Knowledge and Action

What is the relationship between knowledge and action? Many philosophers in recent years have proposed a very intimate connection between these two concepts. John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley—among others—have proposed that knowledge is both a necessary and sufficient condition for rational deliberate action, citing only that an agent must use reasons that are both known and relevant in their decision making. They also argue that an agent is blameworthy and deserving of criticism for failing to adhere to this knowledge norm of action. This thesis examines Hawthorne and Stanley’s norm, pulling apart concepts such as ‘relevance’ and ‘reasons’ to try and better understand what this knowledge norm of action entails. Ultimately this thesis proposes that Hawthorne and Stanley’s principles (and those like it) fail to adequately capture the scope of what a general norm of action should, and proposes tentative suggestions for what features a knowledge norm of action should have.

Reasons, Justification and Defeaters, Oxford University Press, 2020

One can intentionally do something only if one knows what one is doing while they are doing it. For example, one can intentionally kill one’s neighbor by opening their gas stove overnight only if one knows that the gas is likely to kill the neighbor in their sleep. One can intentionally sabotage the victory of one’s rival by putting sleeping drugs in their drink only if one knows that sleeping drugs will harm the rival’s performance. And so on. In a slogan: Intentional action is action guided by knowledge. This essay reviews some motivations for a ‘knowledge-centered psychology’ — a psychology where knowledge enters center stage in an explanation of intentional action (§2). Then it outlines a novel argument for the claim that knowledge is required for intentional action (§3) and discusses some of its consequences (§§4-5)

2009

Criticises Hawthorne and Stanley's arguments for the knowledge rule of practical reasoning. Argues that justification must be the norm of practical reason.

Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many cases (and in all the cases discussed by the defenders of a strong link between knowledge and practical reasoning) is not so much knowledge but expected utility.

Erkenntnis, 2022

On an impurist approach to epistemology, whether a person knows that p can vary with normative facts about her actions-including facts that do not bear on whether p is true. This paper presents a challenge to impurists: they must specify which of the many norms on action are distinctively connected to knowledge, and they must explain why. To the extent that contemporary impurists address this challenge, they do so by citing norms of 'practical rationality.' I show that, on any theory of practical rationality, this approach leads to unacceptable results. Contemporary impurists, then, are in trouble. I conclude the paper by sketching three ways that the impurist might attempt to get out of trouble. The most promising of these approaches appeals to the social role played by certain norms on action.

Much of what we do seems to have the feature that Anscombe attributed to all our intentional actions: that of being known without observation of inference. There is, however, a *prima facie* tension between any attempt to show that this seeming feature actually does obtain and the causal theory of action explanation; as Davidson already pointed out in "Actions, Reasons, and Causes", there is no guarantee that one will know what is causing one to act, or even, potentially, that one has been caused to act---so that one would be performing an intentional action in ignorance. I argue that this tension cannot be overcome: one cannot reconcile a causal theory of action and immediate knowledge of action. The negative argument is prosecuted through an examination of Velleman's and Setiya's attempts to bring the two terms together: in each case one ends up needing to fall back on observation or inference. I close with some positive suggestions concerning the potential of a teleological theory of action explanation for redeeming the immediacy of practical knowledge.

Philosophical Studies

Two traditions in action theory offer different accounts of what distinguishes intentional action from mere behavior. According to the causalist tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished causal antecedents, and according to the Anscombian tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished epistemological features. I offer a way to reconcile these ostensibly conflicting accounts of intentional action by way of appealing to “ability-constituting knowledge”. After explaining what such knowledge is, and in particular its relationship to inadvertent virtue and knowledge-how, I suggest that, among other things, appealing to ability-constituting knowledge can help us flesh out what it is for an agent’s reasons to non-deviantly cause and sustain her purposive behavior.

As epistemic agents, we have certain responsibilities as "knowers"--there are behaviors and actions which are conducive to knowledge building, and others which are not. I argue that these epistemic responsibilities are not completely removed from the ethical sphere, and there are cases in which a responsible moral agent must also be epistemically responsible.

A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As there has been little of direct exchange between the debate on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I consider two notions about blameworthiness and reasons that are fundamental in respective field. The two notions might seem

Philosophy Compass, 2008

It has become recently popular to suggest that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning and that this provides an important constraint on the correct account of knowledge, one which favours subject-sensitive invariantism over contextualism and classic invariantism. I argue that there are putative counterexamples to both directions of the knowledge norm. Even if the knowledge norm can be defended against these counterexamples, I argue that it is a delicate issue whether it is true, one which relies on fine distinctions among a variety of relevant notions of propriety which our intuitions may reflect. These notions variously apply to the agent herself, her character traits, her beliefs, her reasoning and any resultant action. Given the delicacy of these issues, I argue that the knowledge norm is not a fixed point from which to defend substantive and controversial views in epistemology. Rather, these views need to be defended on other grounds.