The Ambiguity of Definite Descriptions

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Oxford University Press and Mind Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Mind. The proper statement and assessment of Russell's theory depends on one's semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell's theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is not the Russellian theory.

Philosophical Studies, 2003

A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellan’s classic paper“Reference and Definite Descriptions,” thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russell’s theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G’ would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style arguments, thenew argument does not rely upon the mereexistence of referential uses of definitedescriptions or the possibility of conveyinginformation about an object by misdescribingit. I argue, however, that we ought to rejectthis new line of reasoning and rest contentwith a Russellian theory of definitedescriptions.

2009

In this introduction I start by presenting and examining the main positions on the current debate concerning the semantic analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions. As is known, the debate in question has started off with Russell’s proposal (Russell 1905), which has been initially criticized by both Strawson (1950) and Donnellan (1966). Nowadays, waters are divided on this issue: some philosophers, representing the so-called univocality approach (Kripke 1977, Neale 1990), defend Russell’s original analysis, according to which all definite descriptions are

The author defends a combination of Strawson’s account of definite descriptions as devices of singular reference par excellence with the Russellian truth-evaluation of utterances of sentences with descriptions. The complex Russellian proposition is, according to the author’s view, introduced by such utterances into communication as a by-product of the instrumental side of an attempt to make a singular statement. This, precisely like the instrumental aspects of similar attempts exploiting names or demonstratives has to be reflected by analysis but should not be confused with the communicative function of utterances. The success of all these attempts depends on the fulfilment of empirical conditions of various types, given by semantics of descriptions, names or demonstratives (unless the relevance of these conditions is neutralized by another identificatory factor dominating in given context). But their communicative function does not consist in claiming that these conditions are fulfilled. The author agrees with Strawson that the first two conjuncts of the complex Russellian proposition are introduced into communication as presuppositions: but argues in favour of defining presupposition (in pragmatic sense) in normative, rather the intentional terms.

Use, mention, and Russell's theory of descriptions A typical way of identifying an object is by means of properties that uniquely characterize it in a determinate context. The properties used are often simply an aid to identification, for we may have no interest in them aside from helping to identify the object. This is very common. Suppose I want you to bring me my copy of Word and Object from my study. I remember that I left the book on top of the printer, and I say: Bring me the book on top of the printer in my study. I am not interested in the printer, or in the fact that my copy of Word and Object is on it, except insofar as it helps me to identify the book I want you to bring me. I am interested in getting the book, and I am talking about it, and I use the fact that the book is on the printer at that time to identify it for you. Intuitively, there is a reasonably clear distinction between what we are talking about, what we want, what we are interested in, and the means we use to talk about it or to get to it. This distinction is related to the use-mention distinction, but the latter is usually drawn in a very narrow way. We say that to mention an object we can use a name or description of it, but that this name or description is not mentioned, only used. If we want to mention the name or description, or linguistic expression generally, we need some device-quotation marks, for instance-to obtain a name or description of it. This is a rather superficial analysis, however, and the standard story about quotes is not very convincing. 1 What is it that I use, after all, when I say 'the book on top of the printer in my study'? Although I use a linguistic expression, I also use my mouth and my tongue. Why concentrate on the former rather than on the latter? Not because it is a bunch of sounds, or marks, but because it is an expression of something; namely, of a property, or characteristic, or feature of the book at that moment. It is not important whether I write down my instruction or utter it, nor is it important whether I use that specific form of expression; the description 'the book on the printer in my study' would have done just as well. It is not even important whether I use this language or that, so long as we both know it, or whether I use a mixture of language and gestures: 'the book on the printer in there', pointing to my study. What is important is the property expressed: being the book on top of the printer in my study. This is a complex property, involving the relations 'is on top of' and 'is in', the property 'is a book', the printer, my study, and some logical properties and relations. Why not say that I am using those things, as well as the linguistic expression-and my tongue, my mouth, my larynx-to identify or refer to my copy of Word and Object?

Linguistics and Philosophy, 1991

Sag, and Scott Soames for valuable discussion. 1 See Grice (1968, 1975). The Gricean/Kripkean strategy for dealing with referential uses of definite descriptions is defended in detail in Neale (1990) in the context of a general defence of Russell's theory. That work and the present paper borrow from one another here and there in their mutually supporting projects.

2013

PhD Dissertation, 2024

This thesis endeavors to reduce the presuppositions inherent in Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions as presented in "On Denoting" (OD). We conduct a detailed, paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of OD, elucidating the theory's objectives, its contrasting theories, and its merits. Nonetheless, Russell's presentation of the theory introduces complications due to imprecise terminology and occasional divergences from the core analytical focus. This has sparked considerable debate regarding the accurate interpretation of OD's arguments and definitions. Among these debates is the examination of the infamous Gray's Elegy Argument. Our analysis posits that a rephrasing of the argument's verbal expression reveals its validity, which, upon closer inspection, bifurcates into two interconnected arguments. Engaging with this argument illuminates the propositions Russell intends to challenge and uncovers his motivations for developing the Theory of Descriptions, which extend beyond the theory's immediate scope. However, these motivations inadvertently burden the theory with extraneous elements. In our study, we differentiate between presuppositions integral to the theory and those extraneously incorporated into OD. Our aim is to introduce a novel conceptualization of presupposition that is applicable to theoretical constructs holistically. This approach enables us to identify and discard presuppositions that, while present in OD, do not contribute to the core theory. By removing these extraneous presuppositions and reevaluating those that are pertinent but not indispensable, we streamline Russell's Theory of Descriptions, thereby achieving a more concise, focused and invulnerable theoretical framework.

Theoria, 2008