REASONISM AND INFERENTISM IN THE THEORY OF ARGUMENT

2012

In Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-pragmatic-approach to Argumentation Theory (Springer, 2011), I provide a new model for the semantic and pragmatic appraisal of argumentation. This model is based on a characterization of argumentation as a second order speech-act complex. I explain the advantages of this model respecting other proposals within Argumentation Theory, such as Pragma-dialectics, Informal Logic, the New Rhetoric or the Epistemic Approach.

2024

Blair articulates a concept of argument that suggests, as he puts it, that argument is a normative concept (Blair, Informal Logic 24:137-151, 2004, p. 190). Put roughly, the idea is that a collection of propositions doesn't constitute an argument unless some taken together constitute a reason for the remaining proposition and thereby support it enough to provide at least prima facie justification for it (Blair, in: Blair, Johnson, Hansen, Tindale (eds) Informal Logic at 25, Proceedings of the 25th anniversary conference, Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, 2003, p.173). My primary task in this paper is to advance an understanding of the illative unit of argument and the reasons associated with it that provides an intuition pump for a normative concept of argument. My aim is to advance a positive consideration in favor of a normative concept of argument that motivates its further development. I take the normative concept of argument I defend here to be in the same ballpark as the one Blair characterizes.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008

Theoria an International Journal For Theory History and Foundations of Science, 2011

While we applaud several aspects of Lilian Bermejo-Luque's novel theory of argumentation and especially welcome its epistemological dimensions, in this discussion we raise doubts about her conception of argumentation, her account of argumentative goodness, and her treatments of the notion of "giving reasons" and of justification. -pragmatic approach; rational belief.

INFORMAL LOGIC-WINDSOR ONTARIO-, 2005

The article outlines a general epistemological theory of argument, i.e. a theory that regards providing justified belief as the principal aim of argumentation, and defends it instrumentalistically. After introducing some central terms of such a theory (2), answers to its central questions are proposed: the primary object and structure of the theory (3), the function of arguments, which is to lead to justified belief (4), the way such arguments function, which is to guide the addressee's cognizing (5), objective versus subjective aspects of argumentation (6), designing different types of argument (7). Then the notion of '(argumentatively) valid argument' is defined and criteria for the adequate use of such arguments are introduced (8). Finally, this conception is justified as, among others, leading to more true beliefs than competing conceptions (9).

The paper argues that argument and argumentation deserve philosophical attention but do not receive it, and proposes some explanations. It then asks whether there is a field of philosophy, "philosophy of argument," that might attract philosophers' attention. A case is made that such a field exists. However, challenges to that case seriously undermine it. Thus those who want philosophers to pay more attention to argument must find other ways to make their case.

Linguistics meets philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2022

This chapter overviews recent work on the semantics and pragmatics of argumentative discourse, with particular attention to work on the se- mantics of argument connectives such as `therefore' in discourse coherence theory and in dynamic semantics as well as on modal analyses of `there- fore'.. In the nal section, I overview some issues that arise on the pragmatics of arguments, such as how we are to characterize the distinctive utterance force of arguments versus explanations.

In: M. Manzin, F. Puppo. S. Tomasi (eds.), Studies on Argumentation and Legal Philosophy. Further Steps Towards a Pluralistic Approach (pp. 51-80). Trento: Università degli studi di Trento.

Argumentation schemes are abstract representations of natural and defeasible arguments. They combine a logical or quasi-logical structure with a semantic, material relation linking the premises to the conclusion. They can be used to represent the logical and semantic relation of the interpretative arguments analyzed by Tarello, pointing out their defeasibility conditions and the different possible logical structures. The defeasible nature of the scheme is shown by means of critical questions, which identify the default conditions of the reasoning and the possible ways of rebutting or attacking them. This ‘translation’ of the arguments of interpretation into the argumentation schemes framework has been applied to the analogical and naturalistic arguments, which show how the procedure can be extended to the other kinds of interpretative arguments set out by Tarello. In both cases the transformation of the arguments of interpretation into schemes shows that the arguments can be complex. The argumentative structure of analogical arguments can be described according to two distinct patterns, one aimed at redefining a category, the other at creating a new one. The naturalistic argument can be divided into two kinds, the appeal to scientific principles and the appeal to common sense. The first case can be represented by the argument from cause to effect, while the second one hides an argument from popular opinion, often mixed with other strategies.

2011