Is it morally permissible to eat meat?

My approach will be to set out and defend that animals are conscious creatures that have the capacity to suffer, and therefore should not suffer or be killed unjustly. I set out to establish that animals have this vital characteristic, the capacity to suffer, which gives the animal the right to equal consideration of interests, as described by Peter Singer. I will also defend that the ethical question of whether one should live a vegetarian lifestyle should be decided on the context of the living circumstances of the human.

Think, 2017

This paper aims to argue is it justifiably to raise animals just for human sake, then killing and eating them. When it comes to animal rights and animal welfare, there are many issues to talk about such as medical experiments on animals, usage of animal products, and hunting for sport and so on but main issue that we need to agree first to talk about the others is mor0ality of eating animals. Is it justifiable to eat them if they a good life or we cannot eat them at all. My argument is if we have no right to harm or kill other human beings, we can neither kill animals to eat just because they cannot defend their life for their selves. There is no difference between human and non-human when it comes to body integrity of a living entity.

Animal Frontiers

Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2021

I argue that eating meat is morally good and our duty when it is part of a practice that has benefited animals. The existence of domesticated animals depends on the practice of eating them, and the meat-eating practice benefits animals of that kind if they have good lives. The argument is not consequentialist but historical, and it does not apply to nondomesticated animals. I refine the argument and consider objections.

Between the Species, 2008

2018

Human eating habits are widely distinguished between Vegetarianism and Non-Vegetarianism, where former presumes themselves to be holding no moral risk toward nature and animals as they do not eat animal meats. However, if we examine it closely and thoroughly, every eating habits hold some or other moral risk. My paper is an attempt to unfold different arguments made in support and against the moral concern of Vegetarianism. Although it is impalpable to answer ‘What is morally good to eat?’, our discourse helps to bring forth different arguments to understand the moral concern of our eating habits.

Impact of Meat Consumption on Health and Environmental Sustainability, 2016

This chapter presents the results of studies that unveil how meat and other animal derived products are causing severe environmental impacts, social problems and ethical concerns regarding both human and non-human animals. Although there are many ways to tackle the issue a critical non-anthropocentric education that encompasses ethics as a dimension of sustainability, is proposed. Traditional non environmental education often legitimizes values that are averse to an ethic that could be described as correct regarding the relationship between humans and the other animal species and even many educational currents that call themselves “environmental” are guided by a shallow conservationist point of view. Although welfarist practices may in some contexts be of help, the authors propose the animal abolitionist perspective as the unique genuine foundation for education to build this new paradigm.

Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2009

This paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. The essay's only assumption about moral status, an assumption defended in the analysis of the wrongness of cruelty to animals, is that sentient animals have at least some moral status. One need not be a strong champion of animal protection, then, to embrace moral vegetarianism. One need only assume some reasonable view of animals' moral status.

The purpose of this article, which takes the form of a dialogue between a vegetarian and a meat eater, is twofold. On the one hand, we argue for a general characterisation of moral value in terms of well-being and suffering. On the other hand, on the basis of this characterisation, we argue that, in most cases, the moral value attached to the choice of eating meat is negative; in particular, we defend this claim against a number of objections concerning the nature of animal suffering, its moral value, and the moral responsibility of meat eaters.