Arguing about Emotion

2013

Abstract. Emotions are commonly thought to be beyond the pale of rational analysis, for they are subjective, may vary even with respect to the person experiencing the emotion, and may conflict with rational thought. In this paper, we develop the position that emotions can be the objects of argumentation, which we express by introducing emotion terms in emotional argumentation schemes. Thus, we can argue about whether or not, according to normative standards and available evidence, it is plausible that an individual had a particular emotion. This is particularly salient in legal cases, where decisions can depend on explicit arguments about emotional states.

In a recent paper (ISSA 2010), Groarke proposes a view of emotional arguments that seems too narrow. While his notion of pathos and emotional arguments may aid in the development of normative analysis, it is not sufficient in addressing all emotional arguments and is guilty of strictly adhering to the tradition's conception of emotion's place in argumentation. I suggest an alternative evaluation of emotional arguments-relying on Walton's dialogue types and goals as its foundation.

Emotions have a certain logic that makes the world make sense. The human being has been attached to emotional life and knows its power and consequences; this power is overwhelming and devastating. Many authors have studied emotions to discover why they are captivating, powerful, and challenging.

2009

In the context of cornerstone ideas of Western Culture, this paper focuses on the issue of why emotional arguments are studied and evaluated from the perspective of logic. Two other issues are briefly considered: whether logical and emotional arguments could/should be examined from the perspective of emotions.

This essay is in three parts; each subsequent part shorter than the previous. In the first I discuss the Principle of Pragmatic Emotionalization, and the role of emotion in argumentation. The specific issue concerns the role of emotional messages in argument. This is used as a foundation for the second part where I will describe the role of expressive speech acts, or, as I will call them, emotional message acts, in everyday argumentation. Finally, I say a very few words regarding the question as to whether or not we are doing Argumentation Theory or Psychology in studying emotional argumentation.

Argumentation, 2006

2015

Argumentation is often seen as a mechanism to support different forms of reasoning such that decision-making and persuasion, but all these approaches assume a purely rational behavior of the involved actors. However, humans are proved to behave differently, mixing rational and emotional attitudes to guide their actions, and it has been claimed that there exists a strong connection between the argumentation process and the emotions felt by people involved in such process. In this paper, we assess this claim by means of an experiment: during several debates people's argumentation in plain English is connected and compared to the emotions automatically detected from the participants. Our results show a correspondence between emotions and argumentation elements, e.g., when in the argumentation two opposite opinions are conflicting this is reflected in a negative way on the debaters' emotions.

Abstract. Most of work on reasoning and decision-making in virtual agents relates the choices with a exhaustive exploration, analyzing every possible alternative and implication, and trying to maximize some utility measure in order to make the best decision. Humans, however, seems no reason and make decisions naturally in this way. As authors such as Herbert A.

2019

Emotions and epistemic rationality have been traditionally considered to be in opposition. In the last twenty years, the role of emotions in epistemology has been increasingly acknowledged, but there is no systematic argument for the rational assessability of emotions that is compatible with both cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of emotions and fits with the epistemic rational assessability of mental states in general. This thesis aims to fill this gap. Using empirically informed philosophical methodology, I offer a novel account of the rational assessability of emotions that fits with the rational assessability of other mental states and that could in principle be accepted by cognitivist and some prominent non-cognitivist theories of emotions. The possibility to epistemically rationally assess emotions opens up a fresh set of questions that regards the nature of the evaluations involved in the emotions, the epistemic norms that apply to them and the extent to which we are e...

One of the most important contributions to Argumentation Theory in the past few decades has been the Pragma-Dialectic approach led by van Eemeren and Grootendorst of the Amsterdam School. This programme presents a systematic theory intended to provide an analytical framework through which one can reconstruct and normatively investigate ordinary argumentative communication. The emphasis is very strongly on a "critical-rational" approach which relies on a language-based analysis: "Argumentative discourse should be studied as a specimen of normal verbal communication and interaction, and it should, at the same time, be measured against a certain standard of reasonableness" (van Eemeren and Grootendorst. 1992, p. 5).