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2019, Journal of Democracy
On 8 May 2019, nearly twenty-five years to the day after Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as South Africa's first democratically elected president, the country went to the polls in its sixth round of national elections. Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) had won by comfortable margins in every previous election, all peaceful, "free and fair" contests administered by the country's well-regarded electoral commission. Much of the skepticism about the quality of South Africa's democracy has centered on the ease with which the ANC wins elections. With the majority of voters committed to the ANC, the essence of democracy as described by Joseph Schumpeter-elite competition for voter support-seems to be lacking. And South Africans seem to be in no rush to pass Samuel Huntington's two-turnover test of democratic consolidation. At first glance, the run-up to the 2019 election looked like more of the same. The ANC's presidential candidate, Cyril Ramaphosa (b. 1952), campaigned on the lofty promise of bringing a "new dawn" that would reinfuse the country with Mandela's values. He had the pedigree to make this promise credible. In the early 1980s, at the height of the apartheid policies that had institutionalized a pervasive system of racial discrimination, Ramaphosa founded and led the National Union of Mineworkers, the country's largest trade union. Between 1991 and 1996, he served as secretary-general of the ANC, which made its own transition from banned resistance movement to dominant political party. He played a central role in the political negotiations that brought South Africa out of apartheid, and he was a key architect of the country's progressive, democratic 1996 Constitution. Ramaphosa was reportedly Mandela's personal choice as presidential successor when the widely re
The Round Table, 2019
to those with only a limited knowledge of Gambian politics who are seeking a more detailed and more analytical explanation of Barrow's shock victory.
2021
This third edition of Anthony Butler's biography of Cyril Ramaphosa was published after Ramaphosa became president of South Africa in February 2018. Subsequently, in the National Elections of May 2019, he received a popular mandate in support of his efforts to return South Africa to economic stability and growth following the erratic and kleptocratic years of Jacob Zuma, and he remains the most popular and trusted politician in South Africa today. Even before his ascent to the presidency, Ramaphosa was a fascinating subject for a biography; his latest incarnation as president gives this well-researched and highly readable biography added relevance. In 2007, Ramaphosa was more famous in South Africa as one of the wealthiest black businessmen in the country than as a politician. Against this background, the first edition of this biography ended with two unanswered questions about his pursuit of the presidency: "Is Ramaphosa up to the job? And does he want it?" (380) If the first remains an open question, Butler seeks to answer the second in the current edition. Based on the new information available to him, he argues that Ramaphosa's desire to capture the top job was clear by 2010. According to the publishers' blurb, this new edition of Cyril Ramaphosa: The Road to Presidential Power is "fully revised and extended." This is not quite accurate. Five of the original six parts-that is, the first twenty chapters dealing with Ramaphosa's origins, upbringing, and career up to 2007remain essentially as published in the first edition. The major revisions and additions come in the final section, Part Six, where five chapters are added, bringing the total number of chapters from 22 to 27. These chapters pick up the story from the Polokwane Conference where Mbeki was replaced by Zuma as ANC president in December 2007, through the Zuma years, to the end of Ramaphosa's first year as state president in 2019. Many of the insights into Ramaphosa's character and career in this book are drawn from an extensive list of interviewees, almost all of whom knew him and interacted with him at critical moments. About fifteen names are added
The African National Congress (ANC) narrowly avoided a damaging split at the recently concluded 54 th national conference. South Africa is, however, firmly in a " muddling along " scenario. The result of the elections for the 86 elected members of the National Executive Committee (NEC) led by newly elected ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa reflects an organization that went into the conference sharply divided and it will take time for these divisions to subside. The recall of Jacob Zuma is one of the key decisions now confronting the NEC. The longer Zuma stays in power the better the opposition parties will do during the national and provincial elections in 2019. However, in spite of the narrow victory of Ramaphosa, Zuma and his incoherent, large cabinet may be recalled sooner rather than later to avoid a further downgrade of South Africa's long-term local currency debt ratings. Since Ramaphosa currently serves as deputy president of South Africa and therefore is a member of cabinet the problems associated with two centers of power (between Luthuli House and the Union Buildings) in the period leading up to national and provincial elections in 2019 are manageable. However, Zuma's announcement on fee-free education only hours before the start of the 54 th Conference clearly demonstrates the potential damage that he could wreak in the months that lie ahead, particularly given his stated intention to press ahead with a hugely expensive and superfluous nuclear energy deal. The question is how rapidly the NEC will unite behind Ramaphosa to recall him. Based on the forecasts presented in Fate of the Nation it seems likely that the ANC will retain its status as governing party during the 2019 elections, with around 53% of the vote, down from 62% in 2014. Such an outcome will avert the need for a coalition at national level. The ANC could however, lose its majority in the critically important Gauteng province. Only a coalition between the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) would be able to put together a governing opposition alliance in Gauteng – a difficult and unlikely partnership given the ideological distance between these two parties. This analysis effectively makes the EFF a potential 2019 kingmaker in Gauteng. The Western Cape, the only province currently governed by an opposition party (the Democratic Alliance), will retain that status and ANC support in rural provinces will remain firm, particularly given the focus on transition of land to rural communities as announced during the conference. The win by Ramaphosa has averted a major crisis for the ANC and it may yet retain Gauteng province (in alliance with others), but it is not going to be an easy ride. The ANC will, however, eventually emerge significantly more united than at present and the outcome may save the Tripartite Alliance that includes the South African Communist Party and labour union COSATU from disbandment. In terms of its foreign relations South Africa has its work cut out to rebuild the respect and trust of others. Generally, values such as democracy, human rights and good governance have found limited expression in foreign policy under Mbeki and Zuma (the Mandela era was an aberration), and it is unlikely that this will change under a Ramaphosa government although there may be some tonal adaptation. In addition, absent structural reform in the military, South Africa's ability to contribute to peacekeeping will continue its steady decline.
State of the Nation Address (SONA) 2018 was a breath of fresh air in so many ways. In the first place, the newly elected President of the ruling party, African National Congress (ANC), and of the Republic of South Africa, Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa, “is a Constitutionalist”, to quote, Roelf Meyer, who, as a National Party representative, together with Ramaphosa – representing the ANC – in the early 1990s, were at the heart of the drafting of the current Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). Being a Constitutionalist, “We the people of South Africa”, reads the preamble of our Constitution, have the convictions that President Ramaphosa will defend our constitution with his life, and if needs be, with his billions and buffaloes! Secondly, the ascension of Ramaphosa to both the presidency of the ANC and country, South Africa, has exciting relevance for Social Cohesion. It is this idea of social cohesion that I would like to base this encouraging beginning of another dawn, The Ramaphosa Presidency.
Alternation: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of the Arts and Humanities in Southern Africa
Cyril Ramaphosa was sworn in as South Africa's President in February 2018 after the late-night resignation of Jacob Zuma. His ascendency came in the wake of a bruising battle with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma that saw him become head of the African National Congress (ANC) by the narrowest of margins. Ramaphosa promised a new dawn that would sweep aside the allegations of the looting of state resources under the Zuma Presidency and restore faith in the criminal justice system. This article firstly looks at the impact that the Zuma presidency has had on South African politics against the backdrop of the Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki years. The article then focuses on Ramaphosa's coming to power and what this holds for pushing back corruption and addressing the seemingly intractable economic challenges. In this context, I use Gramsci's ideas of the war of manoeuvre and war of position to provide an understanding of the limits and possibilities of the Ramaphosa presidency. The analysis presented is a conjunctural analysis that as Gramsci points out focusses on 'political criticism of a day-today character, which has as its subject top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities' as opposed to organic developments that lend itself to an understanding of durable dilemmas and 'give rise to socio-historical criticism, whose subject is wider social groupingsbeyond the public figures and beyond the top leaders' (quoted in Morton 1997: 181).
Politikon, 2019
Political Science research on the President's role in South African politics has been limited and therefore poses a research challenge. In this article, the President's election by the National Assembly is linked to a number of factors. The legislative electoral system has a direct impact on it; also, South Africa's government is a hybrid, presidential/parliamentary system; and political party electoral procedures are followed to elect party leaders. The presidential electoral system has several implications for legislative-executive relations, including presidential accountability, approval of the Presidency's budget by Parliament, and Parliament's power to remove the President from office. Special attention is paid to the 2019 party campaigns, to the extent of their coexistence with presidential campaigns, and to the parliamentary electoral procedure. Conclusions identify the implications of the fact that the President's election is primarily determined by the power balance between the main political parties. Especially since 2007, it is also determined by internal party dynamics.
South Africans voted in their country's fourth democratic general election on 22 April 2009. The African National Congress (ANC) again secured a substantial victory. It might seem that the 2009 Elections proved to be "business as usual". Yet such a conclusion is unjustified, for events had conspired to generate excitement about this particular contest, which rivalled that leading up to the "liberation election" of 1994. The reasons for this were several, but the most important revolved around Jacob Zuma, who had risen to the presidency of the ANC in December 2007, and the formation of a new party of opposition, the Congress of the People (COPE), by dissidents from within the ANC. In the elections, however, the ANC reasserted its dominance. Even so, the results of the 2009 election at national and provincial level indicate change. The ANC has maintained its electoral dominance, yet its grip on the electorate has been somewhat weakened, while the opposition -although remaining very much in the minority -has consolidated.
Representation, 2009
It is common cause that the rise of Jacob Zuma in South African politics signals change; what is contested is the nature and extent of that change. For example, Zuma's champions in the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Communist Party (SACP) describe his rise as a victory over the authoritarian Thabo Mbeki and his neo-liberal '1996 class project' (Craven 2008). Many detractors, including some on the political left as well as the right, see Zuma as heralding an African populism which shields patronage behind popular bigotry.
1994
As the Senior Program Officer for the John D. and catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Prexy Nesbitt, a Chicago-based anti-apartheid activist and educator, wrote this piece covering the 1994 general election in South Africa, the first of which was held with universal adult suffrage
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1994
"NELSON MANDELA: VRIJHEID TEN DIENSTE VAN DEMOCRATIE" in "Als Gist in Het Deeg.", 2011
Critical African Studies, 2018
This article is a critical reflection on Nelson Mandela's changing idea of South Africa as reflected in his widely known autobiography Long Walk to Freedom. It seeks to understand how he worked towards laying down a profound post-racial humanism based on a broader inclusive South African nationalism that transcended the narrow and exclusionist racial apartheid idea of South Africa. His autobiography is intertwined inextricably with the complex and ever-changing idea of South Africa. The formation of Mandela's political consciousness from that of a rural Thembu boy in Eastern Cape, to an urban nationalist firebrand in Johannesburg, a prisoner of conscience at Robben Island, a pragmatist and voice of reason during the Convention for South Africa Democracy (CODESA) negotiations, and right up to his one-term presidency (1994-1999) reflects the life of an active politician and an embodiment of the contested idea of South Africa. While Mandela never stopped seeking to understand the complex aspects of the contested idea of South Africa, his idea was also influenced by instances of mass action, the influence of friends, work and political colleagues, the ANC and his experiences during the 27 years of his imprisonment. Therefore, if his life of struggle embodied the complex and ever-changing idea of South Africa, it is not surprising that his political actions are blamed as the source of the present crisis engulfing the country. However, this article posits that South Africans who remained stuck in racial adversarial politics failed Mandela in his decolonial endeavour to set afoot a new humanism. Based on a platform that radically transcended the colonial/apartheid paradigm of difference, Mandela's vision depended on a successful metamorphosis of the erstwhile 'white/black' dichotomy as an essential prerequisite for the rebirth of a new political community.
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 2020
Journal of African Elections, 2020
The outcome of the 2016 local government elections in which the ANC lost substantial support, fuelled early speculation on not only the outcome of the 2019 general elections, but also on the factors which were likely to determine party support. Added to this was the deteriorating political and socio-economic situation in South Africa. Against this background, two national surveys were undertaken in October/November 2017 and October/ November 2018 to establish the factors at these particular times that were likely to influence the vote choice of South Africans. From both surveys it was found that South African voters increasingly base their choice of a party on rational considerations. Trust in the president was a particularly important predictor of voter choice. In the first survey, loss of trust in the president (Zuma) resulted in a loss of faith in the ANC and in support of the party; while in the second survey, the converse was true: an increase in trust in the president (Ramapho...
2004
April 1994 was a time of liberation and desperation in Africa. While Rwanda degenerated into genocidal slaughter, millions of South Africans celebrated freedom as they elected a democratic government to end apartheid. Ten years later, as the world quietly memorialized the ten year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, South Africans launched a month-long celebration to commemorate ten years of democracy. The highlight of the celebration was the staging of the country's third democratic national and provincial elections on 14 April, followed by the inauguration of the president on 27 April, Freedom Day, in a 90-million Rand fete at the Union buildings in Pretoria.[2] Once again, the continent witnessed two extremes in the month of April: reflection and contemplation in Rwanda, contrasted against exuberant celebration in South Africa. The outcome of these elections was never in doubt: all knew that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) would retain its position and remain the head of government. The questions on the minds of South Africans were how great would be the ANC's margin of victory and whether the opposition parties would fragment or coalesce around a few, allied parties. By the evening of 15 April, the answer to these questions became apparent: the ANC was heading to win over twothirds of the votes cast, while the opposition remained as fragmented as it had become in the 1999 elections. In the end, the ANC won 279 out of 400 seats in the lower house of Parliament (the National Assembly-NA), and the power to form the government in all nine provincial governments. The opposition did not band together behind a few large parties and returned to parliament with thirteen parties sharing just 121 seats. The former ruling party, the National Party (now the New National Party, or NNP), experienced a devastating defeat as it saw its national support decline to less than two percent, winning seats in only two of the provincial legislatures. What were the major events in the electoral process, how did various parties fare, and what do the results of these elections mean for the future of South Africa? How should we interpret the increasingly dominant position of the ANC, and the escalating fragmentation of the opposition? What comes next? As South Africa enters its second decade of democracy, this article represents a preliminary assessment of the 2004 electoral results, tracing major trends since 1994. Administering Elections The 1994 elections exhibited a duality common to political transitions: the period was filled with the spirit of hope and renewal, but within a climate of insecurity and political intimidation. Politically-related violence spiked the year before the elections, with a large number of political assassinations, internecine violence between supporters of rival political parties, and fears that
Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (1918—2013), African nationalist and first black president of South Africa (1994–99). His negotiations in the with Afrikaner Pres. F.W. de Klerk helped end the country’s apartheid system of racial segregation, avoided civil war and white flight, and ushered in a peaceful transition to democratic majority rule and free market economics. Mandela and de Klerk were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1993 for their efforts.
Politikon South African Journal of Political Studies, 2024
The numbing accounts of HIV/AIDS ravages in Chapter 7 of the book succeed the other public health-related fiasco involving mental patients who were made heartlessly to perish during the much-publicised Life Esidimeni government move, that came to public light under the Zuma- Ramaphosa administration. The author’s technique not to submerge the reader in unmitigated gloom is realised through the light-hearted content of Chapter 8 on Mandela’s era. Only then does Makgoba devote the next chapter to infamies of lingering economic and social devastation visited the then young South African democracy by the Zuma oligarchic corruption, including his state capture legacy.
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