Ukraine, the (former) center, Russia, and “Russia”
Roman Solchanyk1992, Studies in Comparative Communism
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Abstract
In Ukraine, as in the other former Soviet republics, the failed August, 1991, putsch resulted in a sudden and dramatic change in the political situation. On August '24, 1991, the Supreme Soviet in Kiev proclaimed Ukraine an independent state subject to a referendum on December 1, 1991. The communist party was first suspended and then banned altogether on the basis of evidence that its leadership supported the putschists in Moscow. Several days later, the communist-dominated majority in the Supreme Soviet dissolved itself, shifting the balance of power to the democratic forces which, although often divided over tactics, have been united on the fundamental question of full independence and statehood. The Ukrainian referendum yielded an astounding 90.32 per cent vote in favor of independence, thereby sealing the fate of the Soviet Union. The new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was formed in December and is seen by many as the successor state to the Soviet Union, remains an unknown quantity. As Li&raturnaya ga:eta commcntcd in its first issue for 1992, the CIS lcadcrs are beginning to realize that thus far the Commonwealth does not cvcn exist on paper. The resignation of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, argues the writers' weekly, in no way signifies the destruction of the center, but rathct "the transfer of lhc idea of central power into other I1ca&" l'ltc key issue, it continues, is the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. This is a polite way of saying that Russia has yet to come to terms with the loss of empire and that Ukraine, as in the past, continues to play a pre-eminent role in the search for Russia's identity. The Ukrainian-Russian Nexus Among the factors that have distinguished Ukraine from the other former republics is its size, economic potential, and geopolitical position. With a population of nearly 52 million, it is the second largest of the former republics after the RSFSR. Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, has almost double the population of ail of Estonia and equals that of Latvia, while Donetsk, one of the 25 oblasts, is considerably larger than Lithuania. The Ukrainian economy, ranked highest in a recent Deutschc Bank study of former republics,2 accounts for about one-fifth of the Soviet gross national income. Moreover, Ukraine occupied a strategic geopolitical position in the Soviet West that provided the Soviet Union with a "European" identity. In short, without
Key takeaways
- Already several years ago something interesting and very different began to happen in the Soviet Union insofar as the framework for discussion of Soviet politics was concerned.
- First, it indicates the degree to which, from the Russian standpoint, the Soviet Union and Russia are very often more or less interchangeable notions.
- For the Soviet President, therefore, it would seem that the interests of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire were indistinguishable.
- of the Russian minority in Ukraine and the likelihood of a Ukrainian-Russian territorial conflict that could result in a nuclear clash.6' At the same time, in a Moscow radio interview, the St. Petersburg mayor claimed that the Ukrainian referendum could not be interpreted as a vote for secession from the Soviet Union.
- That status was projcctccl through the center inasmuch as the Soviet Union and "Russia" were understood to be one and the same thing.
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