectifying this problem by exploring two of the main formulations of the contextualist position currently on offer in the literature-the 'semantic' contextualist thesis put forward by Keith DeRose and David Lewis, and the 'inferential' contextualist thesis advanced by Michael Williams. It is argued that by evaluating these theses in the light of each other one can gain a deeper understanding of the contextualist position. In particular, it is argued that this relative evaluation highlights one interesting way in which contextualism might be developed. Grazer Philosophische Sudien 64 (2002), xx-yy.

Erkenntnis, 2013

This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about 'knows'. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call 'practical interests contextualism'. I also answer some questions that contextualism leaves open, particularly why the concept of knowledge is valuable, why the word 'knows' exhibits context-variability, and why this term enjoys such widespread use. Finally, I show how my contextualist framework accommodates plausible ideas from two rival views: subject-sensitive invariantism and insensitive invariantism. This provides new support for contextualism and develops this view in a way that improves our understanding of the concept of knowledge.