The Science of Logic

In the book La Lógica de Hegel y el marxismo , published in 2009, an exhaustive study of the objective logic of G. W. F. Hegel was made; This matter is the content of the first volume of The Science of Logic, the masterpiece of the German philosopher. Our work was structured as follows. In the first place, Hegel's text was taken as a starting point, either by means of a direct quotation, a summary or an extract; later, an attempt was made to give the Hegelian obscurity the greatest possible intelligibility in order to obtain the marrow of the philosopher's thought; Finally, this essential nucleus was placed on its feet by rescuing the rational content of the Hegelian postulates. In this Summary we present both Hegel's thought and the Marxist interpretation of it, completely decanted, separated from all the complicated intellective apparatus used to arrive at them, but without altering their essence. In this way, we want to make our work accessible to a larger number of readers.

British Journal For the History of Philosophy, 2014

ABSTRACT This paper examines Hegel's accounts of the nature of judgements and inferences in the ‘subjective logic’ of the Science of Logic, and does so in light of the history of the tradition of formal logic to his time. It is argued that, contrary to the attitude often displayed by interpreters of Hegel's logic, it is important to understand the positive role played by formal logic, ‘logic commonly so called’, in Hegel's own conception of logic. It is argued that Hegel's own scientific presentation [Darstellung] of logic relies on a dialectic working through the tradition of formal logic from Aristotle to Leibniz. The positions within the dialectic are most easily brought into focus in terms of the distinction between Aristotelian and Stoic logic, but they can also be seen as internal to Aristotelian logic. The logical tradition can be regarded as presenting a type of reductio ad absurdum, and a science of logic must examine what it was about Aristotle's original project that brought it to this fate.

2013

Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos, 2021

This article is concerned with some of the criteria which Hegel believes apply to a scientific treatment of logic. I briefly address criteria which I take Hegel to inherit from traditional rationalism before focusing on two fairly idiosyncratic criteria: the requirement that a science of logic exhibit a circular structure and that it begin with the concept of pure being. I offer an explanation of these criteria which understands them as motivated by anti-sceptical concerns, before arguing that Hegel's mature treatment of the latter criterion is problematically ambiguous.

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 2015

In the past decades, philosophical interest in Hegel has seen a resurgence in both continental and analytic circles. What has marked this veritable renaissance, however, has been a noteworthy neglect of Hegel's second major work, The Science of Logic . In one respect, this is surprising-the Logic is the self-professed centrepiece of Hegel's system; no comprehension of his thinking can thus occur in its absence. In another, it is very understandable: if the Logic deals, as Hegel himself says, with the concept of God before creation, it would seem prima facie diffi cult if not impossible to make such a project palatable to current mainstream philosophical commitments.

Introductory remarks My lecture consists of some introductory remarks and two parts. In the first part, I will look at the opening chapter of Hegel's Science of Logic on Being up to the beginning of the second chapter on Being-there. 1 Being and Nothing will turn out as the eternal logical prehistory and Becoming as the logical big bang. This big bang marks the beginning of the evolution of logical space, whose first relatively stable state is Being-there. In the second part, I will comment on circular negation as the operation that drives the logical evolution.

Revue roumaine de philosophie, 2017

The paper presents an interpretation of Hegelian objective logic from the point of view of inter-categorial relationships, that are discussed upon within this first part of speculative logic. The author proves that the objective Logic, taken as independent from its continuation, the subjective one, is a categorial structure (but not a conceptual one) where Being and Essence are complementarily related. The categories of objective logic, if related to one another, make up structures of categorial structures (categorial matrixes) which the processes of subjective Logic develop further on as Concept, Judgment, and Syllogism. (English version of: Raporturi intercategoriale în Știința logicii de Hegel)

2013

Analytical philosophy after Frege's logicism and Russell's logical atomism presupposes sortal domains of individual 'entities' for which we already have defined their identities and elementary predicates. Such 'things' exist only in ideal 'possible world' which are nothing but structured sets of purely mathematical sets. In contrast to such purely abstract models, Hegel analyses the role of conceptual differentiations and corresponding default inferences in the real world. Here, all objects are spatially and temporally finite. Even if real things move according to certain forms, they are only moments in holistic processes. Moreover, the forms are no objects of immediate empirical observation but presuppose successfully reproducible actions and speech acts. As a result, no semantics of world-related reference can do without Hegel's categories, which go far beyond the means of merely relational mathematical logic.