Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts

In this thesis I will argue that consciousness is not a physical phenomenon, and that property dualism must be true. The property dualism that I advocate consists of two claims: first, that mental properties are not identical to physical properties; second, that they do not metaphysically supervene on them. This position allows that the bearers of mental properties may be physical objects, and is consistent with the causal supervenience of mental properties on the physical.

2007

We experience the world as perceivers armed with many different sense modalities. These modalities include sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste, each giving an array of sensations and feelings to our phenomenology. How these sensations and feelings come to be is the central concern of the so-called “hard problem” of qualitative experience. Does accepting the premise that Mary gains new knowledge necessarily entail that phenomenal conscious experience must be something indescribable by a physical, reductionist theory?

Acta Analytica-international Periodical for Philosophy in The Analytical Tradition, 2008

The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmers' variation of the argument, a zombie world. Here I argue that both phenomenal and natural kind terms are ambiguous between two senses, phenomenal and natural, and that the conceivability argument goes through only on one reading of a term. Thus, the antimaterialist has to provide some reasons independent of anti-materialism itself to favour that reading of a term that supports his or her argument. Given that there are no such independent reasons, I conclude that we should put more weight on empirical considerations than on a priori discussion in resolving the question concerning the identity between a phenomenal state and its neural realiser.

Filosofska Dumka, 2023

Materialism/physicalism that generally dominates in the contemporary analytic philosophy is challenged by fairly powerful anti-materialist arguments, notably the zombie argument (most influentially defended by David Chalmers) and the knowledge argument (the most widely discussed version of which was advanced and defended by Frank Jackson). These arguments highlight the explanatory gap from the physical (which, if materialism is true, should constitute everything that exists, including consciousness) to phenomenal mental states, the principal impossibility to explain the latter by the former, and from this conclude that phenomenal consciousness is not physical, and so materialism is false. Materialist philosophers attempt to neutralize these arguments in several ways, the most influential of which is the strategy of phenomenal concepts. This article analyzes the main points of this debate with a focus on the knowledge argument, examines and responds to the main objections to the knowledge argument-that it should be mistaken because the alternative is epiphenomenalism, which is unacceptable; that no new knowledge but only new capacities and/or acquaintance are involved; that the knowledge is the same but in different forms; that the knowledge argument affects only type physicalism but not token physicalism. The case is made that psychophysical identities assumed by a posteriori physicalism are unexplainable in principle, and the postulation of brute unexplainable psychophysical identities glossed over by the strategy of phenomenal concepts amounts to dogmatic commitment (motivated by scientism) to a view despite its apparent falsity and its unintelligibility (the impossibility to explain how it can be true), made less unpalatable by offering an ad hoc theory about the mindbrain arrangement that makes us unable to see how the view can be true. As opposed to this, the position of the supporters of the knowledge argument and the zombie argument can be seen as guided by the principle of rational trust in obviousness and our capacities of judgement.

Analytic Philosophy, 2012

Philosophical Issues, 2010

2010

I argue for the superiority of nongappy physicalism over gappy physicalism. While physicalists are united in denying an ontological gap between the phenomenal and the physical, the gappy affirm and the nongappy deny a relevant epistemological gap. Central to my arguments will be contemplation of Swamp Mary, a being physically intrinsically similar to post-release Mary (a physically omniscient being who has experienced red) but has not herself (the swamp being) experienced red. Swamp Mary has phenomenal knowledge of a phenomenal character not instantiated by any of her past or current mental states. I issue a challenge to gappy physicalists to account for how it is that Swamp Mary can satisfy the psychosemantic requirements on phenomenal knowledge while non-Swamp pre-release Mary cannot. I argue that gappy physicalists cannot meet this psychosemantic challenge.

Teorema, 2011

El objetivo del trabajo es analizar la relación entre la experiencia fenoménica y nuestra conceptualización folk de ella. Me concentraré en la estrategia de los conceptos fenoménicos como respuesta al rompecabezas de María. En la primera parte presento el argumento de María y la estrategia de los conceptos fenoménicos. En la segunda parte explico cuáles serían los requisitos que los conceptos fenoménicos deben satisfacer para responder al problema de María. En la tercera parte presento varias teorías acerca de los conceptos fenoménicos y muestro las dificultades que presentan. Finalmente, desarrollo mi propia teoría de los conceptos fenoménicos. Mi tesis es que los conceptos fenoménicos son complejos, ya que sus condiciones de posesión dependen de la maestría de otros conceptos, algunos muy sofisticados como la distinción apariencia-realidad (que pertenece a nuestra teoría de la mente), y los conceptos de color (al menos en el caso de los conceptos necesarios para dar cuenta del caso de María). Y estos últimos conceptos tienen peculiares condiciones de posesión: incluyen el uso de capacidades recognoscitivas no conceptuales.

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2006

According to a currently popular approach to the analysis of phenomenal character, the phenomenal character of an experience is entirely determined by, and is in fact identical with, the experience's representational content. Two underlying assumptions motivate this approach to phenomenal character: (1) that conscious experiences are diaphanous or transparent, in the sense that it is impossible to discern, via introspection, any intrinsic features of an experience of x that are not experienced as features of x; and (2) that the immediate objects of consciousness are not objects per se, but rather properties. This paper explores these assumptions, advancing the thesis that each is rejectable on phenomenological grounds.