Democratic Oversight of the Police

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research

In a democratic governance environment the civilian oversight is particularly important in relation to the police, given their significant power over the daily lives of citizens. The police exist to protect the fundamental freedoms of citizens; their powers also provide the potential for severe abuse of these freedoms. Oversight mechanisms provide an important way in which policing becomes more directly responsive to citizens. Given the significant power which the police hold over citizens, the governance of police in the United Kingdom has in place, systems of civilian oversight of policing which complement the democratic structure of governance in the country. The Civilian oversight mechanisms in the UK target two major dimensions of police accountability that is -the individual accountability and the organizational accountability. The individual accountability mechanisms are concerned with the complaints and misconducts of individual police officers which are addressed through the civilian oversight mechanisms of the investigation of such complaints and misconducts through agencies which are independent of the police. The civilian oversight functions of the organizational accountability of the police services is also well developed in the UK through legislatively constructed and democratically and professionally constituted independent bodies which monitor police performance and review and audit police output in respect of public expectations and professional competencies. This paper intends to present the case of UK as a best practice from which many inferences and inspirations could be drawn for consideration of policy norms for Democratic accountability mechanism for the specific needs of Indian Policing within the overall context of Indian Democracy.

Journal of European Public …, 2011

2013

The publication reviews the policies and institutional mechanisms for countering police corruption in several EU member states. To be effective, anti-corruption efforts should be based on a system of independent and mutually accountable institutions which are sufficiently empowered to implement their objectives. This report emphasises the last two decades of experience in the UK, Belgium and Austria in modernising their anti-corruption policies and institutions. In addition to the institutional and legal framework, concrete measures and methods (risk assessment, integrity tests, etc.) are also examined. The Bulgarian and Romanian experience in countering corruption in law enforcement institutions is also reviewed with an emphasis on some of the main problems and gaps that undermine effective counter measures.

2016

In the course of last two decades some European countries have created independent police complaints bodies with investigative powers, which were originally established in Canada and Australia. The creation of these bodies is in line with the independent investigation standards which have been determined by the European Court of Human Rights in its extensive body of case law as well as by the Commissioner for Human Rights in his Opinion concerning Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints against the Police. This article argues that the reluctance of many European states to comply with the specific independent investigation standards is a consequence of inconsistent and insufficiently clear case law of the European Court of Human Rights as well as of the incomplete wording of the Commissioner’s Opinion when it comes to the investigation of human rights violations which are allegedly attributable to police activities.

Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 2013

This article summarises some of the thinking and empirical findings behind a programme of survey work on procedural justice theory in Europe. The paper locates procedural justice theory in a framework of compliance theories and sketches out the main features of it, defining the central concept of legitimacy. It then presents findings from the fifth European Social Survey, drawing on a ‘trust in justice’ module which was designed by the authors and colleagues. This provides good support for the procedural justice hypotheses that we set out to test – that different types of public trust in the police (trust that they are effective, procedurally fair and distributively fair) are related to public perceptions of police legitimacy, which in turn are related to self-reported compliance with the law and preparedness to cooperate with the police.

As the primary agency for law enforcement, the police operates at close proximity to the public and exerts significant influence over the security of individuals and communities through its behaviours and performance. Therefore, ensuring accountability of both the individuals and institutions of the police is a fundamental condition for good governance of the security sector in democratic societies. The parliament, as the highest representative body in a democratic system, plays a significant role in maintaining police accountability. The objective of the edited volume on “The Role of Parliament in Police Governance: Lessons Learned from Asia and Europe” is to put forward good practices and recommendations for improving police accountability, with an emphasis on the strengthening of the role of parliament in police governance. The comparative analysis includes insights and lessons learned from eight country case studies including Belgium, Germany, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. The findings of the cases studies can be taken into account when analysing and considering options for improving the accountability of the police to parliament as well as strengthening independent oversight bodies and parliament-police liaison mechanisms. However, it must be emphasised that these good practices always need to be adapted to the exigencies of the local context.

The Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group for Europol (JPSG) will meet for the first time in Brussels in the autumn of 2017. Its creation was agreed by the EU Speakers Conference (the Presidents of the EU's national parliaments and the European Parliament) in April 2017. With this decision, the idea of a body to ensure parliamentary scrutiny of the European Police Office (Europol) finally manifests itself in the JPSG. In the emerging Security Union that the EU seeks to create, also in reaction to recent terror attacks, the responsible actors at the EU level must be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. According to Article 51 of the new Europol Regulation No. 2016/794, the JPSG will play an essential role to " politically monitor Europol's activities in fulfilling its mission, including as regards the impact of those activities on the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons. " In its first part, the Policy Paper examines the political difficulties to move forward with respect to intentions and provisions for enhancing the parliamentary scrutiny over Europol. The in-depth analysis of the positions of national parliaments and EU institutions is based on reports, resolutions, publicly available minutes and amendments to draft conclusions as well as other texts. This paper evaluates the agreement on the JPSG for Europol as promising. The second part of the Policy Paper presents concrete proposals in order to make the JPSG work efficiently: The JPSG should complement the existing scrutiny of Europol by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in the European Parliament and it should adopt ambitious Rules of Procedure at its first meeting in order to clarify and fix its internal functioning. The new body could subsequently become a blueprint for interparliamentary scrutiny in the EU.

ABSTRACT This article provides the reader with a literature review with the aim of finding out about the origin and system of police accountability in England and Wales. It is hoped that the article will help to identify some important conceptual considerations that ought to betaken into account by any professional and responsible police departments seeking to embrace accountability in its policing procedures. This article explores the sensitive issue of police accountability to civilian oversight bodies in controlling police excesses. At the centre of the discourse lies the tacit acknowledgement that the enormous power and authority invested in the police does lead to corruption and excesses unless adequate checks and balances are installed. Keywords: Police Accountability, Police Ethics, Police Integrity, Policing the Police, Civilian oversight bodies of Police.