Book Review International Law as Social Construct (Focarelli)

Baudouin Dupret, Positive Law from the Muslim World: Jurisprudence, History, Practices (Cambridge University Press), 2021

This chapter addresses the question of the concept of law and its analytical relevance. By mixing conceptual clarification and semantic probes, and by shifting its scrutiny towards the Western legal experience, it seeks to underscore the problematic nature of characterizing law as a universal concept. On the contrary, we intend to show that law, in the sense by which it is globally understood today, is the outcome of a contingent experience whose extension to other historical and cultural contexts has been achieved at a huge price: heuristic weakness, analytical vacuity, grammatical incoherence, pluralist dogmatism. We conduct this exploration of the concept of law in three stages. First, we examine works dealing with "legal pluralism" and "legalism" to identify the reasons why the term 'law', its conceptual extension, and the attribution of its predicative quality are problematic and badly reflect the gap that can exist between a 'legalistic way of thinking' about the world and the existence of law in its contemporary meaning. Second, we specifically address works dealing with 'Islamic law' and law in Muslim contexts to try to see what law can be at the margin, at what Herbert Hart nicely called its fringe of penumbra, but also what people make it into, often abusively. Third, we seek to outline the contours of a conceptual inquiry, delimiting its relevance, specifying its limits, taking advantage of its analytical razor, clearing the mist, opening the domain of grammar. We thus pave the way for a later examination of the historical ontology of the concept of law and for the ethnography of its practices. Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Law Let us start with concepts of law presented as alternatives to positivism. From the critique of several collections, we will review the notions of 'folk law', 'legal pluralism', and 'legalism', with the aim of tackling the conceptual issues they raise and the analytical dilution resulting from them. It will allow us to stress the contingency of the concept of law and the stalemate into which its extensive meanings lead us. Folk Law and Legal Pluralism Folk Law: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Lex Non Scripta is a kind of manifesto of the current of folk law and legal pluralism (Dundes Renteln & Dundes, 1994). It is emblematic of the stalemate into which the search for a universal concept of law leads us. While recognizing, as Gluckman does, that the term 'law' and its derivatives have various meanings (Gluckman, 1965: 227), most contributions are based on an implicit concept that allows us to describe the many historical and geographical experiences as instances of the same concept. In the same way, many contributions make the correct observation that the study of the constitutive elements of so-called 'primitive law' starts from the characteristic features of modern law and doctrine (Josselin de Jong, 1994: 111); or that the idea that the 'Common Law' is a set of rules constituting a system is closely associated with legal positivism and derives from the concept of any law in terms of the model of legislated law (Simpson, 1994: 122); or that the concept of law held by an English lawyer today is largely influenced by Austinian theory and its later positivist versions, like Kelsen's or Hart's, all of them tending to think of law as a system of rules emanating from a focal point at the top of a pyramidal structure (Hag Ali, 1994: 36). However, they do not draw the conclusions of this assessment, that is, that the very idea of a 'law' characterized as primitive, customary,

2019

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique, 2008

ociety, every society, understood structurally, namely as an agency of civilisation, cannot help wielding power, the power of instituting the human life that takes place in it. And in order to do so, it cannot but establish itself theatrically, as the stage or scaffold that carries the social edifice. It is on this stage that society ceaselessly releases the fictions which enable its subjects to think the normative order theatrically, which is to say, structurally. Pierre Legendre: 148

2014

Foreword [1994] 1–4 LAW AS PRACTICE QUELQUES QUESTIONS MÉTHODOLOGIQUES DE LA FORMATION DES CONCEPTS EN SCIENCES JURIDIQUES [1970] 7–33: 1. Introduction 7 / 2. La particularité de l’objet des sciences juridiques 8 / 3. La particularité de la méthodologie des sciences juridiques 10 / 4. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciences juridiques: Quelques problèmes 15 [4.1. Le concept du droit 16 / 4.2. Le concept dogmatique du contenu du droit 21 / 4.3. Le concept de la normativité juridique 23 / 4.4. Le concept des lacunes en droit 24] / 5. La particularité de la formation des concepts en sciencesjuridiques: Quelques conclusions 26 / 6. La formation des concepts en sciences juridiques et la réalité: Conclusion finale 29 / 7. Annexe: Des bases d’une classification possible des définitions en sciences juridiques 31 // GELTUNG DES RECHTS – WIRKSAMKEIT DES RECHTS [1978] 35–42 // MACROSOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF LAW: A SURVEY AND APPRAISAL [1983] 43–76: I. Issues of the Macrosociological Theories of Law 46 / II. The Role of the Macrosociological Theories in the Social Science Foundation of Legal Thinking 63 // REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ITS INNER MORALITY [1984] 77–89: 1. Law and Morals As Two Systems of Norms, and the Inner Morality of Law 77 / 2. Law As A Value Bearer and As A Mere External Indicator 78 / 3. The Inner and External Moral Credit of Legislator 83 / 4. The Inner Morality of Law 86 // THE LAW AND ITS LIMITS [1985] 91–96 LAW AS TECHNIQUE DOMAINE »EXTERNE« ET DOMAINE »INTERNE« EN DROIT [1983] 99–117: 1. Le »juridique« et le »non-juridique« 99 / 2. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que groupes de phénomènes 104 / 3. Domaine »externe« et domaine »interne« en tant que points de références 112 / 4. Conclusion 116 // DIE MINISTERIELLE BEGRÜNDUNG IN RECHTSPHILOSOPHISCHER SICHT [1977] 119–139: I. Die prinzipiellen und geschichtlichen Grundlagen der Herausforderung der ministeriellen Begründungen 120 / II. Die möglichen und erwünschten Funktionen der ministeriellen Begründung im sozialistischen Rechts 128 / III. Die ministerielle Begründung und ihr Wert in der Auslegung derRechtsnormen 132 // THE PREAMBLE: A QUESTION OF JURISPRUDENCE [1970] 141–167: I. The Notion of the Preamble 142 / II. Content and Functions of the Preambles 146 / III. Normativity of the Preamble Content 150 / IV. The Problem of the Justifiability of Preamble-drafting in the Light of Socialist Legal Policy 161 // PRESUMPTION AND FICTION: MEANS OF LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 169–185: I. Presumption 169 [1. In the Judicial Process of Establishing the Facts: praesumptio homini vel facti 170 / 2. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris tantum 170 / 3. In the Normative Definition of the Facts: praesumptio juris et de jure 171 / 4. In a Possible Theoretical Reconstruction 171] On »Presumption« 172 [1. Function 172 / 2. Presumption and Fiction 173 / 3. Irrelevancy of Epistemological Foundation 173 / 4. The Technique of Presumption 174] II. Fiction 175 [1. In the Linguistic Formation of Legal Norms 175 / 2. In the Judicial Application of Legal Norms 175 / 3. In the Doctrinal Processing of Legal Norms 176 / 4. In the Theoretical Reconstruction of Legal Norms 176 / 5. Approaches to and Understandings of Fiction 177] On »Fiction« 178 [1. History and Understandings 178 / 2. Classification 180 / 3. Law as Fiction 181 / 4. Presumption and Fiction 182] // LEGAL TECHNIQUE [1988] 187–198: I. Legal Technique 187 [1. In the Large Sense 1987/ 2. In Legal Practice 189 / 3. In Legal Science 189 / 4. As a Special Technique 190] II. On Legal Technique [1. Definition and Function 190 / 2. Legal Technique and Legal Cultures 192 / 3. Postulates of Legal Technique in the Cultures of Modem Formal Law 195 {a) The Principle of Consequentiality 195 / b) The Principle of Coherency 195 / c) The Principle of Conceptual Economy 196 / d) The Principle of Non-redundancy 196}] LAW AS LOGIC MODERNE STAATLICHKEIT UND MODERNES FORMALES RECHT [1982] 201–207: 1. Die Klassifizierung als logisches und als gesellschaftswissenschaftliches Verfahren 202 / 2. Typologie der staatlichen und rechtlichen Erscheinungen 202 / 3. Der moderne Staat und das moderne formale Recht: Frage der Zusammenhänge und Entwicklungsalternativen 204 // HETEROGENEITY AND VALIDITY OF LAW: OUTLINES OF AN ONTOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION [1986] 209–218 // LEIBNIZ UND DIE FRAGE DER RECHTLICHEN SYSTEMBILDUNG [1973] 219–232: 1. Aktualität von Leibniz 219 / 2. Der Gedanke der universalen mathematischen Methode 221 / 3. Die logischen Konzeption der Rechtswissenschaft 224 / 4. Die geometrische Vision der rechtlichen Systembildung 227 / 5. Das Scheitern der Leibnizschen Idee und seine Lehre 230 // LAW AND ITS APPROACH AS A SYSTEM [1975] 233–255: 1. The Logical Structure of Law as a Historical Product 233 / 2. Tendencies of Formal Rationalization in Legal Development 234 / 3. Historical Development of the Approach to Law as a System 239 / 4. Present State of the Attempts at a Logical Reconstruction of Law and Legal Reasoning 243 / 5. Question of the Axiomatic Conception of Law 248 / 6. Heuristic Value of the Approach to Law as a System 250 // LOGIC OF LAW AND JUDICIAL ACTIVITY: A GAP BETWEEN IDEALS, REALITY AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES [1982] 258–288: 1. Historical Background 259 / 2. Ideals 264 / 3. Reality 270 / 4. Future Perspectives 277 // KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW – YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW [ms] 289–293, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF NORMS: SCIENCE- AND LANGUAGE-PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS [ms] 295–314: 1. Presuppositions 295 / 2. The Context of the Application of Norms 300 [2.1 Actualisation in Concrete Meaning 300 / 2.2 Linguistic Undefinedness 304 / 2.3 Lack of Logical Consequence in the Normative Sphere 308] LAW AS EXPERIENCE ON THE SOCIALLY DETERMINED NATURE OF LEGAL REASONING [1971] 317–374: 1. Interrelation of the Creation and Application of Law 317 / 2. The Socially Determined Nature of the Application of Law 332 / 3. The Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning 337 / 4. The Question of Perspectives 363 // TOWARDS THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW: SOME THESES ON THE BASIS OF LUKÁCS’ ONTOLOGY [1983] 375–390, IS LAW A SYSTEM OF ENACTMENTS? [1984] 391–398: 1. Working Models of Law 391 / 2. Senses of ContExtuality in Law 393 / 3. Jurisprudential Approach and Socio-ontological Approach 394 / 4. Conclusions 396 [4.1. Law as Historical Continuum 396 / 4.2.Law as Open System 396 / 4.3. / Law as Complex Phenomenon with Alternative Strategy 396 / 4.4. Law as an Irreversible Process 397 / 4.5. The Genuinely Societal Character of Law 397] // EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE UNIQUENESS OF NATIONAL LEGAL CULTURES [1992] 399–411: 1. The Philosophical Framework 399 / 2. Law as Tradition 403 / 3. European Integration and the Preservation of the Uniqueness of National Legal Orders 407 // INSTITUTIONS AS SYSTEMS: NOTES ON THE CLOSED SETS, OPEN VISTAS OF DEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSCENDENCY OF INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATIONS [1991] 413–424: I. A Logic of Systems 413 / II. Ideal Types and Historically Concrete Manifestations 416 / III. Ideal Type As A Normative Ideology 418 / IV.Objectivity and Contingency of Systems 420 / V. Limits and Bonds, ConsEquEntiality and Practicability of a System 423 LAW AS HISTORY FROM LEGAL CUSTOMS TO LEGAL FOLKWAYS [1981] 427–436, ANTHROPOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE? LEOPOLD POSPÍŠIL AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL CULTURES [1985] 437–457: 1. Rule, Fact and Principle in the Concept of Law 438 [a) Abstract rules 439 / b) Abstracts from actual behaviour 439 / c) Principles Upheld by Legal Decisions 440] 2. Attributes of Law 445 [a) Authority 446 / b) Intention of Universal Application 446 / c) Obligatio 447 / d) Sanction 447] 3. Law and its Social Functional Definition 450 [(1) Law is a Global Phenomenon 451 / (2) Law is a Phenomenon Able to Settle Conflicts of Interests 451 / 3) Law is a Phenomenon Prevailing as the Supreme Controlling Factor 452] 4. Conclusion 454 // LAW AS A SOCIAL ISSUE [1985] 459–475: I. The Social Prestige of Law 459 / II. The Social Nature of Law 463 / III. Law and Language in the Service of Social Mediation 466 (1. Passive Mediation and Active Intervention 468 / 2. The Dilemma of the Mediation of Values 472) // LAW AS HISTORY? [1986] 477–484: 1. Understandings of the Term »Law« 477 / 2. Law and History 478 / 3. Law as History 481 // RECHTSKULTUR – DENKKULTUR: EINFÜHRUNG ZUM THEMA [1988] 485–489 Curriculum Vitae 491 / Bibliography 493 // Index 515 / Index of Normative Materials 523 / Index of Names 525

LAW’S HUMILITY THE POSSIBILITY OF METAJURISPRUDENCE TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1-43 PART I THE METAPHYSICS OF LEGALITY CHAPTER I: Metaontology and Metajurisprudence: 44-122 I.1. Reconfiguring the Site and Scope of Theoretical Disagreement about Law: 44-46 I.2. Replacing the Familiar with the Unfamiliar: Morality as a Dividing Criterion: 47-49 I.3. Relocating the Site of Theoretical Disagreement: 49-57 I.4. Reconsidering the Scope of Theoretical Disagreement: 57-72 I.5. Re-mapping the Division of Opinion: 72-122 • I.5.1. Logical Form and Truth Conditions of Legal Propositions: 75-98 A. Logical Regimentation: 76-78 B. Semantic Complications: 78-81 B.1. Perspectivalism about Law: 81-85 B.2. Is Legality Twin-Earthable?: 85-90 B.3. Is Legality Self-Locational?: 90-93 C. A Semantic Digression: Some Preliminary Remarks: 93-98 • I.5.2. Back to Legal Metaphysics: 98-122 A. Reweaving the Web: 100-114 B. Grounding the Truthmakers: 114-122 CHAPTER II Legal Propositionalism: 123-142 II.1. Outlining the Borders of Legal Propositionalism: 127-132 II.2. Relating Legal Propositions to Legal Facts: 132-142 CHAPTER III A Semantic Digression: 143-205 III.1. The Property Approach: 145-157 A. Legality as an Attributive Term: 147-149 B. Legality as an Objectionable Thick Property: 150-157 III.2. The Sortal Approach: 158-179 III.3. A Minimal Semantic Framework: 179-205 A. Legal Propositions as Recipes for Making Law: 183-188 B. The Semantic Value of the Copula: 188-194 C. The Semantic Value of the Dummy Sortal: 194-200 D. Are Constitutive Disputes Merely Verbal?: 200-205 CHAPTER IV Varieties of Theoretical Disagreement: 206-279 IV.1. Legal Constitution and Its Discontents: 211-241 A. First-order Disagreement over Legal Constitution: 212-222 B. Second-order Disagreement over Legal Constitution: 222-241 IV.2. Objectionable Legal Ontological Commitments: 242-247 IV.3. Disagreement over Legal Grounding: 247-279 CHAPTER V A Dispositional Route for Explaining How Facts Make Law: 280-363 V.1. From Nomic Language to Dispositional Facts: 282-290 V.2. The Case of Enforceability: 290-308 V.3. Law Between Coercion and Trust: 308-363 A. Resisting Some Platitudes about the Relation between Law, Coercion and Trust: 314-322 B. Distinguishing the Legal from the Social Capital: The Role of Coercion and Trust: 322-330 C. Inviting and Validating Trust: Function: 331-334 D. Inviting and Validating Trust: Grounds: 334-363 PART II THE NORMATIVITY OF LEGALITY CHAPTER I Resisting Some Platitudes about Practical Normativity: 364-385 I.1. Dimensions of Normative Relevance: 371-373 I.2. Normatively Relevant Facts: 373-77 I.3. Normative Roles: 377-385 CHAPTER II A Digression into Rationality and Thick Evaluation: 386-404 II.1 Rational Requirements, Asymmetry and Response-Constraint: 389-393 II.2 Thick Evaluation, Global Judgment and Constitutive Impact: 393-404 CHAPTER III The Metric Approach to Legal Normativity: 405-438 III.1. Variants of the Metric Approach: 411-415 III.2. Measuring Up Against the Nexus: Legal Facts as Nexus Reasons: 415-438 A. The Metaphysical Role of Legal Facts: 419-424 B. The Evaluative Role of Legal Facts: 425-431 C. The Explanatory Role of Legal Facts: 431-438 CHAPTER IV Varieties of Disagreement about Legal Normativity: 439-480 IV.1. First-order Disagreement about the Grounds of Nexus Facts: 442-448 IV.2. Second-order Disagreement about the Normative Relevance of Legal Facts: 449-480 CHAPTER V In Search for Another Quadrant: 481-540 V.1. Legal Normativity Without Legal Facts: 483-489 V.2. Genres of Social Normativity: Law, Games, Promises and Civility: 489-540 A. Practice Markers: The Role of Constitution: 497-509 B. Dispositional Markers: A Normativity Diagnostic: 509-540 CHAPTER VI The Nature and Grounds of the Normativity of Enforceable Obligations: 541-582 VI.1. Law and Normative Asymmetry: The Relevance of Action-Constraint: 543-556 VI.2. Law and Evaluation: The Relevance of Constitutive Impact: 556-559 VI.3. The Grounds of Legal Normativity and the Value of the Rule of Law: 560-582 A. The Relation Between Freedom-Upholding Action and Enforceability Requirements: 562-567 B. Formal Legality: Making Enforceability Manifestable: 568-582 APPENDIX: 583-4 BIBLIOGRAPHY: 585-621