Risk Reduction and De-Escalation

Much has been said recently about the unpredictability of Russian foreign policy, and the resulting uncertainty. In reality, Moscow’s interests are quite limited and focused on its near abroad. Understanding how Russia prioritizes its security challenges and how it assesses the security situation on its borders is a start to clearing up much of the uncertainty in Eurasia today. This analysis focuses on critical situations that may develop this year into vital challenges to Russian interests, triggering a response from Moscow.

2013

2015

Towards #NATO2030: The Regional Perspective of the Baltic States and Poland., 2020

Risks and Risk Reduction: A View from the South-eastern Flank , 2022

In September 2022, BASIC held a track 1.5 workshop in Sofia to discuss risk and threat assessments in South-eastern and Northern Europe. The workshop is part of the two-year project ‘Phase 2: Applying a Systematic Approach to NATO-Russia Risk Reduction’ that BASIC is undertaking in collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), 2016

Russia entered a period of acute crisis the day it occupied and annexed Crimea. In history textbooks, it will mark the beginning of the end of Putin's rule. It will also read as a turning point in European and transatlantic policies toward Russia's leadership. Much of the change in paradigm was triggered by Moscow's intrusive and subversive methods in the "in-between" states, the states that remained stuck between Europe and the Russian Federation after 1991. 2 Moscow's unswerving support of Assad's dictatorial military rule is, to a large extent, the consequence of Vladimir Putin's fear of "regime fall" and rule-of-law aspirations in several prominent east European and Mediterranean countries. In 2014-2015, the pace of change was momentous. In 2016-2017, it might accelerate even further, as we see no sign of serious appeasement in Russian domestic and foreign conduct. At the same time, Western governments need to be ready for long-term crisis management, and not just urgent conflict containment, as tensions and confrontations with Moscow will continue on a regular basis. Even if Ukraine becomes a low-intensity conflict, European countries will be facing the challenge of long-term insecurity in their immediate vicinity. Economic recession, authoritarian protectionism, and rising confrontation with most neighbors, west and south, are driving Russia onto a very uncertain path. Confrontational policies are bound to be less safe and less controllable than negotiation and conflict-resolution strategies. It is always much easier to fall into conflict and violence than to end war, and to put the lid back on the Pandora's box of nationalist, xenophobic hysterical war scares.

We are witnessing a new era where NATO and Russia are engaged in deep a confrontation, including its military dimension. The West – especially the US and some countries on the Eastern borders of NATO – equal the Russian threat against Europe to that of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and Ebola. Plenty of studies examine Russian use of hybrid warfare in “aggressions” against independent states, including Ukraine, Georgia, and last but not least Estonia, a member of the Alliance. The portrayal of Russia, as the leading military threat against NATO is a hopelessly flawed threat perception that makes no sense at strategic level, unless it serves unstated and concealed geopolitical goals of some great powers. Both a conventional and a nuclear war between NATO and Russia are completely irrational and in nobody’s interest, since it will inflict enormous damage and there could be no real winner. If a conventional military incident might occur between NATO and Russia, the parties will most likely restrain themselves to avoid a major war, as they did in several confrontations briefly analysed in the article. If a nuclear confrontation occurs, the capabilities of both parties are far more than enough to change living conditions on Earth beyond recognition, when the remnants of humanity will struggle to survive. It is in Europe’s interest to reverse the confrontational course with Russia, while the perception of an “aggressive” Russia as a key military threat mainly serves US interests. The ultimate paradox is that Russia would truly become a leading threat to peace and security if the West succeeds destabilising her.

issi.org.pk

In order to make up for the missed opportunities, on April 1, 2009, US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev met in London and agreed to begin negotiations on a post-START treaty to significantly reduce strategic nuclear weapons.[9] The ...

Daedalus, 2002

From Self-Defence to Regional Disarmament: Reducing tensions and stabilizing the South Caucasus, 2014

Is it the great powers’ relationship which shapes the South Caucasus security environment, or do the disputes within the South Caucasus colour the relationship of the great powers? This article will deal with this question by focussing on Russia’s (possible) role in arms control in relation to the South Caucasus. First, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty will be discussed. Concerning the South Caucasus, the aspects of the so-called ‘Flank Agreement’ – ceilings of Russian forces in the North Caucasus – as well as the ‘Istanbul commitments’ – withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova and Georgia – come especially to the fore. Due to Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty in 2007, as well as due to the increase of Russian forces on Georgia’s separatist regions after the Russo-Georgian of 2008, CFE is in a dead-lock. Hence, an alternative approach of arms control and of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) has to be sought, which will be described in the subsequent part of this work. The Vienna Document (VD) offers a number of opportunities to that extent. Next, Russia’s policy and attitude towards the South Caucasus is scrutinized. Finally, the lead question – is Russia affected by the South Caucasus, or the other way around – will be answered.

2014

: The 2014 Track II U.S. Russia Dialogue, 21st Century Strategic Stability, was held in Monterey, California, from May 23 24, 2014. This dialogue was formally unofficial, but many participants have had experience in or connections to government. The event brought together U.S. and Russian experts to shed light on the two countries perspectives, both conceptually and operationally, on regional trends impacting strategic stability, as well as the twenty first century foundations of strategic stability itself. The goal of the dialogue was to identify important elements of each side s strategic outlook; highlight potential areas of cooperation; and identify possible means of overcoming problems in the U.S. Russia relationship. If we needed an example of how a regional crisis can unexpectedly affect strategic stability, the dialogue could not have been more timely, as it took place amidst the crisis over Ukraine.

2021

n 2018, the National Defense Strategy formally codified the latest shift in U.S. threat perceptions, heralding Russia as one of the “principal priorities” for the U.S. Department of Defense. In this Perspective, we illuminate the implications of the United States and its NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies participating in a conventional military confrontation with Russia in Europe and the associated risk of nuclear escalation. This Perspective primarily draws on recently published RAND Corporation reports to identify strengths, weaknesses, and risks for the United States, NATO, and Russia in a large-scale war. It finds that although Russia does possess a number of key advantages in the early stages of a war that would pose serious challenges to a NATO response, its current ground force structure and posture do not ensure an obvious path to defeating NATO in an extended conflict and avoiding nuclear escalation. The Perspective also finds that there are opportunities for...

2014

Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 61-85., 2018

The current state of coexistence in international arena is contested. Russian Federation (RF) cannot come to terms with the fact that following the dissolution of the USSR, it sustained substantial losses, especially with regards to its role globally. The team of Putin is striving to rebuild the power of their country. The Russian society, used to sacrifices for the homelands, offers its invaluable support. A lot of effort is put in the development of the armaments sector. As a result, the structure, command and mobilization the Armed Forces have substantially improved. The RF Armed Forces prepare for a possible armed conflict. Various types of exercise are conducted; frequently maneuvers take place in proximity to the borders of NATO member-states. This paper examines these developments and suggest possible ways of bypassing the emerging challenges.