Complex Predicates and the Metaphysics of Properties
Bryan Pickel
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Abstract
According to an influential tradition, a predicate of one's preferred theory ought to correspond to something in the world, a feature shared by the various entities that satisfy the predicate. 1 If the predicate 'is a kangaroo' occurs in one's preferred theory, then one ought to posit a property which all of the various things that satisfy 'is a kangaroo' have in common. 2 Philosophers of this persuasion divide into two camps. Some endorse sparse conceptions of properties on which some collections of entities lack a common property. Therefore, they hesitate to deploy additional predicates in their preferred description of the world. The predicates of day-to-day language or special sciences likely do not correspond to properties. These predicates then must ultimately give way to the predicates of a more austere schema. Other property theorists endorse abundant conceptions: every arbitrary grouping of individuals shares some property. A theory would be no worse for having a predicate corresponding to any such grouping.
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