Bhartṛhari and his Vedic tradition

Explorations in Indian Philosophy, 2020

Philosophy East and West, 1992

Indian philosophy, like Indian culture, seems peculiarly prone to arouse either violent antipathy or fervent enthusiasm. Rarely does it engender an attitude which tries to present and assess it coolly and calmly, without positive or negative emotion. Nothing perhaps stands more in the way of such an attitude than the universally accepted ideas which I wish to explore in this essay. These three ideas are treated as indubitable facts about Indian philosophy. They seem so self-evident to enthusiasts and detractors alike, that to question them is to question the very concept of Indian philosophy as it has been traditionally conceived and presented by almost every writer on the subject. Yet, it seems to me that the time has come to question the traditional picture itself, to raise doubts about the indubitable, to investigate the sacrosanct and the self-evident. Myths have always masqueraded as facts and many a time the emperor's nudity has only been discovered by a child's disingenuity. The self-evident claims about Indian philosophy are legion. First and foremost is the claim to spirituality. Who does not know that Indian philosophy is spiritual? Who has not been told that this is what specifically distinguishes it from western philosophy, and makes it something unique and apart from all the other philosophical traditions of the world? The claim, of course, is never put to the test. In fact, it seems so self-evident as to require no argument or evidence on its behalf. Nobody, neither the serious nor the casual student of the subject, deems it worth questioning. Yet, the moment we begin to doubt the claim

WZKS vol. 21, p. 239-256, 1977

Contents and reviews of PDNRL no. 37, 2013

Yoga tradition: Abhidharma philosophers such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu posed a challenge before classical Sāṅkhya. Accordingly, the soteriology of Sānkhya, based on the abstract metaphysics of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, was reorganized by Patañjali in the light of Buddhist Abhidharma psychology and soteriology. Hence it would be simplistic to periodize Indian philosophy by giving a pivotal role to Diṅnāga. Franco himself is not emphatic about his periodization. He seems to accept the possibility of skepticism and relativism about the question of correct periodization. However, taken to an extreme, such a stand would frustrate any genuine attempt to periodize the history of Indian philosophy (or any history for that matter), which is not desirable. Bronkhorst's article, "Periodization of Indian Ontology" also deals with Indian philosophy as a whole. He accepts the criticism advanced by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz against Frauwallner's periodization. Frauwallner proposed a division of the history of Indian philosophy into two large periods, Āryan and Non-Aryan. While disagreeing with it, Bronkhorst replaces the racial terminology of Aryan and non-Aryan by a more cultural terminology of Vedic and Non-Vedic. He also changes the order such that the period influenced by the Non-Vedic approach precedes the period influenced by Vedicism. He also shows how changes in the philosophical realm were related to changes in the socio-political realm. One could appreciate his claims and suggestions in a broad way. But some of his claims are debatable. For instance, his claim that Mīmāmsā was opposed to Karma and Rebirth (when it is well-known that the Mīmāmsā notion of apūrva supported the idea of karmaphala) and that Lokāyata was a Vedic school. His view that the Vaiśeṣika ontology was influenced by Sarvāstivāda abhidharma is equally an invitation to debate. Claus Oetke's article is the third one which deals with the periodization of Indian philosophy in general. It talks about periodization as well as classification. One of the points the article makes is that it is possible and permissible to classify and periodize Indian philosophical traditions in diverse ways. Now let us turn to the other nine articles, each one of which discusses a particular school. These articles, however, do not discuss the whole period covered by the respective schools. They generally choose a particular period, whether the earlier, the later or the classical. Shujun Motegi's article focuses on the early history of Sāṅkhya thought. He broadly follows Frauwallner's scheme regarding the development of Sāṅkhya thought, though at times he disagrees on details.

Sophia

Transcultural Studies, 2014

The article shows that the concept of ‘Indian Philosophy’ is the joint product of two philosophical cultures. One culture is Western philosophy that feels the need for wisdom. Therefore Indian philosophy is conceived of as ‘mystical’ or ‘spiritual’ philosophy. The other is the Indian nineteenth century culture of reform thinking. Together with Western philologist the Indians highlight the ‘mystical’ or ‘spiritual’ school of Vedanta philosophy as ‘the’ Indian philosophy. Vedanta philosophy as spiritual philosophy distinguished India from the West. It was a political project that functioned within India’s quest for independency. Modern Indian philosophers have been in the process of reconsidering this concept, especially after the appropriation of Western scientific culture.

India’s progressive emergence on the world stage, in terms unimaginable just a few decades ago, obliges us to reconsider its image as nurtured by the West for over two thousand years: a prestigious image maybe, but also greatly reductive, as the privileged home of occult knowledge, ecstasy and asceticism, or – quite the opposite – of fabulous riches and voluptuous pleasures. Rather than getting to know India, the West has preferred to dream of it: one result has been that Indian thought, albeit unanimously celebrated as the seat of the highest wisdom, has not been granted even the smallest place on the great stage of the history of philosophy. This book presents the thought of pre-modern India first and foremost by outlining the cultural parameters within which it arose and developed, and should be read; often associated with religious experience, but also essentially independent of it; sometimes differing in form and outcome, but more often very close to Western thought, and certainly never ‘alien’. *** “This is a marvellous piece of compact insight in all respects: a summary as well as a fresh view of the whole area, always sound and based on first hand experience with the material. I really mean it when I would like to call it the best modern survey of our field at an extraordinary high level of penetration.” Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, University of Vienna - Austrian Academy of Sciences.