A Philosophically Appealing Nietzschean Theory of Value

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2020

I give an account of Nietzsche's conception of valuing that builds on Katsafanas' 2016 account. Katsafanas argues that an agent values X iff the agent (1) has a drive-induced positive affective orientation toward X, and (2) does not disapprove of this affective orientation. I object to condition (2) by showing that Nietzsche thinks we can disapprove of our values and still count as holding them. On my view, an agent values the aim of one of their drives when the drive is strong enough to generate an abiding positive affective orientation toward its aim. I argue that my view can address the four objections Katsafanas levels against Richardson, Poellner, and Clark and Dudrick's accounts, without neglecting the Nietzschean thought that we can feel intensely conflicted and uneasy about our values.

2018

One of Nietzsche’s main projects was to critique morality and to invite a revaluation of our values. Neither secular nor religious interpretations of Nietzsche’s critique of morality do it justice. Each support their own interpretation by appealing to certain aspects of his writings. The former appeal to Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity and Christian morality; while the latter appeal to Nietzsche’s anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian remarks. In actuality, Nietzsche was neither of the two: he argued that Western secular moralities are a modern manifestation of Christian morality, and that Christian morality is a manifestation of what he comes to call “Slave Morality.” On this account, this thesis is a humble attempt to bring forth a philosophical interpretation of Nietzsche’s critique and historical analysis of morality, and how we can incorporate his critique and revaluation of values into our lives so we can live a better life. I hope that my contribution will be a meaningfu...

Parrhesia: A journal of Critical Philosophy, 2012

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2021

Amplifying Bernard Williams’s critique of the Nietzschean project of a revaluation of values, this paper mounts a critique of the idea that whether values will help us to live can serve as a criterion for choosing which values to live by. I explore why it might not serve as a criterion and highlight a number of further difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project. I then come to Nietzsche’s defence, arguing that if we distinguish valuations from values, there is at least one form of the project which overcomes those difficulties. Finally, however, I show that even on this reading, the project must either fall prey to ‘Saint-Just’s illusion’ or fall back into the problems it was supposed to escape. This highlights important difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project and its descendants while also explaining why Williams, who was so Nietzschean in other respects, remained wary of the revaluation of values as a project.

2016

In this paper, I will analyze Nietzsche’s argument for a moral error theory and examine the implications of his view. In order to arrive at the best possible interpretation I will heavily incorporate many passages from Nietzsche’s original works so that I can delve into a textual analysis of Nietzsche. Because Nietzsche is notoriously vague at times and often contradictory, I recognize that this is far from the only appropriate interpretation. However, I hope that it is one which has at least some intuitive appeal. Eventually, I hope to prove that despite his rejection of moral truths, Nietzsche’s theory of value can lead us to a sound ethical theory

It goes without saying that I do not deny -unless I am a fool -that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged -but I think that one should be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons than hitherto. We have to learn to think differently -in order at last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently.

Journal of the American Philosophical Association

Nietzsche’s discussions of nihilism are meant to bring into view an intriguing pathology of modern culture: that it is unable to sustain "higher values". This paper attempts to make sense of the nature and import of higher values. Higher values are a subset of final values. They are distinguished by their demandingness, susceptibility toward creating tragic conflicts, recruitment of a characteristic set of powerful emotions, perceived import, exclusionary nature, and their tendency to instantiate a community. The paper considers Nietzsche’s arguments for the claim that we are committed to instituting some set of higher values. The cost of not doing so is vitiating our deepest aim and precluding a central form of happiness.

2014

Unless indicated otherwise, references to Nietzsche's works are made from the Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA). The abbreviated title of the work cited is provided in German/English, followed by the number of the book-part and/or chapter title where necessary. This is then followed by the number of the section, the abbreviation KSA, the volume number and then the page number. For the unpublished notes, I use the abbreviation NL, followed by the note number. This is then followed by the abbreviation KSA, the volume number and page number. If the translation from The Will to Power is utilised, I also add the abbreviation WP, followed by the note number. Where reference is made to Heidegger's works, GA, followed by the volume and page number, refers to volumes of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. Where use is made of an English translation, the abbreviation as indicated below, followed by the page number, follows the reference to the Gesamtausgabe volume or other German edition. My initials (CFB) are added to the end of references where the English translation has been modified or is my own, as well as in cases where I have added an emphasis to a quotation. Works by Heidegger Gesamtausgabe Volumes GA3 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929). Edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann. 1991.

2014

This dissertation looks at the details of Friedrich Nietzsche\u27s concept of the revaluation of all values. The dissertation will look at the idea in several ways to elucidate the depth and complexity of the idea. First, it will be looked at through its evolution, as it began as an idea early in Nietzsche\u27s career and reached its full complexity at the end of his career with the planned publication of his Revaluation of All Values, just before the onset of his madness. Several questions will be explored: What is the nature of the revaluator who is supposed to be instrumental in the process of revaluation? What will the values after the revaluation be like (a rebirth of ancient values or creation of entirely new values)? What will be the scope of the revaluation? And what is the relation of other major ideas of Nietzsche\u27s (will to power, eternal return, overman, and amor fati) to the revaluation? Different answers to these questions will be explored. Ultimately, the conclusio...

Philosophy in Review, 2010