A Social-Cognitive Approach to the Moral Personality
Darcia Narvaez
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Abstract
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This work explores a social-cognitive approach to understanding moral personality, emphasizing the role of schema activation and knowledge accessibility in shaping moral behavior. By integrating principles from moral psychology with social cognitive science, the authors highlight the importance of individual differences and developmental grounding in moral functioning. The conclusion discusses the potential for a richer, more productive research program that acknowledges the complexities and challenges inherent in studying moral character.
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