Commentary: Facts, opinions and affaires du coeur

History has produced numerous scientific theories and arguments in favor and in opposition to each theory. Arguably, one of the most notable series of debates between scientific philosophers was the one that existed between Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. This examination of the various theories Kuhn and Popper embraced and denounced will be the focus of this critique. Ultimately, I will reveal the parallel thinking that exists within their perspectives on the importance of the process of scientific discovery by exhibiting both men's intolerance for anything other than what they believed was true science. A Clash Between Two Philosophers: Although Kuhn (1962) and Popper (2002) never agreed on which scientific method was most effective, they both shared similar views that the scientific community, in their aim explain science, too often sought to control and prohibit thinking outside the framework of established scientific methods. They were authentic scientists in their passions for exploring the endless possibilities of reaching the truth in all methods of scientific discovery by refuting the inconsistencies they believed existed in various scientific theories and methods.

Centaurus, 2008

S. Vosniadou, A. Baltas, X. Vamvakoussi (eds.), Reframing the Conceptual Change Approach in Learning and Instruction, 2007

Logical empiricism dominated philosophy of science during the first half of the twentieth century but came under attack during the 1950s. There were two main motivators of this attack: the failure of logical empiricism to solve its own problems, and a major increase in our knowledge of the history of science. The result was an extended attempt, during the last half of the century, to develop a new framework for research in philosophy of science. Although this quest has generally been abandoned, the present paper argues that there are some enduring lessons about science that we should learn from that work. 1954), but a general recognition that something was seriously wrong came only as the decade waned. Then it came with stunning speed. We can note six works with overlapping themes that appeared in a four-year period from several different intellectual backgrounds: , Polanyi (1958), Toulmin (1961, Kuhn (1962), and Putnam (1962). This led to a new body of research and the quest for a new philosophical framework that could replace logical empiricism as a guide to the problems and range of acceptable solutions in philosophy of science. As Gutting has noted (2009, p.151) it is now clear that this quest failed and several issues that were recently at the focus of discussion have largely disappeared from the active literature. Yet it would be unfortunate if this work faded completely from the memory of working philosophers of science because there are some important lessons about science and about of philosophy of science that we should have learned. I am going to describe these lesson from my own perspective as someone who lived and worked through this period. No doubt this attempt will be somewhat idiosyncratic; others will draw different lessons-or no lessons at all-from these endeavors. But, I will argue, the lessons I discuss here are important and should be incorporated into ongoing work. I will begin by focusing on the problem of theory choice-especially on the view that theory evaluation should be determined solely by logic and the evidence. This will lead us to several other issues.

Appraising Lakatos, 2002

Theory choice decisions were the focus of the debate on theory change that dominated philosophy of science in the 1960's and 1970's. Comparative evaluations of competing theoretical approaches were supposed to form at the same time the nucleus of scientific progress and of scientific rationality. A theory choice decision singles out the methodologically most qualified alternative from among a set of rival theories. A sequence of such decisions is supposed to generate a series of theories with increasing methodological virtue; and a series of this kind constitutes scientific progress. Moreover, scientific rationality is tied up with the nature and justification of the criteria brought to bear on theory choice decisions. Rational theory choices are made relying on objective and epistemically significant criteria. The intertwinement of rationality, theory change and theory choice is among the outstanding commitments underlying the entire debate on "theory dynamics"; in particu

European Journal of Clinical Investigation, 2012

2011

In the structure of scientific revolutions hereunder referred to as SSR (1962), Kuhn claimed to have captured correctly how science is practiced. However, his critics such as Shapere (1984) argued that Kuhn’s account is far from being a true account of how science is practiced. Consequently, this led to a philosophical dispute on whether or not Kuhn’s work was a correct interpretation of how science is practiced. In the light of the foregoing debate Kuhn published his The Essential Tension (1977) to defend his position in his earlier book the SSR. In the context of this debate, this article is a philosophical analysis to determine whether or not Kuhn’s SSR is a correct empirical description of how science is practiced.