PHIL 328 Ethics and Genetics Essay 1

The questions we address are the following: Are we entitled to access life extension therapies? Must we draw the line at some point (say 120 years, the maximum life span so far, or maybe even earlier) and decide that that’s that and now we must die? Are there considerations that might make either living or making it possible to live after a certain ages immoral? Does justice require foregoing life extension therapies or does it require the development and application of these therapies?

Rejuvenation Research, 2007

Res Cogitans - Journal of Philosophy

2013

Over the last few years, ethical issues related to considerable life extension have gathered much attention among philosophers. This has largely been inspired by the development of emerging medical technologies such as regenerative medicine, stem cell research, and telomere manipulation. The idea of an extremely long life immediately raises many serious questions about the desirability of such a life and its meaning to our understanding of us as humans and of our mortality. 1 In this paper I will introduce some central arguments that have been presented in the debate on the ethics of considerable life extension. By way of reviewing the debate I will aim to show that the idea that there is a single, unified debate on the topic is quite questionable.

Bioethics, 2006

In the close to medium future, the life sciences might permit a vast extension of the human life span. I will argue that this is a very desirable development for the individual person. The question whether death is a harm to the dying is irrelevant here. All it takes is that being alive is good for the living person and not being alive is not good for anyone. Thus, living persons who expect to live on happily are rationally required to want to stay alive. Eventual uncertainty whether it will be possible to be happy in the future provides no objection, but rather an incentive to try. This view, however, may be naive in assuming that persons are unchanging entities that exist separately from their psychological information. Objections have been derived from reductionistic views that value our future experiences in a way that declines with time, so that there will be a future point beyond which only negligible value accrues. If we adopt such a view, then we cannot now be concerned to have experiences beyond that point. I argue that these arguments fail to take into account all the reasons we might have to be concerned for the future and all the kinds of such concern that come from them. The adoption of a plausible reductionistic account can arguably weaken our concern for the future and certainly change its quality in important ways. But this provides no objection to the desire to live forever, nor to live at all.

2013

Recent developments in biogerontology—the study of the biology of ageing—suggest that it may eventually be possible to intervene in the human ageing process. This, in turn, offers the prospect of significantly postponing the onset of age-related diseases. The biogerontological project, however, has met with strong resistance, especially by deontologists. They consider the act of intervening in the ageing process impermissible on the grounds that it would (most probably) bring about an extended maximum lifespan—a state of affairs that they deem intrinsically bad. In a bid to convince their deontological opponents of the permissibility of this act, proponents of biogerontology invoke an argument which is grounded in the doctrine of double effect. Surprisingly, their argument, which we refer to as the ‘double effect argument’, has gone unnoticed. This article exposes and critically evaluates this ‘double effect argument’. To this end, we first review a series of excerpts from the ethical debate on biogerontology in order to substantiate the presence of double effect reasoning. Next, we attempt to determine the role that the ‘double effect argument’ is meant to fulfill within this debate. Finally, we assess whether the act of intervening in ageing actually can be justified using double effect reasoning.

A humanist approach to ageing, 2009

Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (3): 279-291., 2011

One argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human life extension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable. In this paper I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this argument. I argue that radical increases in life expectancy could, in principle, reduce the evolutionary potential of human populations through both biological and cultural mechanisms. I further argue that if life extension did reduce the evolvability of the species this will be undesirable for three reasons: (1) it may increase the species’ susceptibility to extinction risks, (2) it may adversely affect institutions and practises that promote wellbeing, and (3) it may impede moral progress

If the prediction of some scientists comes true, then we are only few years away from the appearance of the first generation of human beings who will be able to add one year to each remaining year of life expectancy. Faced with this possibility, it seems appropriate to give thought to the public policies that should be adopted. It is better to anticipate the various future scenarios than react to a reality which is a fait accompli. To date, the debate has mainly focused on the ethical question: is it good or bad for us humans to achieve immortal life? Until now, neither legal guidelines at State level nor those of international organisations which deal with bioethical issues have concerned themselves with this matter. But before discussing policies, two other matters should be addressed: first, to show how the prolongation of human life can be as much the unwanted outcome of legitimate efforts in search of healthy aging, as one of the aims of the post-humanist project; second, to present the most consistent and shared ethical reasons for rejecting the human immortality project.